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BOMBAY BRANCH
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A

GENERAL ESSAY ON TACTICS.

WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE,

UPON THE

PRESENT STATE OF POLITICS,

AND THE

MILITARY SCIENCE IN EUROPE.

106454

To which is Prefixed,

A PLAN OF A WORK,

ENTITLED,

The POLITICAL AND MILITARY SYSTEM OF FRANCE.

TRANSLATED from the FRENCH of

M. GUIBERT.

By an OFFICER.

VOL. II.

Hæ tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, & debellare superbos.

VIRGIL.

LONDON:

Printed for J. MILLAN, opposite the Admiralty, Whitehall.

M DCC LXXXI.

00106454

GENERAL ESSAY

ON

TACTICS.

SECOND PART,

GREAT TACTICS.

PREFACE.

IN the preceding part of this Work, the Author has endeavoured to define thoſe principles on which the different corps of an army ſhould be formed and conſtituted; in this part the ſcene opens to a more extenſive field. The queſtion is now, how to combine theſe corps, how to accord and adopt them to all great manœuvres in war. The ſcientific method of diſplaying the execution of theſe principles, to combine them, to direct them, is called the *Great Tactics*. Great Tactics are properly confined to the knowledge of Generals, they being the reſult and combination of all military information. The meaning of the word General, is a man poſ-

ſeſſing theſe eminent qualities, a man well informed in all military departments, a man capable to conduct them in one diſtinct branch, or the whole reunited. What comprehenſive words are thoſe of *General* and *Army*, and even allowing for the very trivial ſtudy dedicated to them, what an immenſity of ideas they preſent to the imagination!

SNATCH the pen from the hands of the philoſopher, who preſumes to regulate the duties of a man, who preſumes to balance his prejudices to determine his opinions. Was he a virtuous man, he ſhould tremble for the conſequences which his work may produce: he ſhould foreſee; how frequently he would be conveying ſophiſms in the place of ignorance, fatal truths in the place of uſeful errors. But the Author of this Work writes on an art he is trained to, on an unfortunate art, on an art that is become neceſſary and important to bring to perfection; imagination does not guide his pen, nor does he invent new ſyſtems, the recent only he examines; thoſe materials which he has ſtudied, he arranges; and he conceives himſelf capable of demonſtrating thoſe principles of the great Tactics, in the ſame manner as he has already demonſtrated thoſe of the elementary. Every man has an equal right of publiſhing his reflections on the art he is cultivating, and ſuch is the advantage of

arts

arts and ſciences, their progreſs increaſes from their diſcuſſion, and even from their errors; while in reſpect to morality, metaphyſics, and all thoſe ſciences where opinion is prevalent, writings only contribute to ſpread a greater miſt of doubt and ignorance.

THUS as the elementary ſyſtem of Tactics is centered in manœuvring of a regiment, relative to all circumſtances of war, ſo the great ſyſtem of Tactics is annexed to all occaſions which an army is ſuppoſed to be capable of manœuvring in.

THIS Eſſay being only a ſketch of a work more compleat and didactical, the detail and method of its principles will not be entered on. The Author only requeſts, that thoſe who favour his Work with a peruſal, will firſt give themſelves the trouble to read carefully over his firſt part before they enter on the ſecond; the former ſerving for a baſis to the latter, and it being his moſt zealous endeavour to avoid as much as poſſible all repetitions.

THE movements of an army are ſuppoſed to be compriſed in theſe terms. *To march, or to fight*, for which reaſon thoſe principles, whereon is founded the theory of marches, and of forming

in battle will be firſt treated of; this Theory, ſyſtematically deduced, the different arms will be united, an army formed, and this army found to execute all combinations of marches and battle. To be more clear, after having eſtabliſhed the great and principal rules of the theory, the practical will be developed by drawing out a plan in form of a journal of a camp of inſtruction, which will be received as a School for the great Tactics, and for all thoſe operations having any relation to a war of campaign.

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EXPLANATION

OF THE

PLATES

OF THE

SECOND PART.

GREAT TACTICS.

PLATE I. OPENINGS made for a front March.

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XII.

EXPLANATION *of* PLATES.

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XV. Order of a flank March, with an Order of Battle made in front, after the unexpected Circumſtance of the Enemy's Arrival at the Head of the March.

ERRATA.

Page 4, Line 5, *for* deſpical, *read* deſpicable.
14, —— 18, *for* B, *read* B, Plate I.
22, —— 27, *for* plane, *r.* plain.
26, —— 1, *for* parck, *r.* park.—And wherever the miſtake occurs.
108, —— 25, *for* care, *r.* ſenſe.
112, —— 1, *for* ſciences of fortifications, *r.* ſcience of fortification.
117, —— 34, *for* ſyſmetrically, *r.* ſyſtematically.
118, —— 18, *for* éclite, *r.* élite.
152, —— 29, *for* Pompy, *r.* Pompey.
167, —— 15, *for* Dumaeries, *r.* Dumouriés.

GENERAL ESSAY ON TACTICS.

CHAP. I.

MARCH OF ARMIES.

BY the marches of an army, is underſtood all movements an army executes; which conceived under this extenſive point of ſight, becomes one of the moſt important branches of military ſcience; by marches an army is actuated, and tranſported from its various poſitions, invading or covering the greateſt extent of country; marches when well executed ſurprize an enemy; counteracting its deſigns in its moſt intereſting ſituations; by marches all orders of battle and offenſive diſpoſitions are formed.

As the ſcience of war improves, in proportion to armies being commanded by well-informed Generals, ſo increaſes the importance of well-combined and executed marches; in this caſe they will be found to be more frequent and deciſive. More frequent, becauſe a man of genius can ſeldom remain inactive; his ideas perceiving more objects, embracing more extenſive combinations, and conſequently where the inferior General dreams only on the defence of his poſition, or on an impoſſibility of manœuvring, there will preſent to the imagination of the former an advantageous movement, which the rapidity of his mind will carry into execution. More deciſive, by reaſon in this caſe of his having in view a diſtant or neighbouring object; ſuch as making a diverſion, or conveying the ſeat of war to an unexpected quarter; to lead to an offenſive

action, or to engage the enemy in a counter-movement, which lays itſelf open to an attack on part or whole of its poſition. More important to be ſuperiorly combined and executed, becauſe their ſucceſs is depending as well on the whole as on the detail of that combination and execution; becauſe faults in their combination or execution, whether general, whether only interior, may be ſkilfully taken advantage of by the enemy, defeat that ſucceſs, and expoſe the army to a favourable attack.

Several examples will be produced to prove the truth of what has been aſſerted, and how in a contrary ſenſe, marches in a bad conſtituted army, and under ignorant Generals, ſcarce merit the name of military operations.

Thoſe facts in military hiſtory which are leſs doubtful are to be found amongſt the ancients; till the middle of the ſecond punic war, the Romans knew nothing of the ſcience of marches, or to be more particular *manœuvring marches*, a term which is adopted to expreſs this obſervation in a fuller ſenſe. Rome diſpatched armies, marching in one column to meet the enemy, and following the neareſt road which led to it: the enemy did the ſame: both armies met, formed in battle, began the attack, or were encamped oppoſite to each other: in which ſituation for ſome days, they were mutually harraſſed; each ſought an opportunity of drawing its adverſary into a diſadvantageous field of battle between the camps: at laſt the battle commenced; the conqueror laid ſiege to the capital, or ſome principal town: no poſſibility of taking it, the country was laid waſte, and the army retreated: the enſuing year both armies were aſſembled afreſh, to commence the ſame kind of hoſtilities. Such were the wars of the Romans againſt the Samnites, the Fidinates, the Volſcians and all the people of Latium. Such were thoſe of all the ſmall ſtates of Greece, over which, in reſpect to military events, hiſtory has too much ſpread the famed and marvellous.

The Romans only began in the punic wars, to fight their battles with more order and ſcience. Amilcar, father

of

of Annibal, was the firſt General, who thought of order in his marches, of dividing his army and beginning its movement on ſeveral columns; ſo that its march might be made more expeditiouſly, and its order of battle ſooner formed. Annibal improved what the imagination of his father had brought to light; and theſe were thoſe formidable foes who, by continuing their ſucceſs over the Romans, taught them the ſcience of marches, in the ſame manner as Pyrrhus, by his conqueſts taught them how to encamp, to intrench, and to improve their military regulation. Why is Fabius ſo juſtly called the *buckler of the Romans*, was it not for that campaign of marches and manœuvres he oppoſed to Annibal; a kind of war, which appeared ſo new to him, that although he ſaved his country, he ſtill condemned the ſublime defence he was ignorant of?

Approaching nearer to the preſent æra, we ſhall find armies began to ſtudy a combination in their marches, in proportion as the art of war improved. It will be found from what has already been advanced, Generals have always adopted a war of manœuvres and marches in proportion to their abilities, and, of their having to oppoſe a ſkilful and well diſciplined enemy. Till the epocha of Guſtavus Adolphus and Naſſau, who were the reſtorers of military ſcience in Europe, armies were brought together without movements or combined marches: perhaps more actions of perſonal bravery, more feats of heroiſm were diſcovered; but there were no plans of campaign, no views, no projects formed on different ſituations. See the wars between England and France; thoſe of Charles V. and Francis I. two princes who at that time were the moſt powerful in Europe and having the moſt ſelect troops: ſee the battles of Bovines, Potiers, Creſcy, Agincourt, thoſe of the Cruſades, how armies at that time were put in motion; how they fought; how they formed their diſpoſitions of marches; they will be found to be made on one column, and armies in three diviſions; the front called *van-guard*, centre, *corps of action*, rear, *rear guard*. When they formed in battle, a day was not ſufficient to

unfold this complicated body, or to form a diſpoſition for action. Frequently the van-guard compoſed of archers and the forlorn hope began the battle, while the gendarmery and the nobility advanced to ſuſtain them: the deſpicable infantry of the commons advanced afterwards, or rather advanced after the battle to fly or to plunder. Such are nearly at this day, the diſpoſition of the Ottoman armies, happily remaining for Europe in their priſtine ignorance.

Under Guſtavus and Naſſau, marches grew more ſcientific; their conſequence was more attended to: Guſtavus executed ſome on ſeveral columns; his hiſtory diſcovers the order and precaution he recommended to his troops. The Duke of Rohan, in his Complete Captain, likewiſe recommends them to be executed on ſeveral columns, to render, as he ſays, the movements leſs fatiguing and more expeditious. This increaſe of columns, was then by no means ſo neceſſary, as at this day; armies being more numerous, and their line leſs deep, their front is more extended. But theſe interior details, or the mechaniſm of marches made no great progreſs; what is moſt to be ſtudied and remarked in the conduct of Guſtavus, and other great Generals of his age, is the conducting of their campaigns, the boldneſs of their expeditions, the great execution they knew how to draw from their ſmall armies, the ſublimity of their projects, the rapid progreſs of their war from one quarter to another; this new ſtile of war conſiſting more in movements and ſcience than in actions, muſt juſtly be attributed to their invention; Guſtavus and his Generals after his death, ſupporting themſelves in Germany with an handful of men, recalls to mind Annibal in the centre of Italy.

Approaching nearer to our time, we find Montecuculli and Turenne, the laſt two great men who were at the head of troops, preferring the command of ſmall armies. Their method of making war, was the ſame as the foregoing part treats of. The famous campaign which terminated the life of one, and the military career of the other, was carried on in marches and coun-

ter-

ter-marches, the two armies continually manœuvring, watching each others motions, always prepared to engage; and this in a ſpace of thirty or forty miles in length, on twelve or twenty in breadth, in an incloſed and rugged country, where middling Generals would not fail of rendering it a war of poſitions.

In the courſe of this work we ſhall have occaſion to return, to the great difference of a defence of poſitions and defence of movements. Marches are now the object of this preſent examination.

After the death of Turenne, no longer ſmall armies ſignalized themſelves, by great operations. Louis XIV. ambitious of invading ſeveral countries at one blow, conceived an idea which he had thought of in a private campaign in his war againſt the Dutch, of forming his army in ſeveral corps; from that time the augmentation began, and all European powers emulous of each other's military force raiſed armies more numerous. Artillery increaſed in proportion. Equipage and ſubſiſtence the ſame. As this ſudden increaſe of men and embarraſſments ſprung up, ſo it was neceſſary for a progreſs to be made in the Tactics; and more particularly in reſpect to marches. But this was not the caſe: Generals with inferior abilities commanded great forces; the face of war varied its aſpect; or rather ignorance of putting their troops in motion, owing to their incapacity, and being for the moſt part of their time occupied in army ſubſiſtance, marches were little practiſed, offenſive movements leſs attempted: in their room they introduced a war of poſitions. If they found themſelves inferior, they ſecured themſelves within their lines or in their intrenched camps: no ſpirited action was attempted, nothing deciſive effected: in ſhort, the great ſcale of war became ſubordinate to torpid and embarraſſed movements.

If among ſo many generals, who have commanded the armies of France, there have been thoſe who were more ſucceſsful in their meaſures, that ſucceſs muſt be attributed to a tendency in their conduct to the antient principles. Vendome ſecured the crown to Philip V. by his daring and rapid marches. France was ſaved by

an offenſive march at Denain. Crequi acquired immortal fame by his campaign of marches and manœuvres on the Sarre and Moſelle. Marſhal Luxembourg, a General of Louis XIV, knew beſt how to put a great army in motion; by reflecting on his campaigns, and reading his diſpatches, the military will ſee how much he thought marches to be of the greateſt import, and how much he was indebted to them. Marſhal Puiſegar, when quarter-maſter-general of Marſhal Luxembourg's army, firſt ſketched out the plan of the greateſt part of thoſe combinations, which he ſince digeſted in his Treatiſe on the Art of War. The Marſhal's theory is very imperfect and complicated, but in that age it was not without merit: it was the means of conveying ſome information in the midſt of ignorance. It would have been fortunate had it even appeared earlier and been ſtudied by the military: in ſhort, his work was the firſt that was ever reduced to principles of the great Tactics. Uninformed people eſteem it a maſter-piece, more enlightened underſtandings, of the military, diſcover many errors in the midſt of a ſmall number of truths: they perceived the Marſhal had not attained his point; that our Tactic was defective; that it ſtood in need of being new modelled by ſome man of parts and genius. Marſhal Saxe had the abilities of making this change, which he poſſibly might have done had he lived longer, and annexed to his extraordinary military capacity, a greater zeal for buſineſs; the Marſhal knew the neceſſity of this change, which he frequently repeated: he wrote in 1750 to M. d'Argenſon, that all troops in Europe, except the Pruſſians, who were acquiring ſome military light, were badly conſtituted, and incapable of executing any great manœuvres. He repeats it in his reveries: where is ſeen his indignation at the ſlowneſs of our marches, our ignorance, our want of ſkill in forming in battle. This ſubject originated his ſaying that, *the whole myſtery of warlike operations was centered in the legs.* This expreſſion has been cited in ſome prior paſſage, which though apparently obſcure, contains a juſt and extenſive meaning.

This

This defect, perceived in the conſtitution of our troops, in the theory of our marches, in our orders of battle, was likewiſe perceived by Marſhal Broglio when he commanded the army. Conſequently he eſtabliſhed a new order, he divided this order into ſeveral diviſions. From this organization, many not knowing to what it tended, more celerity in marches, leſs fatigue for troops, more diſcipline in camps, were ſeen reſulting from it; but the Marſhal had no time to finiſh this work; beſides in two campaigns, and in the tumult of warlike operations, there is no poſſibility of changing the Tactic of an army, and of forming general officers; eſpecially in France ſuch a reſolution is not eaſily made; there is but a man, at once King and General, who could execute ſuch a great ſcale of things.

Pruſſia boaſts of one of this kind, and this was the reaſon why it was enabled to ſtruggle with the league which threatened it. Thoſe truths at that time diſcovered, without any deciſive ſteps made towards them, were ſeen by the King of Pruſſia on his aſcending the throne, for which reaſon he profited of the peace to inſtruct his troops; they were the beſt appointed and manœuvring of any in Europe; they had a particular Tactic of marches and movements. This army was the only one, which had general officers, who knew how to conduct a column, exerciſe troops, and concur to the execution of an order of battle: the reſult of this has been ſeen. His army was the only one that executed any great and enterprizing movement. He has been ſeen at the head of this army, flying from the Elbe to Sileſia, from Sileſia towards Ruſſia. He has been ſeen at the head of this army, ſurprized and defeated, and give battle again. When he loſt the day at Torgau, he perceived in his retreat a falſe movement made by the Auſtrians, a height imprudently uncovered; he counter-marched his troops to take poſſeſſion of it, drew on his whole army to their ſupport, and forced the Auſtrians to retreat on the other ſide of the Elbe. In ſhort, wherever there was a neceſſity to manœuvre, wherever the ſucceſs

depended on the intelligence and rapidity of marches, that ſucceſs was always in his favour. Doubtleſs were his Generals leſs qualified to ſecond his projects, or his troops leſs manœuvring, he would never have attempted the ſucceſs of ſo many ſignalized events; when the ſprings of a machine are unfit for action or for combining other principles upon, how is it poſſible to produce from it any uſeful operation?

Notwithſtanding the many proofs of the King of Pruſſia's ſuperior knowledge in the art of war, it is evident he has not exhauſted all its combinations; and in the great Tactic, more particularly in reſpect to marches, there ſtill remains a great progreſs to be made. This aſſertion may appear too preſuming; to ſupport it, there is a neceſſity of ſelecting ſome proofs.

It is firſt neceſſary to diſtinguiſh the different kind of marches an army is capable of executing.

An army may execute ſimple marches out of the enemy's fire, with the deſign of tranſporting itſelf with eaſe into another quarter. The moſt ſimple combination, and which ſhould be uniformly relative to the ſmalleſt degree of fatigue, and the greateſt convenience to troops, is appropriated to theſe kind of marches, called, *route marches*, which armies are ſometimes obliged to make, whether at the beginning of campaigns, in approaching to an enemy; at the concluſion of campaigns in withdrawing themſelves by mutual compact; or in thoſe caſes, when certain operations have removed armies at a diſtance from each other, and averted all poſſibility of action.

An army may ſometimes execute marches out of the enemy's fire, having a deſign to prevent the enemy from making good a poſition, or to take a rapid poſſeſſion of a favourable ſituation, to tranſport a detachment for the ſupport of a poſt that is menaced; or to change the theatre of war to a different quarter, unſuſpected by the enemy: in the like inſtances it is neceſſary the marches ſhould be combined ſo as to produce all poſſible expedition; if neceſſary, the whole of the army, or at leaſt a body of troops ſhould make a forced march, ſo that the main

main body might arrive in time for its ſupport. It is neceſſary in ſimilar caſes, to know when to deviate from common received principles; to effect which, the army ſhould, if poſſible, to render its march more rapid and leſs embarraſſed, be divided into ſeveral corps, which ſhould be reunited at, or near the deſtined point of its arrival: being at a diſtance from the enemy, and having in view an approach to it, it is neceſſary to acquire in ſpeed, that which method retards, and conſtitute expedition the principal and ſole object of every combination.

An army may be compelled to execute *manœuvring marches*, to be more clear, marches made within reach of the enemy's fire, conſequently being prepared, if neceſſary to form in battle. The principle of this march, which will be largely treated of, and minutely defined, is the moſt important of marches, and which requires the greateſt variety of combinations; a greater variety of combinations, ſince it requires at once a calculation of the nature of the country the army traverſes, and of that to which its motion is directed, the kind of arm it is ſuperior in; the quality of troops the army is compoſed of: a greater variety of combinations, ſince it requires a calculation of the diſpoſition it means to take, whether to act offenſively or defenſively; the more or leſs ſkill of the enemy; its poſition; intentions; its diſtance; the greater or leſſer alacrity of troops forming in battle. Finally, this claſs of marches is a preparation to the greateſt of military operations, forming in battle, to action itſelf, and the reſult of forming in battle; for thoſe movements, by which an army paſſes from its march order, to that of battle, are ſo nearly allied to combinations of the march order, they ſhould be eſteemed as one and the ſame operation. The poſſibility of this connection will be demonſtrated. Let us firſt begin by eſtabliſhing rules for thoſe principles, which ſhould engage the attention reſpecting the movement of an army; or rather *the opening of roads*. From which it will be proper to deduce the method an army ſhould adopt in march order; this will lead

to

to the ſtating of the principles of thoſe movements to form it in battle. This theory is more particularly relative to the third claſs of marches, diſcourſed of in a foregoing paſſage, and which can, only in ſome few particulars, be applied to the two following, by reaſon of their not being adapted to the forming of an army in battle.

CHAP. II.

OPENINGS OF MARCHES.

AN army formed by the preſent regulation, eſpecially an army compoſed, as ours are, of a multitude of men, horſes, baggage, embarraſſments, is not poſſible to be put in motion, and much leſs to execute a march in line, ſuppoſing there could be found plains ſufficiently extenſive to contain it; this impracticability is produced by the extent of its front, which renders its movements ſo very heavy and ſlow.

Neither can it move on one column owing to its immenſe continuity, which retards the march, increaſes the fatigue of troops, and expoſes the army to the danger of defeat and route, before it has time to form in battle.

Therefore if a march is in queſtion, it is neceſſary an army ſhould be divided into ſeveral corps or columns, each purſuing different routes, to arrive on the ſame direction, and be prepared by a correſponding combination of movements, to form a general diſpoſition of battle. When it is ſaid on the ſame direction, it is meant towards the ſame object; ſince the diſpoſition of the march may be ſuch, that a diviſion of the army may march againſt the enemy's flank, while the others march againſt its front; in this caſe, though the direction of all the columns may not be preciſely the ſame, all tend to the ſame object, of forming in battle and attacking the enemy.

When marches are executed on ſeveral columns, each column ſhould have an open and reconnoitred road,

or

PART II.

Great Tactics.

Pl. I.

or at leaſt a direction on which they can advance by the aſſiſtance of pioneers or other workmen at their head. Theſe differences are ſtated; becauſe it is poſſible, the want of ſufficient time has not permitted the enemy to open a road before hand, or it has ſimply permitted the enemy to reconnoitre and not to open it; or there being no poſſibility to reconnoitre or open the road, the march muſt be continued on a projected direction, by reconnoitring and preparing the openings as the columns advance. This laſt caſe often happens, when an army advances to give battle, and the enemy having in front detached poſts and corps which muſt be ſucceſſively attacked and defeated.

The number of columns, on which an army ſhould march, conſequently the number of openings to be made, ſhould be proportioned to the force of the army, and the number of diviſions into which the General has divided it. The ſubſequent chapter will ſhew why an army ſhould be divided into ſeveral diviſions, what proportion is to be obſerved reſpecting theſe diviſions; and when this baſis is fixed upon, how it is neceſſary, as much as circumſtances admit of, to combine the different marches on it, form a column of each diviſion, and be prepared, in forming by this means all parts of the army's diſpoſition of equal force, to take any order of battle, and to ſend reinforcements on any part of that order.

That an army may be as little as poſſible compelled to march before its openings are prepared, the quarter-maſter-general ſhould, at its arrival, begin with opening roads on all directions, which ulterior circumſtances oblige him to follow. If contrary to this, roads are only opened relative to the direction, which momentary or foreſeen circumſtances point out, the General's views are ſoon diſcovered, and theſe views varying, his march will be diſtreſſing and ſubject to the greateſt inconveniences. What elſe relates to theſe principles is compriſed under events; ſometimes an army remains but a day in the ſame poſition, and there is ſcarce time to make openings the next day for its march. Sometimes,

times, the country through which the openings are to be made, is occupied by the enemy, with conſiderable poſts, or with detached corps; in this caſe, if the enemy makes reſiſtances the march cannot be made without advancing, and giving battle. Sometimes it is of moment to deceive the enemy, by opening a road on a feigned point, where the army does not mean to march, while the General ſecretly reconnoitres another on the point he means to execute a ſtolen movement. At other times, circumſtances and the reſpective poſitions of armies are ſuch, that if they move, it can only be to ſome premeditated object; in ſuch a caſe it is uſeleſs to make other openings. In ſome caſes the army is reſolved to act on the defenſive only, not being able, or unwilling to make any other movements than in its rear; it is therefore evident, was it to make openings at its front, theſe openings would be favourable to the enemy's offenſive movements. For a better illuſtration of the principles at the commencement of this ſubject, it is neceſſary to conclude, occaſions may offer, when it is impoſſible and even uſeleſs to open roads on all directions; yet theſe directions are of importance to be reconnoitred by general officers; ſhould this be impracticable, they ſhould enquire from people of the country all poſſible information. From this expoſition it is clearly demonſtrated, how neceſſary it is for the quarter maſter-general to take an accurate plan of theſe itineraries and informations, ſo as never to quit a poſition without having drawn his lines through the country, by means of that information and knowledge he acquires of ſurrounding directions, and to attain by theſe means, the moſt perfect idea of the theatre of war.

It is proper to mention how openings for an army ſhould be made; to be more explicit in this particular, we muſt return to the firſt principles of the march of troops. * Troops can only march perpendicular or pa-

* Mr. Guibert makes uſe of the word *battalion* inſtead of *troops*, which he adopts to explain all his manœuvres by; as our regulation differs from the French, it is preſumed that where the word *troops* is found in the tranſlation, it will more clearly explain Mr. Guibert's meaning.

rallel

rallel to their ground. It is thus with an army. Marches are conſequently reduced to two kinds, *front marches* and *flank marches*; both of which require different precautions and combinations. The miſtake in not eſtabliſhing this diſtinction, and of not making a calculation in conſequence, the moſt prejudicial routine has been employed, to make openings for marches, expoſing armies to be defeated by others more manœuvring and better informed. The truth of this aſſertion will ſoon be found obvious.

When an army marches in front, whether advancing or retreating, the front of this march ſhould be equal to the extent of ground which the army occupies in line; to be more clear, there ſhould be from the right to the left column, a ſufficient ſpace of ground for the army to form on.

In a contrary ſenſe, when the army marches from its flank, each line, or each half line forming a column, the openings ſhould be made very contiguous to each other, ſo that the columns contained in the march, may be as near as poſſible to the exterior column, and conſequently on the parallel which the army is to form on.

In front marches it is not neceſſary, and even impoſſible, unleſs the army marches in a plain totally free from obſtacles, that the openings are always, at a diſtance, exactly combined on the force of the columns marching to it. It ſuffices, that in arriving on the points where the army can or ſhould form, the columns are approached as near as poſſible to that diſtance. This will ſoon be explained.

When an opening is to be made for a march, the quarter-maſter-general ſhould know, by the poſition of the army, by that of the enemy's, by the ſituation of the country the march is directed to, if the army ſhould execute a front or flank march; therefore he will be qualified to communicate all neceſſary inſtruction to thoſe under him, having the care of the openings and directing their operations.

If the march is in front, and made within fire of an enterprizing and manœuvring enemy, the quarter-maſter-

ter general ſhould reconnoitre the entire ſtate and face of the country the columns paſs through; for which purpoſe, every time the ground ſeems to admit of the columns to extend, he ſhould tranſverſally traverſe it from right to left to reconnoitre on the front of the march, one or more ſucceſſive poſitions, where the army can form, ſuppoſing the enemy to arrive inopinate on them; and to direct in conſequence of this information, the operations of thoſe officers under the quarter-maſter-generals, who are active in tracing and opening the roads in his rear.

The ſame precaution ſhould be taken, when the exterior flank of the march is prolonged, ſuppoſing the army executing a march from its wings.

This ſubject is of too great importance to be dropped before it is more clearly illuſtrated. Suppoſe in the country B an opening is to be made for the army to march againſt the enemy encamped at B. the particulars of this march are thus reflected on; it is to be made in front, and found hazardous, by reaſon of the enemy being prepared in front of the army, and to attack it in its movement; the openings are conſequently made, with all thoſe precautions the preceding principles have defined, and executed in the following manner.

The army is formed in ſix diviſions, and therefore the openings are prepared for ſix columns. An intelligent officer practiſed in this kind of work ſhould be poſted at the head of the pioneers, at work in tracing and opening the roads, and the General in perſon ſhould be in advance in front of the march. The ſituation the army is encamped on, is ſuppoſed to be a free and open plain; the openings will advance rapidly, beginning from the right or left of the diviſion, proportioned in reſpect to their interval, to the force of the diviſions, and embracing from the right and left diviſion, the neceſſary ground to form the army on. At a league from the camp the country changes, the plain grows narrower, embarraſſing obſtacles are found; in this caſe the direction of each column becomes ſubordinate to theſe obſtacles, the columns extend from or approach each

each other, as the ſituation of the openings are found, or as the country permits theſe openings more eaſily to be made. Sometimes two columns are cloſe to each other, at others a more than common interval is found betwixt them, but which has no effect on the whole and ſafety of the march; it being evident when the country grows encloſed and replete with openings, there is no fear of being obliged to form rapidly an order of battle; ſince the difficulty of the openings would equally impede an enemy from making an attack to combine his diſpoſition on them. Having the command of the direction of the openings for the march; the General ſhould, as was before remarked, be at the head of the workmen to reconnoitre the road, leaſt any columns ſhould deviate from its direction, and to accord them when the country is favourable, examining, in caſe the enemy ſhould appear prepared for attacking the army or to ſtop it in its march, where the different intermediate poſitions are, which it can move on and what diſpoſitions it can make. To effect this, the General ſhould not purſue one route, or one direction, but traverſe fields and encloſures with the utmoſt rapidity. From the centre of the general direction, which is the neareſt point where he can reconnoitre the front of his march from, he ſhould caſt his eyes to the right and left. If obſtacles obſtruct his ſight, or heights preſent themſelves; to favour his intentions, and to give him a neater and more compact idea of the country, he ſhould tranſport himſelf to them, advance by different contours and croſſings, and in a manner to embrace the whole of the march. The columns are now ſuppoſed to be arrived in a difficult and encloſed country, where each officer ſeeks for his reſpective opening; knowing the end of the general direction, and provided with faithful intelligent guides; the ſignal is ſuppoſed to be ſettled before-hand, either with cannon, muſket, or drum, giving it when in an intricate country where the proximate columns are not diſcovered, and repeating it every quarter of an hour. The General has a particular ſignal which he makes uſe of at pleaſure, and

which

which indicates the centre of the columns general direction; by which means, the columns can be dreſſed in conformity both with the General and themſelves; and he can direct them wherever his reconnoitring has beſt pointed out. If the country opens and is leſs intricate, the columns dreſs and take in advancing their primitive diſtances. If the enemy is prepared to attack the army, the rivulet on the left and the great wood on the right furniſh a poſition. This rivulet is ſuppoſed to run for a league in the ſame direction as the army moves on; therefore to cover the flank of the march the column to the left reſts its movement on it. At the end of the league, the rivulet is ſuppoſed to return and depart from the former direction; on the right of the march, the ground appears to riſe, and forms a chain of heights, which reverſe on the plain on which the army moves; in this caſe, the opening of the column to the right ſhould be directed to thoſe heights, and by rather inclining to them continue their direction; rather inclining to them, becauſe the army, by this inclination, is full as much maſter of the heights, as if it was in poſſeſſion of their ſummit, and the march is leſs painful to the troops: by the favour of this chain of heights, the remainder of the march would be made with ſafety. The enemy will certainly not begin their attack by the plain, while the army occupies the heights which command it; if it makes an attack by the heights, the army takes poſſeſſion of them, and both are equal in their diſpoſition; if an oppoſition is made to the army in taking the poſition DE, it arrives at once on that poſition by all the openings of the plain, and chiefly by the heights to the right, which favour an offenſive movement on the enemy's rear. If the enemy remains in its camp F, the ſame heights conduct the army on its flank, and the ſame day an offenſive movement can be combined on its flank. It is preſumed, ſufficient has been ſaid to give an idea of the method of directing the opening of a front march. The following of the opening of a flank march, will be explained on a different plan to the former.

Plate


Openings made for the Troops on the Attack
Camp of the Duke
PART II
Great Pontoon
PT II
Openings made for a Post
North

Plate II. The army is encamped at G, the enemy at H: there is no obſtacle which ſeparates them, and the army is prepared to begin its march by its right flank. Relative to the eſtabliſhed principle two or four openings are made, that the army may begin its movement, each whole or half line forming a column. That the interior columns of the march may have the ſmalleſt ſhare of ground to traverſe, to approach the parallel on which the exterior column ſhould be formed, compoſed either of the whole or half of the firſt line, theſe *debouchés* are opened as near as poſſible to each other; the General is ſuppoſed to be vigilant over the officers, who conduct the tracings and openings of the *debouchés*, to ſee that they are not ſeparated, and not kept at too great a diſtance from each other by obſtacles, that may impede the columns from forming in battle. If as in C the nature of the country, or the little time to make the openings in, oblige the columns to ſeparate, once the obſtacle paſſed, they ſhould approach by degrees to each other at the diſtance which the foregoing principles have demonſtrated. If the wood D preſents itſelf in front of the openings, inſtead of paſſing it, or leaving it on the exterior flank of the march, as the road ſeems to indicate, the columns ſhould continue their march on the exterior ſide of it; they are thus directed, becauſe the chain of this wood, in caſe the enemy marches to attack, produces a favourable poſition; and becauſe, the columns by thus extending, the enemy cannot diſtinguiſh, either their force, or the diſpoſitions that may be oppoſed to it; it is likewiſe of moment, ſince the enemy by not having that mark between it and the columns it cannot conceal its movements, or make any offenſive diſpoſition, or, if it begins the attack, hinder the columns from forming and making an offenſive attack in return. If at two leagues diſtance, there appears on the right flank a chain of heights, the columns move to the right, and the march ſhould be continued on them, &c. The whole of the flank march is conducted by a reſult of principles obſerved during the opening of a march in

front, in reconnoitring the country on the flank of the march, and in being occupied ſucceſſively in ſeeking for one or more intermediate poſitions where the army can form, if the enemy appears.

There remains ſomething to be ſaid of the openings of the *debouchés* for the columns, conſidered diſtinctly, and relative to the ſpace which ſhould be appropriated to them. In reſpect to this particular as in others, it often happens in war, that you muſt conform to the nature of the country, time and circumſtances, but the general rule is, and to which it is neceſſary to adhere as often as poſſible, that their ſpace or breadth ſhould be relative to the principles of the Tactic which regulate the march of troops. Since in the expoſition of theſe principles the columns of the march were fixed and clearly demonſtrated, that they ſhould be in general formed by platoons, or to be more explicit, and to ſpeak in terms applicable to all conſtitutions of troops, by diviſions of twelve or fifteen men in front; it conſequently occurs, that the openings ſhould have twenty or five and twenty paces in breadth, that not only the ſoldiers can march free, but that the officers may paſs on horſeback to the right and left of the column, or at leaſt on one of the flanks: reaſons will be ſhortly given why they ſhould not march in the intervals of the platoons. In the like roads cavalry can march by four or eight in breaſt, officers in the ſame manner marching on the flanks of the column, and never in the interval of their troop. Artillery and waggons will have ſufficient ſpace, two in front, or at leaſt, if only on one, the column will not be obliged to halt through accident. Horſes or other beaſts of equipage may advance two or four in front. When the diſpoſition of march orders are treated of, a more particular detail will be given.

To repeat what has before been remarked, it often happens, for want of time and means, the nature of the country hinders the openings for the march to be made before-hand and with ſo much attention; ſometimes the columns are obliged to open their *debou-*

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chés on their march, and by the means of pioneers at their head; in this caſe neceſſity enforces an inevitable law; foreſeeing the ſhorteſt directions, piercing through leaſt difficult countries, and in advancing the openings, depend on the intelligence and activity of the officer commanding the march of the column. The happy conduct of this work demands well informed and experienced men, there being no circumſtance of too trivial a nature in war, nor can any thing be effected without practice and information. This is particularly applied to thoſe perſons who treat with ridicule the talents of a man underſtanding the good management of a column on its march, and of tracing its itinerary. Theſe people never reflect, that from an itinerary, more or leſs exactly traced, or a *debouché*, more or leſs opened, depend the greater or leſs celerity of marches, the ſame of the fatigue of troops, certainty of performing the columns movement, and often the ſucceſs of a great operation. This Chapter has led the Author to enter into details of the department of a quarter-maſter-general; details that are immenſe in their nature, on which nothing is wrote, on which there is much left for the imagination to work, and almoſt all to reduce to ſyſtem.

CHAP. III.

DISPOSITION *of the* ORDER *of* MARCHES.

AS the openings, and reconnoitring of the *debouchés* for marches have been treated of, the preſent enquiry is now in reſpect to the different methods of an army's diſpoſition on its march. It is commenced, by explaining how the army ſhould be divided, to what object this diviſion tends, and on what proportion it ſhould be determined.

To move a great body with more eaſe it muſt, if poſſible, be divided into ſeveral parts; thus each of theſe parts are ſuſceptible of a greater ſhare of alacrity

and movement, and they can, by combined and multiplied powers, act on all theſe parts at once; it is thus with an army. To move it in body, it would be unwieldy and ſlow, incapable of executing great manœuvres; divide it into ſeveral corps, each will act in a detached manner with more order and celerity; all theſe corps may act at once, and concur to the execution of a general movement. Whether relative to the ſimplicity of the ſervice and diſcipline, whether relative to the diminution of details and thoſe embarraſſments of the General which reſult from them, the advantages which a like deciſion procures will be given in a future paſſage.

In reſpect to the principles of proportion and the diviſion of an army, the law of mechanics will again produce a ſenſible demonſtration. If, in the conſtruction of a machine, the movements are too numerous and weak, the parts will be complicated and its force diminiſhed. If there be too few movements, and theſe movements too ſolid in their nature, their action, whether in force or in velocity, will be too ſlow. It is the ſame with an army: if in compoſing its diviſions of too ſmall a number of troops, it be formed into too great a number of diviſions, complicated movements enſue, men are wanting capable to command the diviſions, and it is with the greateſt embarraſſment theſe detached movements are combined. If, in compoſing the diviſions of too great a number of troops, the army be formed of too few diviſions, each diviſion will be too ſlow and difficult to put in motion; their principles have not compleated their intent, which is to render them more ſimple, and more eaſy to put in movement. Between theſe extremes a mean is found, which a ſimple reaſon will diſcover.

By the ſame reaſon a regiment is divided into ſeveral battalions, an army is divided into ſeveral diviſions. The diviſions equally compoſed of a certain number of regiments in the firſt and ſecond line conſtitute part of an army, as the battalion does that of a regiment; each

each diviſion is commanded by a General, entruſted with its police and diſcipline, making a report of them to the Commander in Chief. Hence is ſeen how this regulation curtails the ſuperfluous and ſimplifies the details. When the army begins its march, each diviſion forms in column. When it arrives in camp, each diviſion takes its proper ſtation. If, when in march order, the army be to form in battle, as all the diviſions of their march are equal, the General, according to circumſtances, can combine his movements, which his interior manœuvres prepare, ſo as to diſgarniſh or reinforce the part of his diſpoſition he judges beſt.

To continue the compariſon of a regiment's diviſion into battalions. The principles of the Tactic are, not to make the battalions either too ſtrong or too weak; in the firſt caſe they would be too heavy, and in the ſecond they would not have ſufficient conſiſtence. The following is the rule to avoid theſe extremes. The diviſions of an army tend chiefly to ſimplify marches, and to facilitate, as well as to accelerate thoſe movements by which an army forms in battle; conſequently, as each ſhould form a column, they ſhould not be compoſed of too great a number of troops; were they to be ſo, they would be too heavy, too tardy in unfolding and in forming in battle. Or ſhould they be compoſed, once more repeating it, of too ſmall a number of troops; then the diviſions would be too much multiplied, and embarraſſments take place, in making ſufficient opening for the army, and even this would be often impracticable.

The true proportion for the diviſion of an army, combined on the manœuvres of extending the columns and on the principles of the great Tactic, is three or at moſt four diviſions for infantry, not including the wings of cavalry which form each of them one. The diviſions ſhould conſiſt, at moſt, of twenty four battalions, half of the firſt and ſecond line, but never under twelve. Each wing of cavalry forming a diviſion, in regard to which there are no preciſe rules to aſcribe. According to this ſyſtem an example of the diviſion of

an army, in all its marches and formings in battle, will be produced in the courſe of this work.

Our reſearch is now to find, including the neceſſary details, why the diviſion ſhould be equal, why the diſpoſition of the march ſhould, as much as poſſible, be invariable. But theſe diviſions being of the ſame force, all the diſpoſitions of the march, conſequently, being equal, and this march order being, as much as poſſible, nearly the ſame, the General acquires the facility of combining, in an inſtant, and in face of the enemy, any order of battle he thinks beſt. It is proper to remark, in what has been advanced, *as much as circumſtances admit of*, for ſometimes it might chance, the nature of the country not allowing the neceſſary openings to be made, that the columns are obliged to be formed of more than one diviſion. Sometimes it is neceſſary to make an offenſive movement in an entire open country, and to form in battle in the moſt rapid manner: in this caſe there ariſes no inconvenience by multiplying the columns, and in forming two of the ſame diviſion, ſince this may be productive of a more ſpeedy extenſion. Sometimes the march ſhould be continued through countries, where, for the ſafety of the movement, it is neceſſary to poſt infantry at the flanks, therefore the accuſtomary order is deviated from. At others it may lead to a poſition where the centre is a plane and the wings an encloſed country; in this caſe, ſhould there be no apprehenſions of an attack on the march, once more it is neceſſary to depart from the accuſtomary rule, forming the flank columns of infantry, and the centre columns of cavalry. Sometimes it is neceſſary to attack the enemy in a known quarter, and where no ſudden changes can be made in its diſpoſition; in this caſe, the march before-hand can be combined on the order of battle then fixed on; therefore, departing from the accuſtomed diſpoſition, the columns can be of unequal force and differently combined, according as the attack is made with one part, and not engaging with the others, poſting here and there in the line ſuch and ſuch kind of arms, in ſuch

and

and ſuch proportion. Hence is ſeen many exceptions to the cuſtomary rule: exceptions which, far from invalidating it, tend to convey more light, and to diſcover thoſe circumſtances wherein it is neceſſary to depart from it.

Once more to repeat the ſame thing, the accuſtomary and fundamental principle ſhould be, to form as many columns as there are diviſions, that from the equality of all the parts of the march, the poſſibility of forming in an inſtant an order of battle, reinforcing or diſgarniſhing from thoſe points which circumſtances point out, may be the reſult of it. In treating of the orders of battle, will be diſcovered the great advantage of not making any diſpoſitions, but within ſight of the field of battle, and the diſpoſitions of the enemy. It will be made evident how many battles have been loſt, either in not adopting theſe principles, or even ſuppoſing that to be the caſe, in not knowing a Tactic of extenſions, and having practice in the manœuvres which admit of their execution. To finiſh what concerns the ſyſtem of marches.

It follows from the theory, but more particularly from the principles here advanced, that the diſpoſitions of the marches ſhould be ſeldom varied, and that it is left to the man of genius to execute an order of battle combined on the nature of ground and local circumſtances. This ſyſtem is certainly not found in the theory of M. de Puiſegur, nor in the preſent routine of our armies; marches being always combined on the intended orders of battle. A ſcheme is formed of attacking the enemy in any particular diſpoſition, relative to which the march is regulated, or any particular column reinforced. Arrived in front of the enemy, an order of battle is formed according to thoſe principles the march has pointed out. The errors and bad ſucceſs which reſult from this method will be ſhewn in the Chapter on the orders of battle.

It is firſt neceſſary to examine the interior diſpoſition of the march, relative to the nature of the march then executing, and to the motional bodies which compoſe

the column, ſuppoſing theſe bodies to be the troops, artillery and equipages. This will naturally lead to the diſpoſition of troops, artillery and equipages in column on their march.

CHAP. IV.

DISPOSITION *of* TROOPS *on their* MARCH.

TO what concerns the forming of troops in column in march order, and thoſe movements by which they ſhould be formed from the ſaid order to that of battle, it will be neceſſary to refer to what has been ſaid on this ſubject, in the Tactic of the infantry and cavalry, in the Chapter of forming in columns and in battle; the difference between the front and flank march has been there eſtabliſhed; the different methods which the troops of both arms ſhould form in column relative to theſe differences, their order of march, the preliminary movements, by which they ſhould be prepared to form in battle, and thoſe by which they ſhould form, and concur to the execution of a combined manœuvre.

Every thing having been ſaid and conceived on this ſubject, it is eaſy to ſee how troops ſhould form in column on their march. The army ſhould form in battle before its camp, and without loſs of time be in column, towards thoſe directions its march points at, taking a free and natural ſtep the very inſtant it is formed, and not file off in parade till ſuch times it is free from the ground the camp is formed on; an abſurd cuſtom which only tends to fatigue the ſoldier, and which ſhould be ſuppreſſed, as well in quitting the camp as in entering it. If the column is not compleatly formed of all its troops, and theſe troops near enough to follow without interruption, it ſhould halt, extending on its line, till it is joined by all its force, ſo as to begin its movement uniformly on the route ſtep. Hence depends the facility of the march, the

the leſs fatigue for the troops, and the ſafety of having the column aſſembled on the ſpace it ſhould occupy when in march order.

Reſpecting the method of the column's uniform regulation, the cuſtomary principle ſhould be, to march the ſame as in camp, each diviſion forming its own column. When particular circumſtances require a variation from it, an explanation and combination of it will be given in the order of march. This diſpoſition, which is attached to the department of a quarter-maſter-general, is eaſy, and only requires practice, which would become ſtill eaſier by means of new methods of extenſion, and by ſubverting the prejudice of inverſion, it otherwiſe requires all the paltry calculation and minutiæ with which Marſhal Puiſegur has complicated it.

CHAP V.

Disposition *of* Artillery *on its* March.

IN the firſt part of this work, which treats of artillery, has been ſeen, how this acceſſary ſhould manœuvre to form in column for its march and order of battle. Its movements were diſcovered to be in every reſpect relative to thoſe of troops. It remains for the author to ſay, how that artillery equipage, which military powers at this day have in their armies, ſhould be diſpoſed of, not to embarraſs the marches, and to concur to their forming in battle.

The reaſons which favour the ſyſtem of dividing an army into ſeveral diviſions, require the artillery to be diſpoſed of in the ſame way. If infantry forms three or four diviſions, artillery ſhould form three or four of the ſame force, each of which ſhould be attached to a diviſion of infantry, to encamp, march and fight with it. Excluſive of this, there will be another diviſion, called, *a reſerved diviſion*, compoſed of large calibers and hobits. From that marching in front

front of the park, ſhould be drawn all reinforcements, all eſſential detachments; as it is the Author's opinion, artillery ſhould be made uſe of to ſupport cavalry, it ſhould therefore march with it. There ſhould be another ſmall diviſion, compoſed of four or at moſt of ſix pieces of large calibers, this diviſion ſhould be called, *diviſion of the advanced guard*, encamped in front of the army, and march with the advanced guard. It is formed of large calibers, by reaſon of its being from the advanced guard, that all ſignals, regulating the movement of the army, ſhould be made, and becauſe if the advanced guard ſhould find on its road an intrenched poſt, it ſhould have great guns to attack and carry it. The parck of artillery is here only ſpoke of reſpecting that of the regiments, it encamps and marches with them, it will therefore be found ſimply and naturally divided.

This grand diviſion of artillery is independent of the interior ſub-diviſions, which ſhould be formed ſo, as each ſub-diviſion can be compoſed of ſix pieces of the ſame caliber, and that each diviſion of the ſame number of equal diviſions may be compoſed of different calibers.

In the forming of the ſuppoſed army, for the more clear demonſtrating of the execution of theſe principles, will be produced an example of an equipage of field artillery divided according to the above ſyſtem, in which will be ſeen the eaſy and ſimple movements reſulting from it.

The nature and object of the march ſhould determine the order of the artillery. It is here neceſſary to repeat the diſtinctions ſtated, between *route and manœuvring marches*, *front and flank marches*, ſince, relative to each of theſe, artillery ſhould obſerve a different order in its march.

As a route march is ſimply calculated for the greater convenience of troops, or for the greateſt expedition, the forming in battle being out of the queſtion, conſequently there is no need of artillery to protect them, which therefore ſhould march in the rear, ſo as not to retard

tard the march or to cut up the roads, that is to ſay, if the openings admit of it, each diviſion ſhould march in rear of the diviſion of infantry to which it is attached, and if they do not admit of it, the artillery ſhould be poſted at the column the leaſt likely to occaſion embarraſſment. In both the above caſes, the diviſion of reſerve and the grand parck ſhould march with the column where the opening is moſt diſengaged and eaſy.

If a manœuvring march be performed, conſequently a march within ſhot of the enemy, and with a deſign to form in battle, artillery ſhould be ſo diſpoſed as not to inconvenience troops, to impede their march as little as poſſible, and to be prepared, at the ſame time, to operate with the formings in battle and protect their execution. After this, it is neceſſary to ſee if the march be in front or in flank, and concert the diſpoſition in conſequence.

If a front march, the diviſions of artillery march as follow: at the head of each column, and preceded only by a battalion of grenadiers, ſhould be poſted one or two ſub-diviſions of great caliber guns, diveſted of their equipage, having each twenty rounds to begin the action. The remaining part of each diviſion of artillery ſhould follow the diviſion of infantry it is attached to, that the cannon may be immediately in the rear of the troops, and all the baggage, ammunition, &c. in the rear of it. By the means of this diſpoſition, there will be, in front of the columns, ſufficient force of artillery to protect their movements; the troops, not being embarraſſed, will rapidly form in battle, and the remainder of the artillery can be diſpoſed of as the General pleaſes; whether in drawing it on for the ſupport of that already poſted, or in poſting it on flank or collateral points, to the diſpoſitions of troops, or in leaving it in rear of the lines, if a deciſive action is attempted, and not to embarraſs the front. The artillery in reſerve ſhould march in rear of the centre columns, and be always reinforced with every neceſſary precaution to

tranſport

tranſport it, to be able to poſt itſelf on thoſe points of the line where judged expedient.

In *front manœuvring marches*, this ſhould be the accuſtomary diſpoſition, but circumſtances may occaſion various alterations. Sometimes the point of attack being known before-hand, ſuch or ſuch a column will be ſeen to march againſt a village or an intrenchment, which would be firſt neceſſary to attack by a great fire of artillery; in this caſe, more ſub-diviſions ſhould be poſted at the head of this column, and all of great calibers. Sometimes it might be neceſſary to ſupport or ſuſtain a wing of cavalry, conſequently to the column which ſhould form it, one or more ſub-diviſions of artillery, but more particularly hobits ſhould be joined: this artillery, provided with twenty rounds each, ſhould march at the head of the column, covered by ſome ſquadrons, and its ammunition equipage at its rear. The eſſay on the Tactic of artillery has ſpoke of the ſervices which this method, ſo little, or rather not in the leaſt degree known, can produce, of employing artillery with cavalry.

There are yet to be conſidered, all interior diſpoſitions neceſſary to make in the diviſions of artillery, when, marching to attack the enemy, thoſe parts of its order of battle being known where the attack would prove favourable, and where it would prove otherwiſe ſo. Theſe diſpoſitions ſhould tend to reinforce the methods of tranſporting the artillery of the columns deſtined for action, and to poſt, in the diviſions of artillery of thoſe columns, more ſmall pieces; to attach the greateſt calibers to the columns which form part of the diſpoſition, the fartheſt diſtant from the enemy, and where conſequently there will be a neceſſity for the fartheſt range, &c. The Tactic of artillery, will explain theſe principles.

The regimental guns ſhould march with their battalions, and follow their movements; but I cannot help repeating, that ſuch as they are in quality, and increaſed in ſo unproportioned a manner, they are productive of more trouble than utility.

If

If *flank marches* are not executed, when the enemy is ſuppoſed to be extending a parallel to the direction of the army's movement, to attack it on its march, the artillery can march in rear of the troops of each column, or by a column ſeparated on the interior flank of the march. If there be reaſon to apprehend an attack, each diviſion of artillery ſhould march in front and rear of each diviſion, the ſaid diviſions of artillery ſimply having the neceſſary rounds for the firſt moment of attack, and the main body of ammunition, as was before ſpoke of, marching in a ſeparate column, in the centre of the march order.

I appeal to the military in general, whether this theory, of the artillery's diſpoſition in its march, is not ſuperior to that routine which has hitherto been adopted. I refer it to reaſon, whether, in having artillery thus divided and manœuvred, a much leſs quantity than is employed at this day, cannot be received into armies, a much leſs quantity than an ignorant army has oppoſed to you; with this curtail, never be in want of artillery, and procure, on the neceſſary points, a much ſuperior fire to the enemy's.

CHAP. VI.

Disposition *of* Equipages *in their* March.

THERE is little to ſay on this ſubject. Equipages ſhould never be blended with troops; they ſhould march at the ſuite of the columns in the ſame rank of the troops, and the beaſts of draught with the ſoldiers tents always at the head. If there be any thing to apprehend on the flanks of the march, there ſhould not be any poſted on the exterior columns of the march, and neceſſary precautions taken to cover them. If a *manœuvring, or forced march*, the equipage ſhould be left behind, chuſing a ſafe ſpot, which at all events can be covered by the army. All the rules reſpecting this diſpoſition are known. But that having the moſt defect in its

its routine, is the detached or individual order of the equipage. I have been on the paved roads in Flanders, in open countries, on the ſame openings where troops have marched by platoons, mules or horſes with equipage, in one file, as if they were in the defiles of the Alpes: ſurely, inſtead of this tardy diſpoſition, there is a poſſibility for their marching on two or three files. As much may be ſaid for the waggons, which might often proceed two in front. To cut the matter ſhort, there ſhould be a proportionate rule eſtabliſhed, by which the quarter-maſter general ſhould thus give his orders; ſuch a column may march on ſuch a front, and conſequently the equipages of that column ſhould march thus diſpoſed.

But what end, will all poſſible information in the diſpoſition of marches anſwer, unleſs we endeavour to diminiſh this enormous quantity of equipage, beaſts of draught, and ſervants, ſo happily ſtiled by the antients *impedimenta*, and if to effect this, we become not more temperate in our ſyſtem of life, leſs wrapt up in our eaſe, more hardened for our buſineſs? I ſhall not enter farther on the ſubject; for a ſimilar reſolution cannot be acquired, but in changing the minds and manners of a people; and to change their minds and manners is not to be effected by the work of any claſs of writers. It can only be that of a ſovereign, or of a man of genius, into whoſe hands great misfortunes, and the public voice, more powerful than all private cabals, entruſt, during a ſucceſſion of years, the pivot of the machine.

CHAP. VII.

ORDERS OF BATTLE.

ORDER of *battle*, according to the preſent ſyſtem of Tactics, have two different acceptations. Firſt it ſignifies the primitive or fundamental order, in which an army is diſpoſed to encamp or to proceed to action; circumſtances of ground and manœuvres being conſidered apart: ſecondly, it ſhould ſignify, every

every diſpoſition whatſoever, deriving from the primitive order, including all variations reſulting from the above circumſtances. We will proceed to this definition, in a two-fold ſenſe, which will produce an inſight into the theory ariſing from it.

Conſidered as a primitive and fundamental diſpoſition, an order of battle, is the picture which is formed at the commencement of a campaign, for regulating the order and diſpoſition of the different corps of an army. Hence troops are diſpoſed in two lines, infantry in centre, cavalry at the wings. This firſt arrangement is founded on reaſon. When it is only the preparatory diſpoſition, and if I may thus expreſs myſelf, the diſpoſition of expectance and organization; but it becomes abuſe and error, when it degenerates into routine, when it is variouſly conſidered in all circumſtances and grounds, eſpecially when conſtituted a diſpoſition for battle.

I ſay this arrangement is founded in reaſon, when it is ſimply the diſpoſition of encampment and organization: in ſhort, when an army is aſſembled; a fixed and primitive order ſhould be eſtabliſhed, an order, which ſhould be the baſe from which we can depart from, to begin our operations and return to it, when the circumſtances, which occaſioned the alteration, no longer exiſt. I muſt ſtill aſſert, that this arrangement becomes abuſe and error, when ignorant how to deviate from it, as circumſtances occur, and when the order of battle is formed immediately. It is eaſy to conceive, what numerous incidents enforce a variation in the primitive order; it is eaſy to comprehend, this order conſtitutes the forming of the army, on two lines, infantry in centre, cavalry at the wings, and all the corps compoſing each line, contiguous to each other, how circumſtances in war may require the cavalry in centre, and the infantry at the wings; at a certain point acting on one line, detached farther off on three, at another the army poſted and divided into ſeveral corps that each may act on different points, the end of this general diſpoſition being preparative to battle; theſe deviations from the primitive order do not hinder the whole of the diſpoſition

ſition from being an order of battle. Let us hence conclude, as poſterity will be deceived if it imagines, in ſeeing the regulation of our preſent orders of battle, ſuch was the diſpoſition on which our armies always engaged, ſo we ſhould ourſelves, without doubt, be ſtrangely led aſtray, when reading in hiſtory of a diſpoſition of a Greek or conſular army, conceive ſuch was the order it adopted when in action. For, to all appearance, that order was only a fundamental or primitive diſpoſition, from whence all variations were made, according to the nature of the ground and the movements of the enemy. Let us now reſume the ſubject, and clear up the definition of thoſe principles which have been advanced.

Conſidered as a diſpoſition combined on the ground and circumſtances, an order of battle is the kind of order troops are ranged in for action, that is to ſay, it can ſeldom be an order of method; for it ſcarce happens, the army is formed on planes, admitting of ſtraight and continued lines in its order; and as rarely in countries where the centre can be compoſed of infantry and the wings of cavalry. It is often neceſſary for part of the diſpoſition to be weakened, and drawn from action, to reinforce that more immediately fixed upon for the heat of engagement. In theſe different circumſtances it is neceſſary to adopt the above principles; the methodical order is deviated from, and a diſpoſition is taken, having, at times, but a very trifling connection with it. More a General is ſkilful, and his army manœuvring, more he varies from the eſtabliſhed routine, therefore he is better enabled to act more deciſively, and unexpectedly againſt his adverſary. In the courſe of this theory a paſſage will preſent itſelf, where this will be more fully explained.

Sufficient is preſumed to have been ſaid, to demonſtrate the difference between a diſpoſition of method and a diſpoſition of circumſtances, both may, notwithſtanding, be called *order of battle*, with this difference, the firſt only exiſting in camps and in the reverie of Tacticians, while the ſecond is the inſtrument of giving battle

battle, and more eſpecially the method of acquiring conqueſt.

The execution of this laſt may be attained, by the Tactic here treated of, which there could be no poſſibility of knowing ſimply by the ancient principles, and the movements hitherto practiſed in our armies; for though there was no idea of the great Tactic, nor armies divided and conſtituted for manœuvring, the different corps they were compoſed of, moved individually by ſlow and torpid methods, which they even had no practice in executing. Generals were not accuſtomed to the command or movement of their troops. From this ignorance and unſkilfulneſs of Generals, including acting parts as well as commanders, the natural reſult is, that it required ſeveral hours to form in battle; and apprehenſive, when once this army was formed, of confounding and loſing every thing, they could not attempt the ſmalleſt change in their diſpoſition. Hence the march was always combined on the intended diſpoſition; it was executed with a deſign of attacking the enemy in ſuch or ſuch a point; conſequently ſuch or ſuch column was reinforced.

Arrived oppoſite to the enemy, the order of battle was governed by the march order, and the army formed in conſequence. What occurred in this inſtance? It often happened, that theſe orders of battle proved defective, either becauſe the country and poſition of the enemy were badly reconnoitred, or becauſe the enemy had varied its diſpoſition; how obviate this difficulty? Where was the method to be found of changing the primitive diſpoſition of an army, ignorant of the Tactic? Suppoſing the General conceived he had the genius to undertake a change, how attempt it with undiſciplined troops and Generals under him incapable of any great manœuvre? Forming an army in battle at that time was a tardy, a difficult operation. What otherwiſe occurred? The army being ſo long in paſſing from the march order, to that of battle, the enemy could with eaſe judge of the force of the columns, know the points they were directed to, the object they meditated;

tated; therefore make its diſpoſition accordingly. If examples are wanting to ſupport the matter advanced, numberleſs can be found; laſt war will furniſh a ſufficient quantity.

The principles of this Tactic convey a different method of forming in battle. Suppoſe an enemy to be attacked, as the poſition it occupies cannot be preciſely known, or even ſuppoſe it to be known, there is no poſſibility of being certain the enemy is not informed of your movement, and does not concert a change in its poſition, or on the diſpoſition by which it meditates its defence; therefore the army ſhould march in its accuſtomary order, the columns being all equal and each formed of one diviſion; thus diſpoſed, the army advances, the General being in front, at the head of the advanced guard. Arrived within reach of the enemy, the General determines his order of battle according to ground, the poſition the enemy occupies, and to the diſpoſition he has taken. For which reaſon, he either draughts, or reinforces ſuch or ſuch columns he judges beſt, advancing one, leaving another in the rear, directing this towards one point, that towards another, and gives the word for action. Thoſe troops trained to the execution of great manœuvres, having rapid methods of extention, form in battle in an inſtant, and the attack is begun before the enemy has time to diſtinguiſh the point where the blow is intended, or ſuppoſing it has diſcovered this point, it has no time to change its diſpoſition to ward it off. But what is there, the General cannot poſſibly effect, having, in a reſerve at his rear, the columns entirely ſubject to operate what he commands, therefore ready to take the diſpoſition he judges beſt.

Within ſight of the enemy, and not finding it diſadvantageouſly poſted for his attack, the General can manœuvre oppoſite to it, endeavour to change its diſpoſition, employing all reſources of ground and the Tactics to maſk his deſign, feigning an offenſive movement on the left, to begin his real attack on the right; in this place he preſents columns with large intervals, in the

the other, he diſcovers them in cloſe order, in ſhort, his manœuvres are ſuch, if his adverſary be leſs ſkilful, he varies his diſpoſition, abandons or occupies a poſt which lays him open to an attack, or elſe weakened on a certain point, either in leaving too few troops, or too ſmall a force of the army to defend it, or raw and undiſciplined men, the miſtake is took advantage of by the ſkilful and manœuvring General, who without loſs of time leads on his force againſt part of the line which is weakeſt If, notwithſtanding the enemy does not make any ſignal for action, either from its poſition or diſpoſition, in this caſe, the General finds his plan is fruitleſs, therefore retires till a more favourable opportunity offers. Theſe are the true principles of forming in battle. Theſe were the principles by which the King of Pruſſia gained the battles of Liſſa, Hohenfriedberg, and many others; it is this ſcience that the principles are developping of, by diſcovering the great combinations and interior mechaniſm by which an army forms in battle from its march order.

There can be but two methods of giving an enemy battle: the firſt by engaging, or by being poſted ready to engage, all the parts of its front; the ſecond by ſimply beginning the attack on one or more points. Hence it is natural to think, the ſeven orders, of which Vigecius, and all Tacticians after him, have ſpoken of, can be reduced to two, *the parallel and oblique*. In treating ſeparately of each of theſe, their principles and objects will be defined and limited, ſhowing how all kinds of diſpoſitions are dependant on them, and how they are therefore but ſimple conſequences and modifications, reſulting from them.

CHAP. VIII.

PARALLEL ORDER.

A Diſpoſition of battle ſhould thus be called, when its front extends parallel to the enemy, and it can engage at once with all its parts. When the

word *parallel* occurs, it muſt not be underſtood in its geometrical ſenſe, for there are few ſituations of ground which admit of two armies extending their front parallel to each other. The words *parallel order* are therefore annexed to that diſpoſition, which places the corps of two armies oppoſite to each other, prepared and near enough to engage.

This is certainly the method which the firſt ages of military ſcience ſhould have adopted in their armies. They were then leſs numerous than at this æra; they formed on a leſs extenſive line; they were armed ſo, as to need the methods of approach to deſtroy each other. They were ignorant of all the fineſſes of the Tactic; in proportion as their ignorance became greater, their courage increaſed. Each individual was panting for action; each was eager to ſhare the glory and danger of the field: thus was the origin of thoſe combats ſo terrible, ſo bloody, which our battles, in compariſon to theirs, being but trivial operations, make us almoſt conſider them as fabulous. Could we ſee, even now, two ſavage nations, ignorant of the uſe of fire arms, fiercely animated againſt each other, ſhould we not find their brave men aſſembled, marching up to each other? their diſpoſition being that, of waiting till the whole is cloſed, and each man ſingling out his adverſary. This is the method of fighting of all the North American nations, which the Europeans have not armed; and it ſometimes happens, their deſtructive wars conclude with the total extinction of the conquered nation. Thus was the method of fighting amongſt all the firſt race of the inhabitants of Europe, till by chance, ambition and reaſon, ſome knowledge ſprung up amongſt them.

By the ſimplicity and natural property of the *parallel order*, it muſt neceſſarily be the moſt antient diſpoſition that is known. The words alone do not conſtitute the ſenſe, and the ſavages moſt likely are ignorant of the word *order*, and certainly that of *parallel*; it is that unformed diſpoſition which inſtinct ſhows them they ſhould take, to ruſh altogether on their enemy; it is this

this diſpoſition, having its firſt origin from inſtinct, which perfectionates by degrees; and words ſpringing up with ideas, is *now called parallel order.*

In proportion as mankind grew enlightened, armies, ſuperior in number, ſought methods for profiting of their ſuperiority, for this reaſon they ſurrounded the enemy and embraced their flanks. Hence gave riſe to that diſpoſition in form of a creſcent, even at this time ſubſiſting in the Turkiſh and Aſiatic armies. Skilful Generals, finding themſelves at the head of inferior armies, ſought for methods of ſupplying this inferiority with the perfection of the Tactic; it muſt naturally occur to them, if they preſented their army in a parallel line to the ſuperior force of the enemy, they expoſed themſelves to be ſurrounded and beaten, that there was another diſpoſition, another ſcience of movements, which they might adopt, to lead on the choſen of their forces to one point only of the diſpoſition of battle, begin the action but at that point, and draw off the other parts of their line; hence originated the oblique order, and all other deviations from the parallel order. The leaſt ſkilful Generals have annihilated the parallel order, becauſe, either ſuperior or inferior in force, they with reaſon, find other more advantageous diſpoſitions.

What proves this to have been the origin of the different orders of battle of the antients, is, that we have ſeen their principles regenerating in the ſame progreſſion. With the Roman empire, military ſcience decreaſed, and was nearly extinct; ages of ignorance ſucceeded; nations returned nearly to the ſame ſtandard of knowledge as the primitive ones. This ignorance was ſpread over all the world, but more particularly over the military ſcience; for it muſt be remarked, that, at that time, more than at this day, the moſt ſavage and uninformed nations devoted themſelves to war, the inhabitants of towns were not inclined to arms, and the few who dedicated their time to ſtudy, only ſtudied for the church, letters, or for ſome few arts eſcaped from the general deſolation.

Therefore the art of war was the ſame as in the firſt ages. Multitudes of people againſt multitudes, chance againſt ignorance, armies joined and engaged on the extent of their front; this was the principle which Clovis fought upon againſt Atila, Charles Martel againſt the Saraſins, Charlemagne againſt the Saxons. The reaſon why it is ſuppoſed they fought thus, there generally periſhed an inconceivable number of combatants. The chronicles of thoſe wars, ſay, that ſeldom many of the conquered eſcaped the carnage of battle. Their armies adopted the parallel order without knowing it; it exiſted a long time afterwards, it exiſted during the time the Tactic remained in its infancy, it was ſeen at Marignan, Aiguadel, Pavia, and at all times; when armies had time to range themſelves in battle on the eve of action, and where ever a poſſibility offered of attacking the whole of the enemy's front.

When military art once more began to appear, the ſame reaſons as influenced the antients were made by the ſucceeding ages, conſequently the parallel order was deviated from. Generals ſought every method of manœuvring and turning the flanks of an enemy, ſcarce any more battles were engaged on the whole extent of front; and ſtill leſs when armies increaſed and formed with their ranks more open. On fronts ſo extenſive, ſome obſtacles intervened, to hinder armies from engaging. A new method of making war was adopted, founded on the nature of ground and on the choice of poſitions. Armies of leſs force were poſted, either by intrenchments, or the natural obſtacles of the country, under cover of all attacks, or elſe reduced the enemy to the neceſſity of engaging them on ſome particular point. A war of poſts took place; no general battle, conſequently no parallel orders. Since the concluſion of the laſt age, few actions can be cited, where armies engaged with the whole of the front.

What contributes at this time to the general rejectment of the parallel order, is the immenſe front of armies, and the difficulty of marching up to action, and beſides the neceſſity of ſtates not relying on the chance

of

of a general action of an army, in which their whole force and protection is placed, on which their fate depends. At this day, when ſtates are not warlike, by their manners or their conſtitutions, when a people have for their defence but a certain number of troops, excluſive of which, the remaining part of the citizens are a puſilanimous multitude, ignorant of war and diſcipline, conſequently at all times ready to receive the yoke of the conqueror; the politics of governments are ſuch, they expect that Generals ſhould not truſt any operation to chance.

It has been demonſtrated, how the reſult of the parallel orders, put in execution on a day of battle, might render the action a general one, in what reſpect it would prove more formidable, deciſive, bloody, how it might tend to a perfect conqueſt over the enemy. Let us paint to ourſelves the diſtreſs a modern pretended poliſhed nation would be in, if news was brought it in a ſimilar manner to that information the Romans received after the battle of Cannes: "The enemy approaches, the "army that defended the capital has engaged in a ge-"neral battle; that army is defeated."

The parallel order, received in the ſenſe given it in the beginning of this Chapter, we therefore find to be no longer put in execution in battles; but this term may be accepted in the primitive and accuſtomary diſpoſition of the organization and encampment of an army, ſince all the parts of that diſpoſition will be found of equal force, and ready (excluſive of obſtacles of ground) to engage with the enemy, provided its front is wholly attacked.

In the ſucceeding Chapter will be found, the kind of orders of battle, which took place of the parallel order, and the moſt advantageous changes it is ſtill capable of receiving.

It is neceſſary to remark before this article is cloſed, occaſions may offer, when an army is ſuperior in courage, and certain of not being attainable at its flanks, may take the parallel order. At leaſt, there is this certainty, the battles which a ſimilar army may gain

in this diſpoſition would effectively ruin the opponent army, when the preſent armies, commanded by ſkilful Generals, will have nothing of any great moment reſulting from them.

CHAP. IX.

OBLIQUE ORDER.

IT has already been made apparent, in what reſpect military ſcience has ſubſtituted the oblique order, in preference to the parallel, and how it has rendered battles more ſcientific and leſs bloody. Calculation and combination have ſucceeded to hazardous and ruinous operations. It is a happy circumſtance, military ſcience, a ſcience of deſtruction, as it approaches to perfection, renders war leſs deſtructive. It is a happy circumſtance, that the genius of a General may decide the fate of a battle * ſooner than the quantity of bloodſhed. In ſhort, in an age when all the ſciences have made a progreſs, it is a flattering circumſtance, it is encouraging for the military, that the art of war participates of the general refinement.

The oblique order is an order of battle, the moſt practiſed, the moſt ſkilful, and moſt ſuſceptible of combinations; an order which all inferior armies, commanded by well informed Generals, ſhould adopt; it is the order ſo much eſteemed by the antients, but which none of their Tacticians have taught us the interior knowledge of. The King of Pruſſia is the firſt modern who has practiſed it by principles, and who has adapted it to the preſent Tactics.

To form an oblique order of battle, there is no neceſſity the front ſhould exactly delineate an oblique line with reſpect to the enemy's front, as it ſeldom happens, ground and circumſtances permit a ſimilar regularity to take place. The term *oblique* is therefore applied to every diſpoſition, oppoſing to the enemy a part of the line with the choſen of the troops, and

* At Maxen, Field-marſhal Daun proved the truth of this aſſertion.

when

when the remainder are reſerved from its fire; briefly, every diſpoſition when an advantageous attack is made on one or more points of the enemy's line, whilſt a change is given to the other points, and the army ſo ſituated as not to be attacked by them.

Conceived in this ſenſe, almoſt all battles, fought an age ſince, have been in the oblique order; the proof is, they were reduced to certain points of attack. But this order was taken by chance, which circumſtances and the nature of the ground dictated. Its advantages were not fundamentally conſidered, its fineſſes were not known, nor the method of adopting it in a rapid manner on a point which circumſtances of a moment's duration indicated, and unpremeditated in the march order; thus with an art in its infancy, an inſtrument may be made uſe of, when its uſe and properties are perhaps not perfectly known.

To develop perfectly the theory of the oblique order, it is neceſſary to enter into details, gradually explaining their principles, object and application. I am more than any perſon an enemy to prolixity; but in dogmatic works, it is proper to convince, and to convince, it is ſometimes neceſſary to know when to be heavy and ſlow in argument.

A diſtinction will firſt be made between two different kinds of oblique orders: one is the oblique order of principle, properly ſtiled the oblique; to be more clear, the order in which an army is diſpoſed *truly obliquely* to the front of the enemy; the other is the oblique order of circumſtances; that is to ſay, the order in which the army, though not oblique to the enemy, is nevertheleſs formed, either by the nature of ground, or the ſkilfulneſs of its movements, to attack it on one or more points, and to be itſelf unattainable on the others. Each of theſe will be ſucceſſively treated of, and their differences explained.

The oblique order, can more properly be ſaid to be executed in two different ways, *by line*, or *by echelon*.*

* The liberty has been taken to adopt the word *echelon*, as it ſeems more expreſſive of the Author's meaning, and ſo well underſtood by our military.

By

By line is, when the diſpoſition forms an oblique front and a half quarter-wheel, all the battalions and ſquadrons being contiguous to each other, and on the ſame dreſs, thus:

By echelons, is when each battalion and ſquadron inclines, by its proximate battalion or ſquadron, to where the attack is made from, on a certain number of paces, more or leſs conſiderable, according to the number of troops compoſing each column, and the degree of obliquity which is given the line. The part to attack, forms a kind of *marteau* or hammer in front, and in its common diſpoſition is formed thus.



This diſpoſition by *echelon* or ladder can (and it is infinitely better) be formed by regiment or brigade, inſtead of ſquadron and battalion, and even with more conſiderable corps; theſe corps in *echelon* being detached from each other, to join their aſſiſtance when called upon, and to occupy the poſitions the better to protect them from action, and to deceive the enemy. Thus AB is the *marteau*, or the front of the line deſtined to attack

attack the enemy in I; C D E F are four columns of the army formed in battle by echelons; occupying different points, where they perform the above-mentioned circumſtances.



Of theſe two methods of forming the oblique order by *lines* or *echelons*, the firſt is an elementary and ſimple method. It is proper to execute it in a camp of inſtruction, to commence a commanding officer's information, in reſpect to the object and properties of an oblique order. The ſecond, which is only a ſucceſſion of the firſt, is more ſimple, more eaſy in its extenſion, more applicable to variety of ground, more ſuſceptible of manœuvre and action, when the order is formed. It is this which ſhould be practiſed in war, eſpecially when the *echelons*, appropriated to refuſe the enemies attack, or to receive it, are formed by brigades or great corps.

There are various methods of forming theſe different oblique diſpoſitions.

1ſt. In giving the columns before-hand the degree of obliquity the diſpoſition requires, and preſenting them nearly in the form of organ pipes.



2d. In

2d. In preſenting the heads of the columns on a parallel front to the enemy's line, keeping it thus in ſuſpence as to the diſpoſition they mean to take, and afterwards manœuvring, part in advance, to carry and to extend on the point found to be weakeſt, part in arrear, to move backward, and to draw from action thoſe detachments from the line which were diſgarniſhed, and which are refuſed to the enemy.

3d. If the *echelons* are formed by ſtrong corps; each column or part of a column compoſing it, ſhould be directed on the point where its extenſion takes place.

4th. The diſpoſition of an oblique *echelon* may be taken, by departing from an already-formed parallel order of battle; the battalions to begin the attack marching in front, and thoſe to ſuſtain them, and to refuſe themſelves to the enemy, ſucceſſively remaining in rear, at diſtances combined on the degree of obliqueneſs they ſhould be formed on. Certain officers privy to the execution of this manœuvre, performed by ſome battalions at the peace encampments of the King of Pruſſia, falſely conceived it was applicable to an army. It is only ſo to a corps of troops, or a part of the line deſtined to begin the attack, making ſucceſſive efforts with part of its force, and keeping the other in reſerve from the fire of the enemy. For an army always forms in battle by movements in column, becauſe all movements in battle, on an extended front, are too ſlow and heavy, affording the enemy too much time and advantages to make its counter diſpoſition.

The oblique order may be formed on the right, left, or centre; that is to ſay, by means of this order, the enemy can be attacked on one of theſe three points, and the remaining part of the line of battle be refuſed to it.

The degree of obliqueneſs in the oblique diſpoſition, whether formed by line or *echelon*, ſhould be combined on the force of the enemy, on its ſkill, its bravery, and ſtill more particularly on the nature of the ground; on the advantageous points of defence, which the ground is capable of giving to thoſe parts of the order of battle,

tle, deſtined to be refuſed to the enemy. Thus more the opponent army is ſuperior, more that army will be ſkilful and manœuvring, and more care is required to remove the defenſive and weak part of the line from it; therefore the oblique direction, on which the army is formed, ſhould take more precaution in forming an open angle with the attacked wing of the enemy. It is ſcarce poſſible to give more general principles on this ſubject; for the nature of ground may be ſuch, to admit of approaching the enemy with thoſe defenſive parts of the diſpoſition, on certain points, without inconvenience; becauſe, by reaſon of the poſition thoſe points provide, there will be ſuch obſtacles between the defenſive parts and the enemy, as not to admit of its making offenſive movements on thoſe parts ſuppoſed to be weakeſt. An opportunity will offer to treat more largely on this, when the ſecond kind of oblique orders are explained.

The oblique order being generally formed on one of the enemy's wings, and its object to come up to it and to take in reverſe; as ſoon as the General determines which is to be attacked, the columns ſhould direct their head and march acutely towards the flank, ſo that at the inſtant of extenſion, the diſpoſition of the wing, which begins the engagement, may cloſe with the enemy and out-flank it.

To procure a more eaſy advantage of cloſing with the enemy, when the oblique order is executed by the right, all the columns of the army, or at leaſt thoſe of the troops deſtined to begin the attack, ſhould extend on the right; and extend on the left, provided the oblique order is formed from thence.

By theſe means, the ground on which the column at the wing extends, is gained by the flank and the exterior of the march order. Hence it does not follow that, in like circumſtances, the columns cannot extend on the centre: this kind of extenſion, being by half more expeditious, ſhould rather always be practiſed, when, by the direction of the march, the army has already accompliſhed the end of cloſing with the enemy.

What-

Whatever may deceive the enemy in reſpect to the diſtribution and deſtination of troops, in an order of battle to be practiſed in the oblique order, particularly the method of combining the intricate mixture of manœuvres with cloſe and open ranks, ſhould be practiſed.

The advantageous reſult to be drawn from this, was explained in the Tactic of troops.

Another advantage of the oblique order, being to ſurpriſe the enemy by a ſudden diſpoſition, and to attack it before it has time to make any variation in its line of battle, the columns ſhould be extended to ſo well combined a diſtance, that, as ſoon as the extenſion is made, the wing, from whence the attack is begun, may march, without loſs of time againſt the enemy, and arrive with the utmoſt velocity upon it. It is impoſſible to aſſign more preciſe rules for this diſtance; if the enemy has but little artillery, or its artillery not formidable, it may be ſometimes very near, eſpecially if there is a poſſibility to *debouché*, or open under cover to it; at other times, if the enemy's artillery be numerous, well executed, and the ground to traverſe, before it is poſſible to come up to it, level and open, the diſtance ſhould be greater. The kind of troops to conduct in this operation ſhould be well conſidered. Are they brave, warlike, well diſciplined, active in their manœuvres? greater things may be attempted, and a manœuvre ſooner riſked nearer the enemy, than if puny and ignorant. If cavalry be drawn on, it can form in battle at a greater diſtance, it being natural to ſuppoſe, it traverſes the ground more rapidly to the point of its attack. If infantry, by the contrary reaſon, it ſhould manœuvre at ſhorter diſtances. In ſhort, the only general maxims, to be given in this particular are, to manœuvre at diſtances where the enemy's fire is not ſufficiently galling to throw diſorder in the movements of troops; not to manœuvre at too great diſtances, the advantages being then loſt to move in columns, which are much more rapid and more eaſy, than in moving in line; to conceal from the enemy as

long

long as poſſible the number of troops it is attained by, and to draw theſe troops as expeditiouſly as poſſible, with a ſmart puſh on the object of their attack. There is no neceſſity to repeat to the reader that this article, as well as the two preceding ones, concerning the method of extention to attain the enemy, and the uſe required to be made of the intricacy combined of the manœuvres in cloſe and open ranks, are applicable to all offenſive diſpoſitions troops may have occaſion to adopt in war.

To advert to the ſecond kind of oblique order, or that in which the army forms, though not by the nature of the ground or the ſkill of its movements obliquely diſpoſed in the enemy's front, in the ſituation to begin the attack on one or more points, and be out of fire on the part of its diſpoſition reſerved from the engagement. This order is moſt generally taken in war, it being ſeldom the caſe, that battles are given in plains perfectly level and open, where conſequently the diſpoſitions may be made without affinity with ground, and in the regular obliquity eſtabliſhed by principles. To profit of the advantageous poſitions the nature of the country indicates, to favour the illuſions planned againſt the enemy, or to poſt more ſecurely the weak parts of the line, this regularity is generally rejected. In a ſimilar manner, the diſpoſition of battle at Liſſa may be called an obl'que one, though it was evident the King of Pruſſia's army was not obliquely formed in front of the Auſtrians: but he attacked their left wing with the prime of his forces, took it in reverſe and routed it, while he poſſeſſed himſelf of a chain of heights fronting their right and centre, to deceive and check them, and to ſtation in an excellent defenſive poſt, the remainder of his army, weakened by the reinforcement drawn to his right. The diſpoſition of Prince Ferdinand's army at Crevel, may be likewiſe called an oblique diſpoſition, it having turned and attacked our left with the choſen of its forces, while the remaining part of his army poſſeſſed, in diſcovering itſelf at the diſtance of the great range of our cannon, the centre and right

of

of our army. Thus it may be ſaid, that almoſt all armies fighting battles for this century paſt, have engaged on the oblique order, on account of their methods of attack being reduced to points. I aſk, whether it is not a truth, that in moſt of theſe battles (excepting thoſe commanded by the King of Pruſſia) chance and routine have not formed their diſpoſitions? and whether there was then any knowledge extant of the oblique order, of its mechaniſm, and to what inſtances it was adapted?

The ſecond kind of oblique orders being more eaſily applied to ground and circumſtances, conſtitute thoſe, which generals ſhould more particularly make an object of their ſtudy; but where can this ſtudy be purſued with ſucceſs, unleſs it is in camps of inſtruction, or in war? and if the expreſſion is permitted, in particular circumſtances where the diſcipline of troops be practiſed.

I have eſtabliſhed ſome of their principles, where no prior ones exiſted; the application of them is left to genius. At preſent the explanation of their truth remains, which will be conſidered in the formation of armies, and the aſſembling of a camp of inſtruction, in which the march orders, and thoſe of battle, relative to the theory I have eſtabliſhed, will be treated of.

CHAP. X.

Formation of ARMIES; *Neceſſity of aſſembling them in Peace, in Camps appropriated for* SCHOOLS *of the* GREAT TACTICS.

WAS it poſſible for a nation, to have troops and generals ſuch as I conceive they ſhould be, its armies would be much leſs numerous than they now are, be better appointed, and able to execute greater things. Its armies would be compoſed of leſs cavalry, leſs troops, leſs artillery. Its infantry would be better armed, more warlike, higher diſciplined, more manœuvring; like the ancient infantry of the Roman legions,

gions, it would be ſufficient of itſelf to enter the field. Its cavalry would be leſs numerous, but then its goodneſs, velocity, ſcience of its movements would, counterbalance its inferiority. Its light troops would at the ſame time perform the ſervice in line, and the line, when required, would act as light troops; conſequently no double employ, no uſeleſs, expenſive corps employed in one object. Its artillery would be leſs in number, it would ſimply have uſeful calibers proper to produce great effects; it would be well appointed, diſburthened of ſuperfluities, good draught attached to it, well diſpoſed in its poſitions, well ſerved in action. All corps conſtituting theſe armies would have a ſimple Tactic, analogous in its parts, ready to ſerve a General's combinations. A like army would not be embarraſſed with an immenſity of equipages; it would be ſober, indefatigable; more wrapt up with glory than inconvenience; it would know how to ſubſiſt on the commodities of the country, and not be ſubordinate to the confined and routinous calculations of contractors for ſubſiſtance; in ſhort, ſuch armies commanded by great men, would renew thoſe prodigies formerly operated by ſmall ones, againſt ignorant multitudes; they ſtill might make great conqueſts and revolutions in empires.

In my particular eſſay on the Tactic of infantry, cavalry and artillery, in the chapter where light troops are treated of, part of my ideas were diſcloſed on the changes poſſible to be effected, in the preſent method of conducting a war. My thoughts in this inſtance will continue to be farther ſupported and devellopped. The principles on which the theory of the great Tactic was formed, were explained at the commencement of this ſecond part; on a view of further procedures of the march orders, and formings in battles deduced from it, we may begin to conceive the Tactic a ſublime and elevated ſcience; how ſuperiority of genius, and not of numbers, decides the ſucceſs of all warlike events. The great Tactic put in practiſe, hereafter to be demon-

ſtrated, will throw the greateſt degree of light on this truth.

It is a ſtrange circumſtance to ſee how armies are formed at this æra. War is declared: miniſters are fixed upon in the cabinet, to attack the enemy in ſuch or ſuch points, and to act on the defenſive on ſuch others. Conſequently there is a neceſſity of forming armies; of courſe an election of generals. How is this contrived? The war department, if this department in the ſovereign's counſel preponderates in point of credit, propoſes an army in Germany, and one in Flanders. It is obſerved, that the miniſter at the head of this department knows but little of an army's conſtitution, or if he has had a military education, it ſeldom happens he has had the command of armies, ſtill leſs ſo that he has well conducted them; conſequently he cannot ſettle a plan of war, with good information on its contingent circumſtances. Yet this plan is fixed upon. A determination is taken to form two armies; ſuppoſe a deciſion is made to act offenſively in Flanders, and remain on the defenſive in Germany. How will the force of theſe armies be reſolved upon? A ſpeculation is formed of the number of troops, the enemy can oppoſe in each of theſe points. A reaſon ſtarts: the enemy will have an army of ſixty thouſand men in Flanders; let us ſend one of eighty thouſand and act offenſively in that quarter: in Germany there is one of ſixty; let us form one of forty and keep ourſelves there on the defenſive. The corps to compoſe theſe armies are ſpecified; a poor faulty rule of proportion, or rather of routine, propoſes that an army of ſo many thouſand men, ſhould have ſo much infantry, ſo much cavalry, light troops, artillery. Generals are nominated, the campaign begins, they moſt of their time relying on number more than ſcience, never deſiſt from application, unleſs they obtain their reinforcements. To-day it is to cover a point, when the army cannot effect its protection. To-morrow it is to oppoſe a diverſion, which probably would not have exiſted, if a precaution had been taken to obſtruct the enemy's meaſures; now it is becauſe

becauſe the enemy has three hundred pieces of cannon, when they have but two hundred. Another time they remonſtrate the enemy has fifteen thouſand light troops and they have only ten. They conceive not, that in having leſs artillery they have leſs embarraſſment; that their two hundred pieces well employed, would ſoon be made an equivalent to the enemy's three hundred; that to render the laſt uſeleſs, there is only a war of marches and movements to be made. They do not conceive the enemy to be weakened by the kind of light troops conſtituted as they now are; that avoiding a war of detail and making it always in maſs, would ſoon cut off the apparent advantage of its having fifteen thouſand. In ſhort, they do not comprehend the great art of war to be that of compenſating for their want of number, by their ſkill, ſooner than increaſing their force, to act offenſively againſt an enemy with a ſuperior army, and to refuſe battle being on the defenſive, when they are weakeſt. Reciprocally and in modelling themſelves after each other, armies increaſe to that degree, Generals are at a loſs how to put them in motion, countries how to find ſubſiſtance, governments how to ſupport and find payment for them. More enlightened Generals would likewiſe be obliged to conform to the eſtabliſhed routine, and require numerous armies. For are theſe troops in Europe, in their nature both citizens and ſoldiers; troops, who, by their conſtitution, abilities, valour, ſobriety, alacrity for toil, ſcience in manœuvres, ſo deciſively ſuperior to thoſe of the neighbouring nations, that there may be a poſſibility of ſaying, with forty thouſand men, a campaign may be attempted, and that campaign an offenſive one againſt ſixty thouſand? Have theſe troops ſufficient confidence in their courage, in their Tactics, in their Generals, to look upon as embarraſſing and weakening all numbers beyond the reaſonable proportions, ſo as not to be alarmed at entering a campaign againſt a ſuperior army; be there Generals in Europe whom governments veſt with ſufficient authority, and who have at firſt ſetting off acquired that confidence in

forming troops on this ſyſtem during peace time, by moulding them, if the expreſſion is permitted, to the principles they would wiſh to conduct them by?

Should there chance to ſpring up in a nation a good General, the policy of miniſters, or intrigues of courtiers, are active in keeping him at a diſtance from troops in time of peace. They ſooner prefer to truſt theſe troops to men of common talents, incapable of forming them, but paſſive, conformable to their wills, and to all their ſyſtems, than to a ſuperior man, who might acquire too great credit, reſiſt adopted opinions, render himſelf a channel through which the ſovereign's military favours are beſtowed; and, in ſhort, be the generated General, the only man capable to command troops. Miniſters are vigilant in providing armies with their own creatures, accuſtoming troops blindly to receive what man they pleaſe to appoint at their heads; I ſay what man they pleaſe, provided he has the ſovereign's brevet. War takes place; misfortunes alone can fix their choice of a General. They employ him, but at the ſame time they traverſe, they act oppoſite to his opinions. Was it poſſible, they would chuſe affairs to ſucceed, and the General to miſcarry in his operations. This General attains the re-eſtabliſhment of affairs, and becomes their ſupport; ſoon his reputation is dreaded; they are importuned with his glory; peace is made; the General already formed, or beginning to be ſo, is no longer conſulted, no longer employed. His talents grow ruſty, or do not attain to perfection; the troops he was acquainted with are changed, conſtituted afreſh, receive other inſtructions, other principles. Thus when new misfortunes replace him at the head of armies, he finds himſelf a ſtranger to thoſe armies, and thoſe armies a ſtranger to him. This picture is a hiſtory of almoſt all ſtates, nearly at all times, therefore let me not be accuſed in having wiſhed to have deſigned one in particular.

What difference between this method of forming armies, and the method which the Greeks, Romans, all great conquering nations formed theirs upon! Did Miltiades,

riades, Themiſtocles, Epaminondas rely on an enemy's number? Did Alexander compare his force to that of Aſia, when he meant to conquer it. He marched with an army of fifty thouſand men to dethrone a king who could arm millions. Annibal took with him ſixty thouſand men for the conqueſt of Italy; Scipio fifty thouſand to attack Carthage. Cæſar with a few legions bent the Gauls, Africa, and part of Aſia to his yoke. And to cite a modern; Guſtavus Adolphus, with twenty-five thouſand Swedes, was a terror to the empire of Germany. Theſe great men knew they were to attack ſuperior armies; they knew more troops than they had, ſometimes arms and methods of fighting unknown to their ſoldiers, would be oppoſed to them; but they had their plans, their Tactic, their armies replete with their own inſtructions, and full of confidence in them. The idea that ſcience and courage inſured victory, and not a multitude of followers, was ſtrongly engraven in the minds of the commanders of theſe ſmall number of men.

Reflect on the Romans, that military people, conquerors by their conſtitution. They engaged with formidable enemies, with courageous and well-conducted nations; they overcame them. How were theſe armies compoſed? Whatever the forces of the enemy were, they were ſubject to a formation, and to proportions from whence they never deviated. The conſular army, that is to ſay, the compleat army, was compoſed of fifty thouſand men. There was likewiſe the army of the tribunes, or incompleat army. Was the republic threatened with ſome imminent danger, two conſular armies were in motion; this was its greateſt effort, and it only took place on two or three occaſions. I do not pretend this is poſſible to be perfectly imitated by our modern ſtates. I do not pretend that a kingdom, having extenſive frontiers, ſubject to be attacked on many points at a time, in which the citizens, not being ſoldiers, can be limited only to one army; but I think at leaſt it might be very poſſible to have armies leſs numerous, and not confined to the regulating of their in-

terior compoſition on thoſe of their adverſaries. In my opinion ſeventy thouſand men ſhould be the moſt conſiderable proportion of an army; a like army, well conſtituted, well commanded, would advantageouſly act againſt one of eighty or a hundred thouſand. I believe every General, who knows the reſource of the Tactic, and who is certain he can rely on his troops, would never wiſh to exceed that proportion; becauſe he will calculate that, whatever he conceived he might gain in favour of numbers, he would loſe by an augmentation of embarraſſing circumſtances, by the ſlowneſs of his movements, by the difficulty of ſubſiſtence. In ſhort Turenne has ſaid, and the opinion of this great man ſhould be a law: "Every army exceeding "fifty thouſand men is inconvenient for the man who "commands, and for thoſe who compoſe it." But for a General to attempt a deviation from the eſtabliſhed routine, and to introduce a new kind of war, I repeat it; he muſt have excellent troops; if they be not compoſed of the choſen part of the citizens, and the conſtitution of the ſtate ſuch, that government cannot nor will nothing change, they muſt at leaſt repair that primitive vice, by all the perfection poſſible in their interior conſtitution, in their diſcipline, in their Tactic. Peace muſt be profited of to form them, to inſtruct both them and thoſe men who are to be put at their head. The camps I am going to propoſe, I believe will fulfil this important object.

The idea of eſtabliſhing peace encampments is a very ancient one. The Romans had this practice; their legions were encamped almoſt all the year. By the means of this inſtitution the diſcipline of theſe legions for ſome time ſurvived the corruption of the empire. But by degrees luxury penetrated into theſe camps; it relaxed their diſcipline, it peopled them with futile characters, courtiers, artificers, merchants, all profeſſions colleagues with debauchery and effeminacy. It turned them into towns, and then warlike virtues not having an aſylum to fly to, they, together with the empire, were ſoon annihilated.

No nation imitated the Romans; therefore no military power equalled theirs. Louis XIV. and Auguſtus I. eſtabliſhed peace encampments; but they were alone camps of parade. Theſe princes ſeeking occaſions of inventing novel recreations, like the glittering gewgaws of their palaces, made an oſtentatious diſplay of their troops. The king of Pruſſia was the modern who firſt eſtabliſhed camps of inſtruction, who employed theſe camps in the execution of marches, orders of battle, and in forming Generals. The fruit he has drawn from this military exertion has been evident; yet what difference between theſe camps of fifteen days, particularly appropriated to render troops manœuvring, to thoſe ſtable camps where the Romans braved the ſeaſons, worked in the earth, making their bodies and minds ſupple to the toil of war!

Laſt peace ſeveral camps were eſtabliſhed in France, but the firſt principles of the Tactics were wanting; luxurious convenience was attended to, manœuvres were diſplayed for the ladies, and they were broke up without much inſtruction. During this peace we have camps every year, but they are of little uſe. Time is loſt in reviews and exerciſes of detail. The conteſt is between thoſe whoſe arms are the brighteſt, ſoldiers beſt appointed; thoſe who can more dextrouſly acquire ſome trifling approbation and great penſions. There are no manœuvres in the great ſcale executed and proper to form general officers; intereſt is made for thoſe who ſhould come or return the enſuing year. If, in the midſt of theſe futilities, ſome officers more enlightened raiſe their voices, and exclaim, theſe camps do not anſwer the object they ſhould fulfil, that an army ſhould be aſſembled and inſtructed in the great operations of the Tactics; they are anſwered, it is either not yet time, or, Generals are not to go to ſchool to learn their duty.

CHAP. XI.

Plan of a CAMP *of* INSTRUCTION; *Compoſition and Diviſion of an Army propoſed to be aſſembled in it.*

WERE troops conſtituted as they ſhould be, I ſhould talk of forming camps after the manner of the Romans; camps when diſtant from towns and vice, they might be in the conſtant exerciſe of warlike operations, where there might be a poſſibility of making them go through a compleat courſe of military education; it is this mixture of a town and military life that renders our troops effeminate, and unadapted to great things; it turns the minds of our officers from ſtudy; Paris in particular is the tomb of military talents. There, characters are impaired, courage enervated, manners corrupted, application becomes languid; there, ideas of fortune are learnt inſtead of thoſe of glory; conſequently when the ambition of particulars takes this fatal courſe, honour, virtues of all kind, the ſtate itſelf, are ſubject to an entire ſubverſion.

But while a revolution, almoſt approaching to a miracle, can operate a change, things muſt be propoſed which can and will be followed. If troops cannot be made citizens, and perfectly conſtituted, at leaſt they muſt be diſciplined and inſtructed. I therefore propoſe to form camps of three months only, and there to aſſemble armies compoſed, divided, organized in the ſame manner as they ſhould be in war. The picture I have here prefixed of an encampment to employ in the execution of all operations of the great Tactic, will be that of an army of fifty thouſand men, conſequently an army of the ſecond claſs. The inſtruction of this may with eaſe be applied to a matter or a more conſiderable one, to one of ſixty or ſeventy thouſand men, which I conſtitute an army of the firſt claſs, and a number never to be exceeded.

A par

A particularized Plan of the Compoſition and Diviſion of an Army propoſed for a Camp of Inſtruction.

Eighty battalions.
Eighty ſquadrons of cavalry or dragoons.
Two thouſand light troops, almoſt compoſed of cavalry.
A hundred and fifty pieces of cannon.

It is here proper to recollect the battalions eſtabliſhed in my plan of an army's conſtitution, were not to exceed four hundred and fifty fighting men, and the ſquadrons more than a hundred and twenty. Conſequently the propoſed army will not be more than forty thouſand four hundred men, including infantry and cavalry, but not light troops and artillery.

It is evident, if the queſtion is to form an army of this claſs for war, and this war is to be carried on in a country difficult for cavalry to manœuvre in, the number of troops of this army ſhould be diminiſhed, to be reinforced with a proportionate number of infantry.

It has been remarked in the eſſay on light troops, why they ſhould in preference be almoſt compoſed of cavalry, and how conſtituted.

The hundred and fifty pieces of cannon ſhould conſiſt in ſix pieces of ſixteen inch caliber, thirty of twelve, fifty of eight, forty only of four, and what we call *four long*, and twenty-four howitzers. I ſhould not attach any cannon to the regiments in war time: depoſits of field artillery ſhould be made in places the moſt proximate to the country where the war is carried on, whence every neceſſary reinforcement ſhould be drawn; if ſieges have been before hand conſidered of, neceſſary trains ſhould be furniſhed for that purpoſe; independent of the cuſtomary beaſts of draught of all the pieces, there will be a third of light draught, as well at the ſuite of the park, as in the depoſits proximate to the army.

There is now a poſſibility of judging after what rule of proportion I ſhould form an army of the firſt claſs. The extreme of its force, I once more repeat, ſhould not exceed ſeventy thouſand men; but when men are mentioned, it is not to be ſuppoſed they are fictitious

ſoldiers

ſoldiers or recruits, but really combatants; ſoldiers well inſtructed, perfectly formed, and the regiments compleat. Why has an army been choſen for the execution of the operations of the great Tactic, but for the better explaining to what degree too great a number of men is uſeleſs, and what ſucceſs may be expected from an army well conſtituted of leſs force? The order of battle, that is to ſay, the primitive diſpoſition of encampment and organization of this army will now be treated of.

The eighty battalions will be divided into three diviſions, called right, left, and centre diviſions. Each diviſion, compoſed of twenty-four battalions, twelve in the firſt and twelve in the ſecond line, is commanded by a lieutenant-general, having under him a ſecond lieutenant-general and three major-generals.

The eight remaining battalions are divided into two brigades of four battalions, called flank brigades, each of which, commanded by a major-general, encamps *en potence* * on the cavalry's flank, and in the diſpoſition of battle, places itſelf where the General judges beſt.

The two wings of cavalry form a diviſion of forty ſquadrons each; twenty in the firſt line, and twenty in the ſecond; this diviſion is commanded by a lieutenant-general and four major-generals. Who could have conceived the ancients knew this order of diviſion, and our having been ſo long applying it to our armies, notwithſtanding their having grown ſo numerous and complicated? Quintus Curtius deſcribes Alexander's army to be divided into many diviſions; he mentions their number, force, the generals who commanded them; this is a proof many people read without acquiring information, and that ſimple and great things do not ſtrike the generality of men.

Light troops ſhould be encamped in advance, and on the wings of the army; they ſhould have the van-guard of the army's movements or cover its flanks; keep rank in the diſpoſition of battle; generally ſerve to reinforce the wings, and menace the flanks and rear of the enemy.

* In the form of a gibbet.

enemy. In caſe of neceſſity they ſhould be ſupported by dragoons from the line, and by corps of infantry.

Artillery ſhould be divided into three diviſions, each attached to a diviſion of infantry, and compoſed of thirty-ſix pieces of artillery, forming ſix diviſions of ſix pieces each, ſo that each diviſion be compoſed of an equal number of pieces of the ſame caliber. Another ſubdiviſion of ſix pieces ſhould be in the park in advance of the army, and called ſubdiviſion of the van-guard. The remaining part of artillery, compoſed half of ſixteen pounders, and half of howitzers *, ſhould form the diviſion of reſerve and the head of the great park, where all the depoſits and baggage waggons are.

The order of battle of this army, repreſented in Plate III. explains what that ſhould be of an army of the firſt claſs. It ſhould be the ſame, but with this exception, four diviſions ſhould be formed inſtead of three, not to render thoſe of infantry too ſtrong and too heavy for the manœuvres. The diviſion of artillery ſhould follow the ſame rule. In reſpect to cavalry, as my opinion, is not to give it a conſiderable augmentation, being perſuaded the increaſe of infantry conſtitutes the principle difference between an army of the firſt and ſecond claſs, therefore each wing of the army ſhould form its diviſion.

Here obliged to conform to the plan of our preſent conſtitution, I ſubdivide infantry in brigades of four battalions each, and cavalry in brigades of eight ſquadrons, or two regiments. If the plan of an army's conſtitution, as propoſed in my great work, had taken place, this diviſion would be ſtill more ſimple: each regiment of infantry, compoſed of three battalions, would form a brigade, and likewiſe each regiment of cavalry the ſame, which would be compoſed of ſeven ſquadrons. But otherwiſe this ſubdiviſion is a thing in itſelf of no great importance; and be whatever it may,

* The army in general making uſe of the word *howitzer* inſtead of *hobit*, which is ſuppoſed to be the proper Engliſh name for this ſmall field mortar, as deriving its name from the german *haubitz*. I have therefore ſubſtituted it inſtead of *hobit*.

the

the great Tactic to be treated of would know how to profit of it.

What is of greater conſequence, and what is now proper to advert to, is the number of general officers. It muſt appear evident how deſirous I am of departing from the cuſtom of overcharging our armies with them. Ten lieutenant-generals and twenty major-generals are now found to be ſufficient for commanding the diviſions of an army ſimilar to that aſſembled in a camp of inſtruction. According to this operation, each commands a number of troops in proportion to his rank. The lieutenant-general a diviſion, and thoſe next in rank have under their orders twenty-four battalions; and in the ſame gradation the major-generals have each eight. In the cavalry, two lieutenant-generals command forty ſquadrons, and the major-generals under them have each ten. On extraordinary occaſions, ſuch as the command of the van-guard, detachments in places, particular commiſſions, replacing Generals in caſe of accident, my plan is to extend the number in time of war to twelve lieutenant generals and twenty-four major-generals. The ſame proportion is obſerved in an army of the firſt claſs.

In employing ſtrictly but the neceſſary number of general officers, the immenſe quantity of equipages and other embarraſſments at the tail of our armies, are diminiſhed: more attention would then be had in chuſing Generals for ſervice: thoſe fixed upon having more extenſive commands, and opportunities more frequent, would be more eaſily inſtructed. Hence thoſe diſtinguiſhed ranks acquire a firſt conſideration, and troops will be accuſtomed to reſpect them. At this day they are ſcarce regarded, ſo many bear the title! At the ſuite of armies and every where ſuch numbers are found! In a word, ſo many people, to the diſgrace of the military, or to its detriment, are veſted with the rank!

Many reflections ſtill remain to be made on this ſubject, particularly ſo as to what regards the liſt of general officers. There is a poſſibility of proving that this liſt,

PART II. *Great Tactics*, Plate III.

Order of Battle of an Army, mustered in a Camp of Instruction.



liſt, in reſpect to our cuſtom of forming it, is complicated, and contrary to the ſecret operations and ſimplicity of the ſervice. It may be proved, that in general it is more compoſed of government creatures, generals, and miniſters, than men peculiarly adapted to that line. It may be expedient for me to ſay ſomething more particularly on the nature of the liſt of general officers, in which is repoſed details of marches, reconnoiterings of country, ſubſiſtances, &c. Inſtead of theſe very eminent objects having theory and ſyſtem, they are manifeſtly guided by routine. Is it not evident a quarter-maſter-general and his principal aids ſhould be officers perfectly informed in the principles of the great Tactics; and who to the general ſcale of war ſhould ſubjoin a knowledge of detail? Theſe poſts ſhould not be given to inexperienced youth, and made openings for further advancement, but conſtituted diſtinguiſhed poſts, where only approved talents are admitted. Theſe employments ſhould ſubſiſt during peace; they ſhould be made active in camps of inſtruction; the remaining part of the year they ſhould have a chain of buſineſs aſſigned to them relative to their functions. This merits farther inveſtigation, and I mean it ſhould take place in the courſe of my work.

A van guard was mentioned in the theory of orders of battle to march at the head of an army; and by the favour of which the General ſhould determine the movements of his columns, and the diſpoſition proper to be taken: it would be proper to explain more particularly what the objects of this van guard are, and how it ſhould be compoſed.

Van guards are generally the corps poſted in advance of the army, and deſtined to precede its movements. Sometimes van guards are detached a few leagues from the army.

There are operations in which theſe detached corps may prove uſeful; but in general it is better to avoid the diſuniting of armies in this manner; for if ſuperior the enemy, the army by this diſunion will be rendered on a level with it; theſe corps are expoſed to defeat,

and

and to loſe in detail what might otherwiſe be acquired in a body. If inferior to the enemy, the army for a much ſtronger reaſon ſhould carry on the war without diſuniting itſelf; but by thus dividing its force, it is reduced to be every where on the defenſive, in a reſtleſs ſtate, and expoſed to reverſe and ſurprize. If it deciſively acts on the defenſive, and generally in ſome *manœuvring kind of operation*, theſe detached corps ſhould be called in; likewiſe all the light troops, and unite its force as firm as poſſible. In ſhort, if it means to attack, why lay itſelf open, give information of approach, and be liable to be engaged on any of its points? As lightning, when the flaſh is ſeen, has already ſtruck the point its direction tended to, ſo it could be deſired when the enemy diſcovers the head of the army, the line might daſh upon it, and no time left to counteract the diſpoſition it is concerting. If on the defenſive, and the army apprehends an attack to be made upon it, can there be a better diſpoſition than one that unites its force, and prepares it, ſo as to be able to reſiſt the enemy in the ſpot where it directs its attack?

If the excellent principle ſhould be conteſted, of diſuniting the force of an army as little as poſſible, was there a neceſſity to have authority for its ſupport, that of the king of Pruſſia's might be cited. Whenever he is on a *manœuvring march*, his vanguard is always cloſe with his columns, and never at a greater diſtance than half a league. This van-guard, like that I propoſe, is compoſed of light troops, dragoons, a few battalions of grenadiers, and ſome pieces of cannon. He is with it in perſon, with the general officers commanders of the columns. From thence he reconnoitres the enemy and determines his order of battle, keeping his columns ready prepared in his rear, and giving to each commander of the columns, when his reſolves are fixed, the points they are to advance to, and the objects they have to ſucceed in; in the mean while making uſe of ſignals, that the columns may make the preparatory diſpoſitions for their extenſion; maſquing, if poſſible, with

with his advanced-guard every thing which is paſſing in its rear; then immediately at the laſt ſignal for the forming in battle, advancing this van-guard all or in part to reinforce the point which is attacked, while at the ſame time the columns extend, and begin the engagement; and this mechaniſm operating with ſo much uniformity, and ſuch great expedition, that the enemy alarmed, have no time to diſcover the diſpoſition the army takes, and to make any variation in theirs.

For the ſame reaſon the king of Pruſſia, in his offenſive manœuvring marches, has his van-guard almoſt immediately at the head of his columns; ſo in his manœuvring marches, when he retreats, his rear-guard, likewiſe compoſed of huzzars, dragoons, and grenadiers, keep to his army. For this reaſon his rear-guard is never engaged. How would it be poſſible for heavy armies, incapable of manœuvring, to attack a rear-guard compoſed of choſen troops, and ſupported by an army ſkilful in halting on its march, forming in battle, and making, when expedient, an offenſive movement in front? In reſpect to light troops and van-guards, they will certainly not engage, but ſubject themſelves to blows.

It would be proper to explain the appointment and regulation of the battalions of grenadiers which I mean to make uſe of, and the reaſon why they have been propoſed.

The companies of grenadiers of each brigade, with a like number of *chaſſeur* companies, or other auxiliaries of grenadiers, formed at the beginning of the campaign, it matters not what name is given them, will compoſe, when called upon, a battalion which ſhould march, fight, and encamp ſeparately.

A company of *chaſſeurs*, or a ſecond one of grenadiers, is propoſed, becauſe theſe battalions ſhould have the neceſſary force and conſiſtence. Beſides, it is a defect in our conſtitution that this is not always the caſe, and that one of the flanks of the battalion ſhould be reinforced and ſupported by a choſen company, while there is wanting one at the other.

When

When judged neceſſary, theſe grenadiers are proffered to be aſſembled and made uſe of in battalion; there are an infinity of occaſions when it will be found advantageous to have corps which may be depended upon; becauſe a particular attack not ſucceeding, may prove the ſource of fatal expedients; becauſe ſuch a march, or ſuch an expedition which theſe battalions can perform with a rapid execution, may not in like manner be effected by regiments of the line. They are further propoſed, becauſe in ſmall engagements troops ſhould never come off with diſadvantage; and becauſe that ſpirit of invincibility and reſolution which is eſtabliſhed in armies, depend on ſmall ſucceſſes acquired daily; in ſhort, they are propoſed becauſe no inconvenience can ariſe from them, and by reaſon of the great art of a General appearing to me to be, that of employing conſtantly his choſen troops, and if poſſible to lead thoſe and none elſe to action.

The following occaſion will demonſtrate the utility which is drawn from theſe battalions of grenadiers. The right of the army begins the attack on the enemy's left, and the left keeps the right on a check. The right flank regiments keep their grenadiers to their colours, and in their cuſtomary rank, but this flank will be reinforced by a detachment from the battalions of grenadiers of the left. The enemy will be attacked, by the means of this ſtratagem, with ſuperior force, and they will not perceive the weak parts of the army's diſpoſition. For the ſame number of battalions will always appear on my left; and whoever has made an active campaign knows that the ſight of colours makes up in appearance for the deficiency of numbers; and that thoſe illuſions made in reſpect to the number of troops, however frequently practiſed, always accompliſh the end required.

It is neceſſary to ſpeak of the choice of country, and the expences of a camp of inſtruction. The firſt may be eaſily found. There is no province in the kingdom but what furniſhes one. There are few but what have extenſive uncultivated ground; but the preference

ſhould be given to interior provinces, to thoſe provinces, which, abounding in produce, want money and population. But above all, theſe camps ſhould be removed from the court and capital. Their expence would not be conſiderable, it would ſcarce exceed that of thoſe uſeleſs camps at Compiegne: it would be even leſs, if the luxury of tables was curtailed, and the enormous profuſion of pecuniary favours; and if the military were brought back to that diſintereſted ſpirit, that auſterity of manners, which ſhould form the baſis of its conſtitution. In ſhort, while this revolution be operating, if the like camps demand a yearly expence of two millions of livres, to what an advantageous intereſt will not this capital be placed, if the glory of our arms, if ſome battles gained, prove the fruit of it.

CHAP XII.

MANŒUVRES *to be executed in a Camp of* INSTRUCTION.

SUFFICIENT has been ſaid to admit of my paſſing without farther preamble to the execution of all orders of battle and of marches. They will therefore be here laid down in the form of a journal, and in the order of their execution. In their order, becauſe it is neceſſary to paſs from one to the other according to their mutual connection, firſt executing thoſe that are moſt ſimple, and afterwards thoſe that are the moſt complicated; and continuing to repeat the ſame till it has been perfectly conceived by the troops and commanders.

Each manœuvre, ſuch as I ſuppoſe will be given to the army to execute, will be explained by the means of the order of marches and of diſpoſition; this order will have a plate prefixed to it, explaining the different movements to be executed. The beſt method of explaining a manœuvre appears to be that, of giving the inſtruction which troops require for its execution.

The primitive order of an army will be the baſis of all manœuvres. Vid. *Pl.* III. In this order of battle the brigades have been numbered, to ſhew the form they are to be ranged in, and that their movements may be ſeen without confuſion in the plans which repreſent them.

FIRST MANOEUVRE.

PLATE IV.

A FRONT MARCH, *with a* PARALLEL ORDER *of* BATTLE.

THE army marches on five columns, each diviſion of infantry and cavalry forming its reſpective one, and begins the march from the right, left, or centre, according to the ſituation of the road it means to follow *.

The two flank brigades march each in rear of their wing column of infantry †.

Each diviſion of artillery marches at the head of the diviſion of infantry to which it is attached, preceded only with a battalion of grenadiers of the ſecond line of that diviſion, taking the head of the column accordingly ‡.

The van-guard is compoſed of light troops, two regiments of dragoons, ſix battalions of grenadiers of the ſecond line and two pieces of large cannon. It ſhould not be in advance of the army, more than two

* Pl. IV. fig. 1. ſhews the army on its march.

† When the nature of the country requires infantry to be attached to the columns of cavalry, theſe flank brigades can either march in front or in rear.

‡ Cannon with their indiſpenſable *caiſſons* to ſerve for inſtantaneous conſumption, are here only ſuppoſed to be made uſe of; for all waggons of draught ſhould march in the rear of troops. When there is a ſuppoſition of no ſuch great quantity of artillery being wanted at the head of the columns, leſs ſhould be poſted; in ſhort, whatever circumſtances point out, ſhould, in reſpect to this, be proportionably combined.

or

PART II.
Great Tactics.
PLAN.
Order of a Front March with the order of Battle in two parallel lines. The Columns as Divisions on the Left



or three thouſand paces, and march by the road of the centre column *.

The commander in chief ſhould be there, with the principal ſtaff officers and the lieutenant-generals commanding the diviſions: theſe laſt, as ſoon as their columns are in motion, ſhould take their poſts as above.

The light troops ſhould detach two or three hundred horſe in advance of each of the wing-columns. Theſe detachments march in *echelon* and communicate with the van-guard.

The commander of each wing-column of cavalry, ſhould ſend with his detachments one or two intelligent officers, to obſerve, during the march, the nature of the country in front, ſo that if the army be obliged to form in battle, the ground can be known, and that he may be able in conſequence to make his diſpoſitions of attack or defence. For want of this precaution how often does it happen, that the commander of a column ready to form is ignorant of the ground which ſeparates it from the enemy!

All the columns ſhould as much as poſſible march on the ſame height, regulating themſelves accordingly on the centre one, which regulates its movement by the orders it receives from the general at the van-guard.

When local circumſtances do not admit of the columns ſeeing each other, the generals ſhould diſpatch well informed officers on their flanks to find intermediate points, from whence the march of the columns can be diſcovered, and return their obſervations accordingly.

The columns of infantry ſhould march on a free and determined ſtep, having a foot officer at their head to regulate their ſpeed †.

* In front marches the van-guard ſhould always march by the road of the centre column, becauſe from thence it is better prepared to reinforce one of the two wings according to circumſtances. Beſides, it is from thence the commander in chief can better view the general diſpoſition of the enemy, and direct the movement of his columns.

† In all columns compoſed of a great body of troops the march ſhould

The columns of cavalry regulate their pace accordingly, keeping on the ſame height of the columns of infantry.

The army ſhould march one or more leagues in this order, till it is arrived on the ground, where the general thinks proper to form it in battle.

When the line is formed a gun ſhould be fired at the van guard: this firſt ſignal will inform the army of its approach to the ground on which its extention is to be formed *.

All the columns ſhould take the ſame height and neceſſary diſtances. Whenever the ground has permitted the openings to be made according to the eſtabliſhed principles, theſe diſtances are ſuppoſed to be determined by the traced road.

The diſtance of one column to the other ſhould equal the front of the troops to manœuvre from the firſt line; and every column of infantry, being compoſed of twenty-four battalions, twelve in the firſt and twelve in the ſecond, take an interval of 1800 paces each †.

In whatever manner the columns of infantry form their extention, whether on the right, left, or centre, their interval being once combined on the number and form of the battalions of the firſt line, ſhould be equal and always the ſame.

In reſpect to the columns of cavalry, if the extention be made on the right, that on the right leaves between it and the column, the 1800 neceſſary paces for the extention of that column, and 150 paces more,

ſhould be leſs accelerated; for more there are troops, more thoſe in the rear will be fatigued, provided thoſe in front do not keep a ſtep proportioned to the extent of the column.

* This ſignal ſhould be made ten or twelve hundred paces before the columns arrive on the ground for manœuvring, ſo that they may have time to take their neceſſary heights and diſtances, and afterwards to double by diviſion and prepare for their manœuvres.

† 150 paces to each battalion are here ſuppoſed to be wanting to form in battle; ſhould there be more or leſs wanting, the diſtances of the columns will be in conſequence calculated. The queſtion is here of two feet to a pace.

for

for the interval between the left ſquadron and the battalion at the right wing of the infantry: the column of cavalry at the left will have the neceſſary interval between it and the column of infantry on its right, to extend the twelve ſquadrons of the firſt line, and 150 paces more which ſhould remain for the interval, between the extremity of its own right wing and the left wing of the infantry.

If the general extention be made from the left, the right column of cavalry, ſhould leave between it and the column of infantry on its left, the interval mentioned as above to the column of cavalry on the left, and this latter the interval appropriated for that on the right.

If the general extention be made on the centre, between each column of cavalry and the column of infantry next to it, there is left the neceſſary ground for the extention of half that column, with 150 paces, which ſhould remain between the cavalry and infantry, and afterwards the neceſſary interval for the extention of the ſix ſquadrons.

When the columns arrive at 7 or 800 paces of the ground, where their extention ſhould be formed, a ſecond ſignal from a gun ſhould be made; they then quit their route march, cloſe their ranks, form by diviſions, afterwards form their extention on cloſed intervals, and begin advancing on a quick march, increaſing their attention to dreſs their head on that of the approximate columns.

The part of the column which ſhould extend in the ſecond line, likewiſe retains 300 paces of interval, which is the neceſſary diſtance between the lines, counting from the diviſion which ſhould ſerve for its line of dreſs, in its extention to that which ſerves the line of dreſs of the firſt line in its extention. For example, as the extenſion is here made by the left, this interval ſhould be told off from the firſt diviſion of the firſt battalion of the column, to the firſt diviſion of the thirteenth battalion.

The columns of cavalry obſerve the ſame precaution.

When the columns arrive at the point for dreſſing upon, which the General has ſhewn to the command-

ing officers of the diviſions, a third ſignal ſhould be made from the advanced guard; at this ſignal the columns of infantry extend from the left without advancing, but forming their extenſion on quick time.

The artillery forms in battle by one of thoſe manœuvres deſcribed in the particular Tactic appropriated for it. The battalion of grenadiers marching before it, rejoins their brigades.

The columns of cavalry extend by the ſame movements as thoſe of the infantry.

In all orders of battle whatever, the firſt line of cavalry ſhould be formed in cloſe ranks, and the ſecond with intervals between each ſquadron. This principle has two advantages; firſt, when the firſt line is defeated, it will not diſorder the ſecond; ſecondly, the ſecond line, by attaining thus the firſt, will aſſure and protect its flank.

The flank brigades in the moſt expeditious manner form themſelves *on potence* on the flank of the lines of infantry: if they find an advantageous curtain to cover them, they keep themſelves in column by diviſion on the flank, and ready for attacking by forming themſelves in battle; if not, they ſhould reſt one of their wings on the flank of the firſt line, and thus extend themſelves on the flank and beyond the ſecond.

The battalion of grenadiers of the vanguard expeditiouſly rejoin the brigades, unleſs the General judges proper to diſpoſe of it to reinforce ſome part of his order of battle.

The dragoons likewiſe paſs on a march trot, through the intervals which are between the wings of the cavalry and infantry, and poſt themſelves in a third line in rear of the centre of the infantry.

The light troops throw themſelves on the flank of the wings of the cavalry, to be near enough to harraſs the enemy in rear and in flank.

The extention formed, the army will find itſelf drawn up on two parallel lines to thoſe of AB, which are ſuppoſed to be the poſition of the enemy.

The



PART II.

Great Tactics

Plate VI.

Order of a March in front, with a parallel line of Battle, the Columns countermarching in the Center.

The lines formed, they will immediately dreſs on the centre. The General can afterwards order them to advance 1000 or 1200 paces: then the army may halt and repoſe under arms; and ſometime afterwards reform itſelf in columns for its march, and by the ſame road enter its camp.

Here it would be proper to call to mind, what has been ſaid in reſpect to the miſtake, of making an army march in line of battle in perfect dreſs. This immenſe movement cannot be executed in any way but the following one. The General firſt ſhews the poſition where he means to tranſport himſelf, and then the army puts itſelf in motion on an equal and determined ſtep: each regiment, brigade and diviſion dreſſing itſelf as perfectly as poſſible in their reſpective marches; and each general officer, commanding either a brigade or diviſion, regulating their march, ſo as to give as much ſymmetry as poſſible to the lines; but in no caſe whatever, ſhould the lines endeavour to dreſs from one wing to the other, and retard their motion to acquire ſuch a chimerical perfection of their line.

SECOND *and* THIRD MANŒUVRES, *Plates* V. *and* VI.

The parallel order, formed after a front march, will be likewiſe the object of a ſecond and third manœuvre. In the ſecond (Pl. V.) in general the extention will be formed on the right; and in the ſecond (Pl. VI.) it will be formed on the centre. For the detail of the march orders and the movements of theſe two manœuvres advert to the preceding example; there being no difference in this but the ſpace of the extentions, and the diſtances which the columns ſhould in conſequence obſerve.

Fourth Manœuvre.

Plate VII.

Flank March, with a parallel Order of Battle.

The enemy is ſuppoſed to be encamped at AB, or elſe marching by its flank to occupy the poſition CD, and that one or other of theſe circumſtances forces the army to execute a march on its right.

The army marches by its right flank and on three columns.

The van-guard compoſed of two regiments of dragoons, and ſix battalions of grenadiers, marches in a ſeparate column detached from the general march, at 2 or 3000 paces, on the flank of the columns, and on a height with the centre of the army, ſo as to obſerve the enemy, and to give, if neceſſary, time for the army to form itſelf in battle.

If the enemy be in movement, the principle attention of the van-guard ſhould be had to the head of the march, ſo that if they varied from a parallel direction to the movement of the army, and that their project was to gain its flank to begin the attack towards the head of thoſe columns, the army in conſequence might change its diſpoſition and form in battle on the flank.

The light troops ſhould march 2 or 3000 paces in advance of the head of the columns, to accompliſh the end ſpoke of, in concert with the van-guard; and particularly to open the front of the march.

The general, ſtaff-officers and commanders of the diviſions ſhould be at the van-guard.

The firſt column to the left ſhould be compoſed of the entire firſt line of the army, in the order it means to encamp in.

The third column ſhould be compoſed of all the artillery.

It

PART II.

Great Tactics.

PL. VII.

Order of a March in Flank with a Front Line of Battle.

It has been remarked in the ſyſtem of opening marches, that the road of this column ſhould be opened as near as poſſible to the columns of the troops, ſo that it might, if obliged to form in battle, tranſport itſelf rapidly for their ſupport.

If indeed circumſtances be ſuch, that the enemy would attack the army on its movement; a detachment of artillery of each diviſion, diſengaged of their carriages, ſhould march in front and rear of every brigade of infantry, dividing themſelves for this purpoſe, half to thoſe of the firſt line, half to thoſe of the ſecond, and the third column ſhould be no longer compoſed but of the remainder of the artillery, baggage waggons and draught horſes.

The flank brigades put themſelves in motion, thoſe of the right having two battalions in front or rear of the cavalry of the firſt column to the left, and two in the front or rear of the cavalry of the ſecond, according as the nature of the country requires. The flank brigade, as local circumſtances occur, will have the ſame, and two battalions in front or rear of the cavalry to the left.

The army marches in this order till the General thinks proper to form it in battle.

A gun at the van-guard will then be fired; at this firſt ſignal, which prepares the army for its approach to the ground where it is to form in battle, the columns will dreſs as well as poſſible, on their left file; the platoons cloſe their ranks, take their compleat diſtances, and the heads of the columns ſlacken their ſtep. The ſecond column which forms the ſecond line, ſhould approach if poſſible to the firſt, at the diſtance of 300 paces, which is the interval between the two lines. At the ſame time the commander in chief ſhould ſend the general officers to their diviſions, ſhowing them the points of dreſs of the right and left of the line.

A ſecond ſignal prepares the army for drawing up in battle by quarter wheels to the left, when the lines ſhould be formed.

The

The van-guard rejoins the army, the ſix battalions of grenadiers re-enter their brigades, and the dragoons rapidly paſs through the interval of the order of battle to form in the centre.

The flank brigades take their accuſtomed order on the wings of the infantry.

The artillery, if forming a third column, ſhould paſs through the intervals of the battalions of the two lines, to diſtribute themſelves in an expeditious manner in the advantageous poſts on the front of the firſt line.

The light troops form on the flank of the line of battle. The army, being formed and dreſſed, halts, and repoſes itſelf, afterwards it begins the column of its march and enters its camp.

Fifth Manœuvre.

The day following the ſame march to the left ſhould be executed, the army forming in battle by the contrary movements I have been treating of: this manœuvre has no need of a plate, or explanation.

Sixth Manœuvre,

Plate VIII.

Another flank March, with a parallel Order.

The flank march may likewiſe be executed on four columns, each half of the line forming one; for example, in ſuch a manner that the army marching by its right, the firſt column of the left ſhould be compoſed of the firſt line of the right wing of cavalry, and of half of the infantry's right at the firſt line; the ſecond column of half of the left of the ſaid infantry, and of the left wing of the firſt line of cavalry; the third and fourth columns each of the half and ſecond line in the ſame order.

Excluſive of the above four columns, there will be a fifth within the march for the artillery, without counting

ing

PART II.

Great Tactics.

Pl. VIII.

Another order of a Great March with a parallel line of Battle



ing that without the march which forms the vanguard, conformable to what was ſaid in the preceding manœuvre.

It muſt here be remarked, that the roads of theſe columns ſhould be opened as near to each other as poſſible, that at the inſtant of forming in battle, the parts of the ſecond line may find themſelves nearly tranſported to the diſtance where they ſhould be poſted.

The army forms in battle by the accuſtomed ſignals, the firſt column extending on the determined poſition, to occupy half of the right of that poſition, the ſecond column directing itſelf, and afterwards halting to occupy half of the left, the third and fourth columns making the ſame movements as the firſt and ſecond; to form the ſecond line.

Remark.

This method of executing a flank march, has the advantage of keeping the army more united, and conſequently, if ſuch were the circumſtances to be apprehended, that the enemy making a concealed manœuvre to diſcover itſelf at the head of the march, the army would by this means be more ready to form itſelf on the defenſive oppoſite to them; but in this caſe, unleſs there was time ſufficient for the purpoſe, the troops ſhould not be ſubject to be drawn from the right to the right of the new poſition, or from the left to the left. The queſtion is, by the moſt rapid movements, to multiply the columns, to direct their movement by extending them one from the other, on the points where they are to break, and form an order of battle, combined on the poſition which the commander in chief thought proper to take, to oppoſe the above unexpected circumſtance of the enemy. Examples will be produced of this manœuvre, when the orders of battle analogous to ground are treated of.

The parallel order, ſuch as I have adapted to an army, after its different front and flank marches are made, is but a primitive diſpoſition of encampment and organization,

ganization, without any affinity to ground and other circumſtances.

Some examples of the oblique order will ſhew, how this primitive diſpoſition is varied from, to admit of reinforcing the line on one particular point, when an attack is refuſed on that which has been weakened. We ſhall afterwards find how this oblique order is applied to ground and circumſtances. In all ſcience of principles we muſt proceed by degrees, and in ſuch a manner, that the ſimpleſt things may lead to the moſt complicated.

SEVENTH MANŒUVRE.

Plate IX.

Front March, with a line of battle in oblique Order.

The enemy ſuppoſed to be attacked is poſted at AB, and ranged on two lines, its infantry in the centre, and cavalry on the wings.

The army marches on five columns. The formation of theſe columns, that of the van-guard, and of all the details of the march order, will be the ſame as theſe in the firſt manœuvre.

The General having, at the head of his van-guard, examined the poſition of the enemy, and reſolved to attack its left wing, will ſhew to the commanders of the diviſions the line of battle he purpoſes taking, the extention by which they are to form it, and the points which ſhould regulate the dreſs. The commanders in conſequence expeditiouſly join their columns to direct the execution of the extention and the order of battle.

The heads of the columns arrived at the diſtance of 300 paces of the ground where the army forms, a ſignal ſhould be given from the van-guard. This firſt ſignal informs the army of its approaches to the ground, where it ſhould begin its extention and, that the oblique order ſhould be formed to the right *

* It is to be ſuppoſed, that the different ſignals will be fixed on before-hand, which diſcover to the army the order of battle it ſhould take, and if it is an oblique order, the part of the diſpoſition of the enemy on which that order makes the attack.

When





PART II.

Great Tactics.

PLIX.

Order of a great March, with an oblique Order of Battle in a continued line.

XI. *To make the Explanation of the Disposition of the order of Battle which is to be established which serves as a Rule to all the other oblique orders, the Brigades in the March order and in drawing the order of Battle are numbered.*

When the extention is made on the right, the columns ſhould take their neceſſary diſtances. For which purpoſe advert to the principles given in the parallel order.

The right column of cavalry, and firſt column of infantry ſhould always in this caſe extend entirely in the firſt line, for which purpoſe they ſhould be careful to have on their right the neceſſary diſtances to form.

Each head of a column ſhould retire 600 paces from the head of the column to the right, by which means the degree of obliquity from right to left will be 2400 paces *.

All the columns continue tranſporting themſelves in front, by an inſenſible inclination to the right, to gain the flank of the enemy.

The right column of cavalry, and firſt column of infantry, ſhould be entirely extended in the firſt line, and begin the attack; to be more rapidly formed, they might begin to divide their ground, forming each two or three columns, the heads of which turned towards the points where they ſhould form in battle: this preliminary motion is marked in the plan.

The three brigades of the ſecond line, of the ſecond column of infantry, will ſeparate from their columns, to direct themſelves to the right, to approach the rear of the firſt column of infantry; theſe three brigades ſhould form in a ſecond line, immediately in rear of the three right brigades.

The three brigades of the ſecond line of the third column make the ſame movement to the right, to be prepared to occupy, when in battle, all the ground of the ſecond line from the right to the left brigade.

A ſecond ſignal made 1200 paces before the columns are on the ground, where they are to begin their extention, prepares them for it. They then form by diviſions, and extend themſelves with cloſe diſtances.

* Reſpecting this, there is no principle as yet fixed. The General ſhould give more or leſs obliquity to his diſpoſition, according as he has more or leſs to fear from the enemy, againſt the weak parts of his line.

The

The column of cavalry to the right, and the firſt column of infantry take their order, to extend entirely for forming the firſt line.

The ſame ſhould take place for the three brigades of the firſt line, and of the ſecond and third columns of infantry. The point to be occupied by theſe brigades of the ſecond line of theſe columns has been pointed out in a former paſſage.

The twenty ſquadrons at the head of the column of cavalry of the left, move on a ſmart trot and with intervals between their diviſions, on a line with the van-guard; and they ſhould manœuvre with the greateſt diſplay of force, and with all the appearance of the offenſive, to engage them to think that the attack will be made on their right.

The van-guard will alſo halt on the line of the ground where the column of the right extends itſelf, and it will manœuvre in front of the army, to maſk, as much as poſſible, the movements of the army carried on in its rear.

Theſe 20 ſquadrons of the left wing carried on a line with the van-guard and manœuvring before the centre; and the column of the right preſenting its head alſo on the ſame line, ſeem to indicate to the enemy their preparing to form on a dreſs parallel to their front, while in reality this diſpoſition is only a curtain, behind which the ſame army forms in battle, and which ſham diſpoſition diſappears at the third ſignal *

The 20 rear ſquadrons of the left column move on a ſmart trot, and, if poſſible, in cloſe column by diviſion, to reinforce the cavalry on the right; for which

* It muſt likewiſe be obſerved that theſe movements can, by means of the different ſituations of the country and combined on theſe ſituations, procure more compleat decepticns, that they are made at a tolerable good diſtance from the enemy, and that in like circumſtances the enemy, againſt which the army marches, has always accidental cauſes to fight through, which is the reaſon why it ſees but imperfectly the force oppoſed to it, and the wavering plans which paſs in the mind of the General, and even when theſe plans are fixed, it ſcarcely diſcovers the ſlowneſs of the counter movements which he endeavours to oppoſe againſt the enemy.

purpoſe

purpoſe they paſs in rear of the columns of infantry, being attentive to keep themſelves as near them as poſſible, to conceal their movement from the enemy.

As ſoon as the head of the column on the right arrives on the ground where it begins its extention, which is ſuppoſed to be about 1200 paces from the enemy, a third ſignal is given for the army to form in battle.

All the columns now extend by the right; thoſe of the infantry on a quick ſtep, and the column of cavalry on a gallop.

The firſt diviſion of each column, which ſhould be the diviſion of dreſs, previouſly makes a half-quarter-wheel to the left, ſo that the line may take its degree of obliqueneſs and dreſs upon it.

The column of cavalry on the right entirely forms on one line, and the twenty ſquadrons which arrive from the left form a ſecond line in rear of it.

The right column of infantry, will likewiſe entirely form itſelf in the firſt line.

It muſt be here remembered, that the columns might divide the ground before-hand, to approach thoſe points the brigades which compoſe it ſhould occupy. It depends on the vigilance of the lieutenant-generals who command them, to direct theſe interior movements, for increaſing the rapidity of the general extention as they think moſt convenient.

The flank brigade of the right ſhould extend the flank of that wing, or keep in column on the flank of the lines of infantry, to be prepared to ſuſtain the cavalry, or to extend, if thought neceſſary, the front of the infantry. Circumſtances ſhould in this reſpect determine its movement *.

The ſecond and third columns of infantry extend, half in the firſt line, and half in the ſecond. The brigades 15, 18, and 16 of the ſecond column of infan-

* This is demonſtrated in the plan at the extremity of the right wing of the infantry. If it be not judged neceſſary to extend this line ſo much, it can be made a reinforcement on the flank, or at any other part of the diſpoſition.

try

try form themſelves in a ſecond line immediately in rear of the three brigades of the right; to effect this, at the firſt ſignal they incline to the right, to draw near to the poſt where they form in order of battle *.

The brigades 12, 8, and 4 of the third column, in the ſame manner as the flank brigade of the left, occupy the remainder of the ſecond line, leaving neceſſary diſtances between each other; and keep themſelves in readineſs to march for the aſſiſtance of the right, in caſe a reinforcement is wanted.

The artillery, at the head of the firſt column of infantry to begin to fire, ſhould extend itſelf in a rapid manner in front of the right of the line, and take poſt particularly in front of the interval which ſeparates the cavalry from the infantry, obſerving to throw its fire in an angular direction on the cavalry of the enemy, and to act more particularly on the troops.

The artillery at the head of the ſecond and third columns, excepting thoſe of a large caliber, which ſhould remain, that by the means of their ranges they may attain the enemy, move with the utmoſt precipitation to reinforce the right, and to diſtreſs the left wing of the enemy by its heavy fire.

The van-guard retreats in a rapid manner by the intervals of the order of battle, the dragoons move as quick as poſſible, to form a third line in rear of the right of the infantry, and the ſix battalions reinforce the wing of the ſaid infantry and form or ſupport the head of the attack. That theſe grenadiers may have time to arrive at their deſtination, they may, from the firſt ſignal, begin to draw off to the right wing.

* Here it may be ſeen that I touch on the prejudice of inverſion. The columns being as I ſuppoſe on their march on the right, to form the troops in battle in their primitive order, they ſhould begin their extention in advance on the left, or on the right in rear: inſtead of that the extention is formed in front of the right: a movement which brings the troops on the rear of the columns to the right; but this is of ſmall conſequence, the brigade 19 is of the ſame value as the brigade 1, and by this inverſion I compleat the deciſive object of attaining the enemy, and forming the line in front on the dreſs of the head of the column: an advantage which will always be ſeen by thoſe who reflect upon it.

The

The twenty ſquadrons of the left column, which ſhould be already tranſported on a line with the vanguard, retire with great expedition, and join the left wing forming all in the firſt line.

By the means of theſe movements the army will be formed in the following order; its firſt line will conſiſt of ſixty ſquadrons and forty-eight battalions, without including four battalions *en potence* on the right flank, and ſix battalions of grenadiers prepared to lead or ſupport the attack. The ſecond line will be compoſed of twenty ſquadrons and twenty-eight battalions, twelve of which ſupport the right of the firſt line. Excluſive of this, two regiments of dragoons will be in reſerve, and form a third line in rear of the infantry of that wing. Conſequently the whole of the reinforcement tranſported to the point of attack, will conſiſt of eighteen battalions, twenty ſquadrons, two regiments of dragoons, and two diviſions of artillery *.

The firſt repetition of the oblique order may be here applied, that the troops may begin to know perfectly, and without confuſion, the interior movements by which they form. To make them comprehend the manner in which the enemy ſhould be attacked after the line is formed and the meaning of this line, the ſecond method of forming the oblique line ſhould be practiſed in the following manner.

So ſoon as the cavalry on the right wing is drawn up, the officer who commands it, without attending to the general extenſion of the army which would be forming during his movement, ſhould begin his attack, giving the ſignal by the trumpet from the centre brigade.

* It is evident, if the general thought proper to give a greater extent to the right of his firſt line of infantry, to attain and embrace the enemy's flank in a more compleat manner, he might effect it by the means of the flank brigade of that wing, and with the ſix battalions of grenadiers which were the vanguard. On the other hand it is obvious if he meant to contract it, he might in this caſe move his firſt column of infantry, part in the firſt and part in the ſecond line. In the oblique order, all the mechaniſm of the diſpoſition is contained in the flank columns; it is by them the front is extended and reinforcements made on the point of attack; in ſhort, they are the principal and acting part of the line.

The 1200 paces for the cavalry to traverſe before it attacks the enemy, ſhould be made with that progreſſion of ſpeed and movement, recommended for the manœuvres of the charge in the Tactic of the cavalry.

The commanding officer of the right wing of the line of cavalry, ſhould not be remiſs in taking his points of direction in his movement, to be able to make uſe of all parts of the wing which attains the enemy to embrace and attack its flank.

The ſecond line follows the firſt on a trot.

When the firſt line of cavalry has traverſed the 1200 paces, which we ſuppoſe has already broke that of the enemy, it ſhould halt to put its ſquadrons in good order, detach ſome ſmall troops to purſue thoſe who fly and hinder them from rallying; at the ſame time manœuvring on the flank and the back of the infantry of the enemy, while the infantry on the right of the oblique part of the line attacks in front.

The ſecond line on a gentle trot ſupports the horſe detached after the part of the enemy that is routed.

When the battalion *en potence* on the flank, diſcovers the ſucceſs of the cavalry, they ſhould make a quarter wheel to the left, to reinforce and extend the line of the infantry.

The light troops ſhould likewiſe profit of this advantage, to penetrate into the rear of the enemy and increaſe their diſorder.

When the cavalry begins its movement to charge the enemy in front of it, the right of the infantry ſhould march on a quick ſtep for the attack, deſcribing ſomething like a circular motion to fall on their flank. The reſt of the army ſhould incline to this motion, and follow its direction. This quarter wheel ſhould not be performed with the ſlowneſs and preciſion of a line which would execute it from the right to the left; the commanding officer, who leads on the right of the wing, has only to remark when he begins his attack, to take his point of ſight beyond their front, that if he attains them, he may fall on their rear.

There

There is no neceſſity to be able to compriſe, in this manœuvre, a perfect reality of the circumſtances of war, ſince neither enemy or obſtacles are before me; the queſtion is ſimply to make known, that the intention of the oblique order is to change briſkly the wing it marches to attack, and then without loſs of time to puſh its ſucceſs, taking the line of the enemy in rear and flank; the army for this purpoſe making a ſmall part of a wheel, and driving the enemy before it, till it is entirely defeated.

It might be judged proper, but indeed this ſhould not be attempted, but when troops are perfectly inſtructed, to ſuſpend from time to time the movement of the right wing, as if in reality retarded by the enemy, it was ready to attack them; and in this caſe make the battalions fire by platoons; then after a few diſcharges continue to advance them, as if they had the advantage. It is the buſineſs of the commander of the right wing, ſuppoſed to be engaged to conduct this manœuvre; and all the intelligence of the generals in the remainder of the line ſhould conſiſt in following the movement of that wing, always marching in concert with it, and finiſhing the quarter-wheel; this is a definitive object of the manœuvre, becauſe, when it is finiſhed, the army is ſuppoſed to be maſter of the field of battle.

When the right of the wing is arrived at O, ſuppoſed to have routed the left of the enemy, it will halt, as alſo the reſt of the army, the lines dreſſing and repoſing under arms, afterwards forming in columns of march, and returning to their camp.

REMARK *on the preceding* MANOEUVRE.

What was ſaid on the ſubject of forming the oblique line, in treating of the different orders of battle, ſhould be here remembered, I pointed out, that it was ſimply a manœuvre of principle, and only calculated for the better comprehending the execution of other oblique orders. When the king of Pruſſia, in his peace encampments, trained his generals in the firſt principles

of the oblique orders, their execution was the ſame as I have explained them, and it was only when they were finiſhed, he formed them in *échelons*. It ſeems as if he reſerved for war the ſecret of applying that order to ground, ſimply contenting himſelf with the idea of having organized his machine, and having prepared its ſprings; at Liſſa, at Hohenfriedberg, and in ſome other capital occaſions, he only put that *chef d'œuvre* of his Tactic in execution. Some examples will be ſubjoined of this oblique order in *échelons*, its ſimplicity and utility will ſoon be acknowledged how it is calculated for action, and how applicable to all the variety of ground and circumſtances in war.

The EIGHTH MANOEUVRE.

Plate X.

A March Order, with an oblique Line in Echelons, *extending from the centre.*

The army marches in five columns. For the explanation of forming the columns, for the van-guard and detail of the march order, advert to the firſt manœuvre of the parallel order.

When the firſt ſignal prepares the columns to take their diſtances, the firſt and ſecond columns continue the ſame height in their march. The ſeventh manœuvre ſhews, what the other columns ſhould attend to from each other, and what reſpects all the anterior precaution for the extenſion; the only variation in this manœuvre is the columns extending from the centre, and the oblique forming by *échelons*.

The firſt column ſhould have ſufficient ground on its right, to extend twenty ſquadrons.

The ſecond column ſhould have an interval between the ſecond for an extenſion of twelve battalions and twenty ſquadrons, and 150 paces more between the cavalry and infantry.

There ſhould be a ſufficient interval between the third and ſecond column for the extenſion of 18 battalions.

Between



PART II
Great Tactics
PL X.

Order of a great Attack with an oblique line of Battle en echellon
the Columns extending to the Center.

Between the fourth and third there ſhould be ground ſufficient for the extenſion of twelve.

Between the fourth and fifth there will be ground ſufficient to contain ſix battalions and ten ſquadrons, and 150 paces more of interval, which ſhould remain between the cavalry and infantry.

At the third diſcharge of the cannon, to prepare the army for forming in battle, all the columns extend on the centre, without the diviſions of the dreſs previouſly making half quarter wheels.

The firſt and ſecond columns having marched to the ſame height, ſhould form themſelves in battle on the ſame dreſs; they ſhould entirely extend themſelves in the firſt line, and their ſecond ſhould be formed, according to the foregoing example, by the troops of the other columns.

In reſpect to the third, fourth and fifth columns, which have marched to 600 paces of height, one from the other, as ſoon as their extenſion is made they ſhould remain in *échelon* by diviſion, in the ſame manner as it is marked in the plan by pointed lines; or if the general gives his orders for it, they ſhould form the *échelon* by brigade or by battalion. Theſe three methods are marked in the plan, and the two firſt are preferable. Whether the *échelons* are formed by diviſion, by brigade, or by battalions, they ſhould be ranged each in rear of that which is at its right, and its right flank in a perpendicular height of the left flank of the ſaid *échelon*.

For the movements of the brigades of the ſecond line, and for thoſe of the van-guard, advert to the example of the preceding manœuvre.

The army having finiſhed its extenſion, ſhould form two lines of equal force to the above manœuvre; but here the oblique line will be in *échelons*, the diviſions, brigades, or battalions, which form theſe *échelons*, being ranged parallel to the front of the enemy, and ſucceſſively extending from the right to the left, while the right wing, which ſhould begin the attack, forms a kind of *marteau*, or wedge in front of this oblique line.

The ſixth manœuvre will explain the movement of the cavalry of the right.

When it has defeated that of the enemy, all the infantry of the right inſtantly advances, the reſt of the army reſting againſt it and following its movement, always attends to its diſtance and preſcribed obliqueneſs.

If the right ſtands in need of ſuccour, it ſhould be ſucceſſively reinforced by all the brigades of the line, the line of battle in this caſe only contracting itſelf, and the battalions deſtined to reinforce the right, having only to march by the flank, or by a half quarter converſion to carry themſelves to the attack.

As it acquires ſucceſs, and as the right continues to advance, the army ſhould incline to it, and follow its movement, ſo as not to diſunite: to effect this, each battalion carries its left wing in a half quarter wheel or converſion, that it may march with more eaſe towards the flank.

The intention of the right wing ſhould be always to gain ground on the right, to reverſe on the enemy, and form on its flank.

When the left of the enemy is entirely defeated, and the right of the army formed on the ground which it occupied, the diviſions, brigades, and battalions approach each other, to form, in a ſenſe, two contiguous lines, and thus with their front to puſh this firſt advantage, until the right of the army, arrived at the point P, is ſuppoſed to have entirely routed the enemy *.

Then the lines take their dreſs next under arms, and ſoon afterwards put themſelves in columns of march to re-enter their camp.

Remark. It is needleſs to obſerve, that this oblique order by *échelons* can equally be executed by the left, and by extending the columns by the right, or by the left.

* The ſeventh manœuvre has ſhewn, how the movements of an army, after it has taken its order of battle, can be ſketched but in an imperfect and approximative manner, becauſe in war, circumſtances, the nature of ground, and the reſiſtance of the enemy determine the movements; but this ſketch is of itſelf ſufficient to give any military man an idea of the manœuvre.



PART II.
Greek Tactics.
Pl. XI.

NINTH MANOEUVRE.

Plate XI.

March Order, with an oblique Line of Battle; the Columns preſenting themſelves to the Enemy on a Dreſs parallel to their Front.

The army marches in its accuſtomary order. For the forming of the columns, and of the van-guard, for the march order, and for the diſtances which the columns ſhould keep between each other, ſee the example of the preceding manœuvre, the columns in this caſe equally extend by the centre.

The firſt ſignal informs the army of its approach to the ground, where it begins its extenſion, the columns carefully attend to the diſtances which are preſcribed for the extenſion on the centre; but, as the object of this manœuvre is to deceive the enemy, by preſenting to it the columns on a parallel dreſs to its front, and to take afterwards the oblique order by movements made in the rear, the columns ſhould therefore always march on the ſame height till the very inſtant the extenſion is begun.

A ſecond ſignal from the cannon having prepared the columns to be in readineſs, they will then form by diviſions, and take the order of extention at cloſed diſtances, &c.

A third ſignal from the cannon prepares the army for its extenſion. This ſignal ſhould be made when the heads of the columns are at about 1200 paces from the enemy.

Then the firſt and ſecond columns extend on quick time in their march, and according to the preceding example.

All the other columns face to the right, and march by the ſame road which they had taken; the third 1200 paces, the fourth 1800, and the fifth 2400.

When each of theſe columns have made the number of paces which was preſcribed to it, they will face about,

extend by the centre, and afterwards form the *échelon* by diviſion, by brigade or battalion, as in the preceding manœuvre.

The artillery which is at the head of the ſecond column of infantry, tranſports itſelf on a full trot to reinforce that of the firſt. That of the third follows the movement of its column.

The brigades of the ſecond line of the ſecond and third columns of infantry ſhould put themſelves in readineſs on the firſt ſignal, the firſt to extend in rear of the right of the firſt line of infantry, and the ſecond to occupy the ſecond line.

The van-guard ſhould withdraw itſelf by the intervals of the centre, and poſt itſelf in the ſame manner as in the preceding example.

As ſoon as the right wing of cavalry is extended, it ſhould inſtantaneouſly march againſt the enemy, the remaining part of the army during the time of its movement having time to finiſh its extenſion. For the continuation of this manœuvre ſee the preceding example.

The army having arrived at O P, and the enemy being defeated, it ſhould halt, redreſs its lines, reſt itſelf, ſome time after form itſelf in march order, and return to its camp.

Remark. The enſuing day the ſame manœuvre can be executed by the left.

TENTH MANOEUVRE.

Plate XII.

The Enemy is ſuppoſed to be poſted at A B, *having its Centre in a hazardous Poſition, and open to be attacked.*

The army marches in its accuſtomed order.

The general having determined with his centre to attack that of the enemy, and refuſe his wings, the rear guard gives a ſignal with the cannon. This firſt ſignal informs the army of its approach to the ground on which it is to form.

When the extenſion is made on the centre, the columns muſt not fail to keep between each other the preſcribed diſtances. The



PART II.
Great Tactics.
PL XII.
March order, with the Major order of Battle of the Corps

The centre column follows the van-guard. The ſecond and the fourth ſuffers it to paſs them at 800 paces; and they at the ſame diſtance paſs the firſt and fifth.

The two brigades, from the rear of the ſecond and of the fourth columns, direct their march to approach the centre column, ſo as to extend in a ſecond line in rear of the troops which compoſe that column, when the line of battle is forming.

A ſecond ſignal from the cannon puts the columns in readineſs to prepare for the extenſion; they then form by diviſions, and make their extenſion in cloſe order.

At the ſame time each column of cavalry diſpatches the twenty ſquadrons from its head on a full trot to manœuvre on a height with the van-guard.

They ſhould extend themſelves as much as poſſible to deceive the enemy in reſpect to the dreſs they mean to take, and the object of the diſpoſition.

The twenty ſquadrons from the rear of each column of cavalry ſhould depart at the ſame time on a great trot; and paſſing as near as poſſible to the columns of infantry, ſo as to conceal their march to the enemy, they ſhould carry themſelves in rear of the centre column.

When the head of the column of infantry arrives at 300 paces from the van-guard, ſuppoſed to be halted at 1200 paces from the enemy, a third ſignal ſhould be made.

At this ſignal, the ſix battalions of grenadiers of the van-guard form themſelves in the moſt expeditious manner, to make the head of the attack on the centre of the enemy.

The artillery of the centre column to begin its fire, forms itſelf on a full trot in front, and on the flanks of the van-guard.

The centre column extends on one line; the ſecond line ſhould be formed of ſix brigades, three from the head of the ſecond column, and three from the head of the fourth.

The

The 40 ſquadrons from the wings form a third line behind them.

The 40 ſquadrons brought in front of the wings, form an oblique line in *échelons* on the right and left of the army.

The reſt of the infantry of the ſecond and fourth columns extends on an oblique in *échelon*, to the right and left of the army.

The reſt of the infantry of the ſecond and fourth columns extends on an oblique line in *échelons*, reſting on the contiguous line which forms the infantry of the centre.

The two other columns extend, each three brigades in the firſt line, and one in the ſecond, and form the oblique in *échelons*.

If ground be favourable, the two regiments of dragoons form in line with the van-guard, to ſupport it in the attack, but if it be an action of poſt, and they be not wanted, they rapidly paſs through the intervals of the line of battle, and form behind the line of cavalry.

In this caſe the army forms a kind of angle fractured at its head, that is to ſay, its centre preſenting a front to the enemy, its wings will be filled together, and detached from it by the means of its obliqueneſs.

So ſoon as the van-guard is extended, it marches againſt the enemy, ſupported by the two centre lines; according to the nature of the poſition the enemy occupies, the attack will be made in line or checquered; it will be continually refreſhed by the centre lines; and if there be a neceſſity, by that of the oblique.

During the whole time of the attack, the parts of the oblique line that are folded will reſt to the centre, and follow its movements, either to reinforce it, or to ſuſtain its progreſs.

The centre of the enemy being broke into, that of the army advances, and immediately takes its lines in reverſe for flanking, while the two oblique wings continuing the ſame movement as above, are carried for its ſupport, and attack the enemy in front.

The

PART II.

Grand Tactics.

PLATE III.

Hyatt reader, with the common or oblique line adapted to ground.

The centre of the army being arrived at the point O, and the wings at the points P Q, which ſuppoſes to have diſperſed and routed the enemy: it halts, reſts under arms; and ſome time after it forms in columns for its march to return to its camp.

Remark. The ſame order can, if judged neceſſary, be put in execution the next day, all the columns preſenting a parallel front to the enemy's line, and the wings only taking their oblique direction at the time of extenſion. For the method of executing this movement, ſee the ninth manœuvre.

CHAP. XIII.

Application of the preceding MANOEUVRES *to* GROUND *and* CIRCUMSTANCES.

IN all the manœuvres which have here been deſcribed, there is not one which perhaps could happen to be executed in war by combinations exactly ſimilar to thoſe which are annexed to them; ground and circumſtances abſolutely, change the given principles; and in war eſpecially the nature of ground and circumſtances not often being perceived, the movements are not to be foreſeen, and it is often the moment that determines them.

However infinite, however varied all combinations may be, it is nevertheleſs by the ſame mechaniſm they can be executed; that detached mechaniſm, and without any connection with ground and circumſtances, ſhould have been previouſly explained; conſequently in the order of marches, there ſhould firſt have been explained the kind of line of battle which they lead to. Now the firſt object, and the principles of the order of battle being conceived, the general officers and troops having formed their *coup d'œil*, and judgment by ſimple and computed manœuvres, the ſphere of inſtruction will extend, and by degrees become more intereſting.

The preceding manœuvres may be ſuppoſed to be executed in ground that is entirely naked and even, which

which conſequently does not require any local computation. Here examples begin to have more appearance of reality; manœuvres can be always executed relative to all kinds of ground, ſuch as the country produces.

The army takes its march as in war, to carry itſelf to ſuch or ſuch a point, and it will only be from the van-guard, and relative to the nature of the country, that the general determines the order of battle. For it ſhould be repeated, ſuch is the advantage of this organization of the army and diſpoſition of its march order, that the army can rapidly, and according to circumſtances, take any kind of order of battle, and reinforce or repoſe ſuch or ſuch parts of that order. The general, at the head of his van-guard, has in rear of him all his columns which he directs, advances, retards, halts and extends according to his views. How would the battles of Condé and Turenne have been ſcientifick, had they known the ſimplicity and reſources of this mechaniſm!

The army opening into the plain A, Plate XIII. to attack the enemy in the poſition B C, and the general arriving at the head of the van-guard at E, will diſcover the left of the enemy open to an attack, and to be approached; and without loſs of time, he gives ſignals for the army to prepare on the right for the oblique order.

He will ſhow the commanding officers of the diviſions, the points where they ſhould direct their columns to, the points of dreſs at the wings, the manner in which the column ſhould extend, and the general object of the diſpoſition.

For this purpoſe he will have determined that diſpoſition by a *coup d'œil*, in taking that advantage which the ground offers to the offenſive and defenſive parts of his order of battle.

In conſequence of which he will direct the firſt and ſecond columns on the point F, becauſe he means to profit of the plain to form his right upon, and to attack the left of the enemy that is weak and uncovered.

He

The Front when the Attack should have been made in the first disposition
Oblique position of the Co-
marched to attack
PART II.
Great Fortifications
PL XIV.
Oblique line combined on the Enemys first position, and afterwards equally changed on another point at the discovery of the Enemy having made an alteration in its disposition

He halts the third column on the heights I, to give a defenſive poſition to the part of his order of battle he means to refuſe; and under cover by the heights he will carry to his right the brigades of the ſecond line of that column, that they may form the ſecond line of the ſecond column, which ſhould entirely extend on the firſt line.

Under cover of the ſame heights, the 20 ſquadrons at the tail of the left column move as a reinforcement to the right, to form the ſecond line of the firſt column, which ſhould entirely extend in the firſt line.

Should he be even in want of a greater reinforcement of infantry to this right, he could draw it from the brigades of the ſecond line of the fourth column, or he could poſt himſelf near enough to draw them from thence, in making them approach to the heights of his centre, and in this caſe leaving leſs infantry on the left.

He would leave on the curtain H ſome light troops, and file off in rear of this curtain all his van-guard to reinforce his right.

He would take advantage of the woods in front of his left columns, to threaten the right of the enemy, and to draw its attention on them. For which purpoſe he commands the fourth and fifth columns to manœuvre along the chain of the woods, to preſent ſeveral heads with open diſtances, in ſhort to make the greateſt oſtentation of forces and of offenſive movements, afterwards to withdraw again, form in battle on the chain of the woods, and concur to the general object of the diſpoſition. The 28 battalions, which compoſe the fourth column, entirely form the left of the army; and the 20 ſquadrons which remain to the fifth, move in a rapid manner to form in the hollow which is between the wood and the height of the centre.

He will not, as the plan demonſtrates, ſubject himſelf to the order of any dreſs or obliqueneſs in the diſpoſition; his centre will be found much varying from the degree of obliqueneſs, which was eſtabliſhed in the order of its principles, becauſe his intention was to profit of the heights to keep it farther diſtant from the enemy;

enemy; his left is poſted much in advance, for reaſon of its being covered by the wood where certainly the enemy will not come and attack it, and where in ſome reſpect it forms a kind of baſtion on the curtain of its order of battle

The whole object of his diſpoſition will not leſs partake of the advantages of the oblique order, ſince it refuſes and keeps from the *portée* of the enemy the center and the left of his army, and gives him an opportunity of attacking with his right conſiderably reinforced.

The preceding example ſhows how the oblique order ſhould be applied to ground; that which will be ſubjoined to this, will alſo ſhew how, having determined after the firſt diſpoſition, the oblique order can be formed on a poſition: and the army having in conſequence began its movement, how, if the enemy ſhould change its diſpoſition, it can rapidly change the plan of the attack, and form the oblique order on another point.

The army begins its march in the accuſtomary order to attack the enemy poſted at AB (Pl. XIV.) arrived near enough to reconnoitre the enemy, the General diſcovers the centre of his poſition to be inexpugnable, that the right preſents difficulties, and that the left, by the nature of ground, is the leaſt ſtrong and the moſt acceſſible. In conſequence he determines on the attack from his right, and commands the army to begin the neceſſary movements to form the oblique order on that wing.

Approached nearer to the enemy, and continuing to ſtudy more and more its poſition, and to diſcover the movements which his approach occaſions it to make in its order, it is to be ſuppoſed, he ſees that the enemy, relying on the ſtrength of its right, and fearing the weakneſs of its left, tranſports the beſt and greateſt part of its troops to it. He ſees by the means of this change of diſpoſition, this left, which, in its primitive aſpect appeared to him, and which in reality was the weakeſt ſide, become, by the number and kind of troops it is reinforced with, the point leſs calculated for being attacked, while the right, more difficult on account of ground,

ground, is almoſt abandoned by local force, and only defended by a ſmall number of troops; immediately his ſcheme is varied, and he reſolves on forming his oblique order on his left. A ſignal indicates this change to his columns, which then form by the left the oblique *échelon*, which they began to form by the right: if there be ſome parties of troops that are already in movement to reinforce this right, they ſhould halt and countermarch on the left, to approach the columns they were detached from.

At the ſame time, and as ſoon as the General has reſolved upon his new diſpoſition, he diſpatches officers he can confide in to the columns, who ſhow them the new diſpoſition he means to take, the direction they ſhould follow, and points they ſhould form on. In reſpect to himſelf, he takes poſt on the left of the army, to follow the execution of the intereſting part of the movement.

According to his firſt diſpoſition, he ſhould form the oblique order on the right, reinforce that wing of cavalry with 20 ſquadrons drawn from his left, and form them in C, to attack the left of the enemy; his firſt column of infantry reinforced with brigades of the ſecond line of the ſecond and third columns, and of troops from his van-guard ſhould reſt to that wing, and engage the attack in concert with it, while the remaining third, fourth and fifth columns ſhould extend in the rear by *échelons*, and favoured by the advantage of ground, keep out of the enemy's fire.

The movements which the enemy has made, occaſion a change to be made in the firſt diſpoſition, and to form the oblique order by the left: conſequently this is a freſh advantage he draws from ground and the orders he diſpatches to the columns.

The right of the enemy, excepting a ſmall part of the place where he left 20 ſquadrons or ſo, is poſted on heights, difficult of acceſs, and ſtill fortified with redoubts and batteries, that is to ſay, this wing is incomparably better poſted than the left, which is in an open and clear plane; but the enemy rather relying on the advantage

advantage of ground, has diſgarniſhed it with troops, and has only left thoſe it can the leaſt rely upon, to reinforce conſiderably its left, which the nature of the country, the facility of the *debouchés*, and the ſight of the firſt diſpoſition of attack have made him fearful of. This miſtake of the enemy the General is ſuppoſed to have diſcovered, and to profit of it he commands the left column of cavalry, which is joined on its road by the 20 ſquadrons already in motion on the right, to direct their courſe on the point D, advancing in cloſe ranks, and endeavouring as much as poſſible to conceal their ſtrength.

The object of this cavalry at the ſignal made for its extenſion, is to form in battle oppoſite to the ſquadrons on the right of the enemy, to profit of its ſuperiority by coming to cloſe quarters with it, to turn it if poſſible, by tranſporting from the ravin ſome ſquadrons to which they reſted, and in ſhort to make a vigorous attack, while the infantry at its right attacks the right of the infantry of the enemy.

The firſt left column of infantry, compoſed of 28 battalions, including the flank brigade, traverſe the great wood E, advances in cloſe order to the point F; arrived at this point, and extending wholly on one line, it is ſupported by a ſecond line with the ſix brigades of the ſecond and third columns of infantry on the left wing, and beſides reinforced with grenadiers and dragoons of the van-guard which poſt themſelves on its right. As ſoon as this diſpoſition is finiſhed, it marches ſtraight to the enemy, profits of the firſt advantage of the cavalry, to turn the great curtain F, to which the redoubts on the right reſt, and to all appearance concludes to carry the poſt, or the enemy inferior, either in number or quality of troops, makes but little reſiſtance.

The ſecond column of infantry on the left takes poſſeſſion of the heights G, which, to appearance, intentionally diſpoſed of, extends in departing from the enemy's line, and forms a ſingle line, having its left covered by the dragoons of the van-guard. The three brigades

brigades of the ſecond line of this column, previouſly ſpoken of, are tranſported in a ſecond line in rear of the left.

The third column of infantry in the ſame order forms on the chain of the wood H; this wood, ſtill more in rear than the height G, conceals its force, and furniſhes it with a favourable poſition. The three brigades of the ſecond line of this column have made the ſame movement as thoſe of the two columns.

Theſe two columns only take their poſitions in rear, but at the time of the general extenſion; till then they ſhould preſent themſelves in front of the heights of the woods, diſcover ſeveral heads of columns in cloſe order, and appear to threaten the centre and the right of the enemy.

In ſhort, it is the fifth column which is particularly charged to give a change to the enemy, and in conſequence it advances in a ſpirited manner acroſs the great plain, as if in reality it was to begin the attack, in the ſame manner as in the firſt diſpoſition it divides itſelf into ſeveral columns with very open diſtances, then at the ſignal of the general extenſion it retires on a full trot, and forms in battle under the protection of the infantry on the right of the hamlet H, which the flank brigade has occupied.

Advert to the plan for the general effect of this diſpoſition, the eaſe with which it is executed, the deception which its execution ſhould produce on the enemy, and the appearance of infallible ſucceſs which ſhould reſult from it in favour of the army that begins the attack. In ſhort what can the enemy do? Scarce has it conceived the intention of the new diſpoſition, when its right is already attacked by a force infinitely ſuperior. Will it endeavour to manœuvre with its left and centre, to garniſh thoſe points that are weakeſt and fartheſt diſtant from the oblique? Theſe are at ſo great a diſtance from it, that the odds would be much againſt it, but what it would be recalled by the diſaſters on its right, before ſo great a movement could be finiſhed. Beſides, this oblique line has only to retreat from it,

always reſting when it retreats on the left of the army, ſo as not to be detached from it. Will it ſend reinforcements to the wing that is attacked? It is evident they will arrive but to be witneſs of the defeat of that wing. In ſhort, even when theſe reinforcements attain the end of rallying the battle, even when the battle is loſt for the army that attacks, it has only one of its wings engaged; this wing retreats under cover of the other parts of the diſpoſition. It might ſo happen that an attack made by troops ſuperior in quality, and well commanded, fails; but it is ſeldom, it is almoſt impoſſible for it to be entirely routed.

To ſupport this aſſertion, it is proper to cite the battle of Liſſa: nearly ſimilar to what has been ſaid it was conducted. The king of Pruſſia manœuvred before the Auſtrians for four or five hours. At firſt he threatened their right, which, on account of the nature of the ground, was the weakeſt. They reinforced it by a great number and the *élite* of their troops. They relied upon their left, poſted on formidable heights, and they only left there, the Bavarians and ſome troops of the empire. The king of Pruſſia profited of that error. His diſpoſition, for a long time uncertain and in ſuſpenſe, was in a rapid manner determined towards his right. The left wing of prince Charles was taken in flank, and thrown into diſorder after an engagement of half an hour. The Auſtrians arrived, but it was too late, two lines were already formed on their flank; every thing that preſented itſelf was drove back, and the victory of the king of Pruſſia was one of the compleateſt and moſt deciſive of the war.

It is a great advantage and little known in our armies, that of keeping in column till the order of battle is determined on. For by this means the army is perfectly at command, it can be eaſily manœuvred, interior movements can be performed with it unknown to the enemy, deceptions can be made, the enemy menaced firſt on one point and then on another, lead it into error, and yet never come to action. This advantage, in the chapter on the orders of battle, has before been treated of.

We

We ſhall riſk a repetition of part of this once more, by citing ſome examples for the better illuſtration of it, and making it more clearly underſtood.

Let us ſuppoſe an army to be inſtructed in all the reſources of the above ſyſtem of the Tactic, and in the ſituation of attacking the enemy: in conſequence it begins its march in the accuſtomary order, and arrives in ſight of it. The General in this caſe reconnoitres from the head of his vanguard, the poſition of the enemy, and the diſpoſition he means to act upon. If a weak point is found in one or the other, it will be on that point he forms in a rapid manner his diſpoſition of attack. If not he begins to manœuvre before it, he endeavours to give it the change, he employs all the reſources of ground and of the Tactic to deceive the enemy in its ſcheme; he feigns an offenſive movement on one of its wings, to oblige it to diſgarniſh its centre or its other wing, and there to begin a real attack. At one place he preſents columns with open ranks, at another he preſents them in cloſe order. In ſhort he does that, that if the enemy be not as ſkilful as himſelf, it varies its diſpoſition, it abandons or occupies a poſt, which lays it open to a favorable attack, or elſe weakens itſelf on ſome particular point, either in leaving too few troops, or in leaving not ſufficient of the neceſſary kind of arm to defend it, or in leaving there the moſt indifferent of its troops *. In this caſe the

* Is it not ſtriking to conceive by what M. Guibert advances, that a poſſibility does exiſt, for a General, a man of genius, to diſcover with the above facility, an alteration in the diſpoſition of his adverſary's line of battle?

Suppoſe the enemy to be within the common diſtance to begin the attack, and the weak point diſcovered, that we may know this weak point is produced in conſequence of its being unfurniſhed with its due proportion of troops, or that it is deficient of the neceſſary arm to defend itſelf with, is very poſſible; but for a General to have the ſkill in knowing, whether it be compoſed of an inferior body of men, appears to be the greateſt effort of the genius of man. Were troops compoſed of mercenaries inferior in quality, and the point known where they were poſted, perhaps this might produce the effect; their movement and appearance muſt be put out of the queſtion, for this would

ſkilful and manœuvring General profits of the miſtake, and immediately carries his force on that weak part. In ſhort, if the enemy does not come to action, either by its poſition or its diſpoſition; in this caſe, the General finds he has not engaged, conſequently retreats and waits a more favourable occaſion.

We muſt agree that this kind of war, this method of reconnoitring the enemy with the whole force of the army, of offering it battle, of leading it into a falſe manœuvre and profiting of it with rapidity, is utterly unknown to us. We are but little acquainted with forming expeditiouſly in order of battle, and combining that order according to circumſtances: In a word to ſay every thing, we are ignorant of the art of manœuvring armies. What battles we have loſt, which would even never have been fought, had we ~~have~~ known that! One will here only be cited, of which the example and misfortune are very ſtriking for the nation.

Our army * moved from the plane of Minden, with a diſpoſition combined the day before on a reconnoitring, made in the morning. Our right, conſiderably reinforced, ſhould have attacked the left of the enemy, which in conſequence of this reconnoitring, had been found weak and capable of being attacked. An opening is made into an extenſive plane, and oppoſite to it a long chain of woods, behind which was concealed the diſpoſition of the enemy. According to the eſtabliſhed routine, the line of battle was formed, two lines were extended which the enemy without much trouble could calculate its force; inſtead of leaving theſe lines in arrear, and concealing their weakneſs from the enemy; favoured by the rough country at the entry of the plane, they are advanced, and dreſſed on the right which was commanded for the attack. A diviſion from the centre

would admit of too nice a diſquiſition: and nothing ſatisfactory could be deduced from it. Great muſt the genius be of the General, who can ſee the inferiority of the troops of an enemy, at the diſtance where it would be advantageous to attack them! I have converſed with military characters who have thought it impoſſible.

* The French army.

was

was carried in front of this line of dreſs, and at a quarter of a league from the chain of the wood occupied by the enemy. It was likewiſe remarked that this order of battle ſhould have been formed at day break, but by a ſucceſſion of unſkilfulneſs in our troops, and of their little acquaintance with the execution of great manœuvres, even hours tranſpired, and the lines were even then heſitating about their diſpoſition. However the enemy had varied theirs in the night and in the morning; its left which was looked upon as weak and unfurniſhed was reinforced with troops; batteries and intrenchments were raiſed. In this ſituation their wing was not to be attacked. With reaſon they reſolved on not coming to action on that point, the ſucceſs of which would but turn out fatal. They deliberate, time is loſt; the enemy diſcovers our centre too much in advance, and compoſed of two weak lines of cavalry unſupported by infantry, againſt which it forms a diſpoſition covered by the woods in its front; opens upon it, attacks it, breaks in upon it and gains the battle. Had the army moved to the enemy in the oblique order, had it been formed into columns, till it knew what the ſituation of the enemy was, this battle would not have tâken place, the enemy would not have diſtinguiſhed the weak parts of its diſpoſition and combined its attack on them. It would have known that its left was reinforced and protected from an attack; and inſtead of making matters worſe, it would have returned to its former camp: this would have been reconnoitring made without loſs and without diſgrace. It is preſumed, that the military miſtake the appellation, when they call the march of an army a *falſe movement*, when it moves to attack and the plan it forms to retreat, ſeeing the impoſſibility of engaging with advantage. A ſkilful and manœuvring General will frequently make the like movements, without thinking when he retreats that he makes confeſſion of his inferiority; it will be by theſe precautions of making theſe well-timed retreats, he will find a favourable occaſion to attack the enemy. Among the ancients, the army that was on the offenſive, went thus

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and offered battle to the enemy, to entice it from its intrenchments and to bring it to action, retreating when it could not find a favourable occaſion to begin the attack: Thus Annibal defeated the Romans at Traſimenus and at Canne: likewiſe in the ſkilful campaign of 1675, of Turenne and Montecuculi, who mutually felt each other's force without coming to open action. Theſe great men notwithſtanding preciſely knew in what conſiſted ſhame or glory.

An example has been promiſed of a flank march order, with an order of battle in front, occaſioned by the unforeſeen appearance of the army of the enemy, on the head of the march and combined on the ground.

Suppoſe the enemy in march order as in AB (Pl. XV.) The light troops which reconnoitre at the head of the march, inform the general that the enemy appears in CD, and approaches in front to the army, to attack it in its march. The general without loſs of time advances to the head of the column, making the van-guard follow him; and having reconnoitred the enemy, concerts his diſpoſition immediately to oppoſe it. In front of him, and on his right is a rivulet, at the left of which extends a chain of heights covered with woods; to this rivulet he inclines his right, extending it afterwards along the heights. The centre of his diſpoſition will be on the great plane D, and in conſequence he tranſports the greateſt part of his cavalry there. His left compoſed of infantry, occupies the wood F, and reſts on the village G, where he poſts a brigade of infantry. The remaining part of his cavalry will be in battle behind the village, and in different hollow ways which extend along the wood on the left, to ſupport the infantry which defends it. His poſition determined on, he will ſhow the commanders of the diviſions the points where they ſhould tranſport the troops, and the general plan of the diſpoſition. The two lines of his right wing of cavalry, which are at the head of the march, move rapidly into the plane D, forming the centre of the army on one line, reſting their right to the heights and their left to the wood. The ſecond

line

PART II.
Grand Tableau,
PLAN
Front Camp of the Enemy
Grand March of the Camp
Rear Camp of the Enemy
Grand March of the Army to the Rear
Army in Order of Battle

line of infantry, which forms the ſecond column, directs itſelf towards the right part of the poſition which it ſhould occupy. The ſix brigades at the head of the columns, including the flank brigade, ſhould form the firſt line of this right, and the four brigades the tail of the ſecond. This column divides itſelf for this purpoſe into two or three columns, to arrive more expeditiouſly on the points where it ſhould form. The firſt line of infantry, which compoſes the centre of the firſt column ſhould, in the new order of battle, occupy the left of the poſition: conſequently, it divides itſelf in the ſame manner for the rapidity of the movement into ſeveral columns, and directs itſelf on the points where it ſhould form. The flank brigade, which is at the tail, moves in a ſtraight line to the village on the left. The five brigades at the head of the column form the firſt line of the right, and the four brigades of the tail, the ſecond. In reſpect to the firſt line of the left wing of cavalry, which forms the tail of the firſt column, it directs itſelf in front on the left to form in battle, in the rear of the hollow ways of the wood which are occupied by the infantry of this wing; and the ſecond line of cavalry at the tail of the ſecond column, continuing its movement forward, forms in a ſecond line in rear of the centre. The van-guard is nevertheleſs carried in front of the centre in ſome advantageous poſition, from whence it covers the movement of the army, and from whence it is near enough to carry itſelf as a reinforcement to the weakeſt part of the order of battle, according to the diſpoſition the general thinks proper to make againſt the enemy. This order of battle entirely inverts the primitive order of the army, but it rapidly makes head againſt an unforeſeen circumſtance; the troops arrive by the ſhorteſt way to the points which they have to occupy; and in war method ſhould not fetter expedition, it ſhould not fall into routine.

By this example it is eaſy to conceive, that if the ground on which the poſition is formed by the general requires other combinations in the poſting of troops, they can be executed with the ſame eaſe. It is likewiſe

to be conceived, that, if inſtead of arriving ſimply to occupy a defenſive poſition, the general finds it advantageous to paſs immediately to a counter offenſive movement on the enemy, it can be equally done. When once an army is organized, when it has once acquired the cuſtom of great manœuvres; if the man that commands it has genius, there is no machine more eaſy to be worked, more ſimple and capable of a greater variety in its combinations.

All the examples given above, or others variouſly combined in a relative manner to the different aſpect of ground, but tending to the illuſtration of the ſame reſult of principles, can be put in execution in the camp of inſtruction. The general may, to execute ſome few with more appearance of reality, divide the army into two bodies, and make the one act againſt the other after ſuch or ſuch given circumſtances; for example, to give orders to the commander of one body to make choice of, and to occupy a particular poſition that accompliſhes ſuch an object; and the commander of the other, to attack him, and to diſpoſſeſs him of it.

Theſe two commanders ſhould ſeparately conduct themſelves according to their own ſkill, the general confining himſelf, during the whole time the operation laſts, to be the ſpectator of their movements, afterwards to talk over what they did, and what they ſhould have done. But for this purpoſe, what kind of a man ſhould this general be? In certain ſtates, he ſhould be the ſovereign himſelf, that he might not experience any contradiction; in all he ſays, he ſhould be of that ſkill ſo univerſally known as to command the opinion of other men.

It would be under ſuch a kind of a man, and in a like camp of inſtruction, that general officers would learn how to move troops to calculate diſtances, to ſeize with a *coup d'œil* the analogy of ground with different kind of arms, and a greater variety of other principles, which originate from circumſtances and ſituations, and which is not poſſible to be here explained.

There

There they would learn, after the general had informed them at large of the poſition for them to occupy in order of battle, with a diviſion or a body of troops, how there remains in the method of occupying that poſition an infinity of details which belong to it; that they ſhould know how to occupy a height rather more advantageouſly in front or in rear of the given points; poſt the troops behind a curtain or a ravin, to cover them from the fire of the artillery of the enemy, when they are employed or reſerved for ſome ſecret purpoſes; to make ſome ſlight changes in the given line, when that change can be advantageous; in ſhort, to take upon themſelves whatever, in procuring ſome advantage, does not militate againſt the general ſenſe of the order of battle, and which concur in a more perfect manner to fulfil the object of the general diſpoſition.

In all the manœuvres performed in a camp of inſtruction, the troops ſhould never approach within muſket range; they ſhould avoid all thoſe kind of ſilly practices with fire arms, which only tend to ſpread diſorder, and unreal appearance in the movements. The ſuperiority will with reaſon be ſuppoſed to lay with him, who, by the choice of his poſition, will have beſt advantaged himſelf with a ſmall number of his troops, or who by his extenſions and manœuvres, will have preſented on one of the points of attack or defence, ſuperior means to his adverſary; for it ſhould be a general rule, and it is a principle of the higheſt importance, not to diſcredit the inſtruction of officers, that in the peace encampments the manœuvres ſhould always ſtop whenever they loſe their appearance of reality.

CHAP. XIV.

Application of the above System of TACTICS *to defensive Orders of* BATTLE. *Necessity of making that Application known to* TROOPS *and their* COMMANDERS.

IN considering all the orders of battle, relative to the offensive object, I have shewn the advantages which could result from the combination of marches and extensions, whether to deceive the enemy in the force of the columns and on the point of attack, or to take a rapid disposition of battle. These advantages have been shewn to become immense, when the army that was attacked made, according to the accustomary routine, its disposition before hand, and extended its lines on the disposition it was to defend; for in this case the general that attacks arrives with his van-guard, reconnoitres that disposition, counts the number and quality of the troops which defend each point, and determines his order of battle in consequence.

The Tactic would be a very imperfect science, unless it produced to the army on the defensive, means to ballance those advantages. These means are produced by it, and in this it is similar to the art of mining, of attacking, and the defence of places. Equally to be employed by both parties; to him that possesses it, and employs it the best, it renders the effects more decisive.

Let us suppose a general to be skilful, and a Tactician in the necessity of receiving battle; he would not unmask his disposition of defence, but till such times he had reconnoitred the points where the enemy meditated an attack. He would keep his army in columns on the field of battle he meant to occupy, that he might determine the repartition of his troops only on those of the enemy. In short he would oppose finesse to finesse, and manœuvre to manœuvre; that is to say, he would be continually in movement before the enemy, endeavouring how to make his adversary irresolute in his plans, enticing him into an error, deceiving

ceiving him in reſpect to the number and diſpoſition of his troops, diſcovering to him a point, to all appearance unfurniſhed, to engage him to direct his attack on that point, that is to ſay, not always to confine himſelf merely to a ſimple defenſive diſpoſition; and that if the enemy comes to action on a point, he will know how to make a counter offenſive movement againſt them.

There is no queſtion here of theſe defenſive poſitions, ſo advantageous that the ground neceſſarily reduces the attack to one point; for in this caſe, as there can be no uncertainty on the determination where it is neceſſary to carry the greateſt force, there conſequently can be no inconvenience in determining the order of battle before hand. But it is not the ſame in thoſe poſitions which are attackable on ſeveral points; for in this caſe, ſo that one of theſe points may not be unfurniſhed, at the time when the others would be unuſefully occupied by a great number of troops, and that the enemy might not engage his ſtrong part againſt one that is weak, it is therefore neceſſary not to determine the diſpoſition but on that of the enemy; the points of the attack ſhould be occupied with the head of troops, and in rear and in centre of them, the remaining part of the army ſhould be kept in columns, to carry force where the enemy eſſays itſelf, and ſometimes where it begins its attack and is itſelf open to the ſame; for a ſtronger reaſon in the poſitions of plane or open ground, the order of battle ſhould not be determined upon, but according to that of the enemy, becauſe, in theſe poſitions, it is the number of troops, a wing more or leſs ſtrong, ſuch or ſuch arm rendered ſuperior in a part of the order of battle, which decide the ſucceſs of the action.

But what would the opponent general do in this caſe? He would ſee heads of troops in the principal points of the poſition he was for attacking, and inſtead of an army in battle, and diſpoſed to ſuffer its force to be computed and defeated, that army divided into columns, of which he could not either judge of its depth or object. Would he manœeuvre? This army would likewiſe manœuvre. Would he endeavour to give it the change,

change, it would be prepared for it, and endeavour in its turn to deceive him; would he decide to attack one point, and unite his force to carry it? The force of this army would unite to defend it. Between two ſimilar armies, ſucceſs would be to that, which had the moſt genius and the greateſt celerity in its manœuvres.

This application of the Tactic to the defenſive orders of battle, is ſtill more unknown, and yet not the leaſt more important than its application to the offenſive order. In default of this laſt, I have ſaid how frequently armies that attack have loſt battles. In reſpect to this a modern and ſenſible occaſion has been cited. Hockſtet and Ramillies have ſhown how armies have been defeated, for having unſkilfully firſt diſplayed their diſpoſition, and by that invited the enemy to combine an advantageous offenſive diſpoſition on them. It is therefore evident, how eſſential it is to practiſe the defenſive order in a camp of inſtruction. Troops and their commanders ſhould be familiariſed with it. Eſpecially when the army is divided into two bodies, ſimilar examples in reſpect to this can be given.

When I have ſaid that troops ſhould be familiariſed with this method of taking defenſive diſpoſitions, it is, becauſe they would much wonder to ſee them performed, unleſs examples in which good care prevailed, had made them, during the time of peace, know the advantage of them. It is the common opinion, that an army to be attacked, cannot be too ſoon formed in battle. The routine is therefore adopted in forming its lines on the poſition that is choſen, before the enemy has made its diſpoſition. Would it not be an inſult to the opinion of men and their cuſtoms, if the enemy opening to attack the army, the general that commands it, moved it on ſeveral columns on the field of battle that is reconnoitred; if there, inſtead of forming himſelf in battle, he waited for the plan of the enemy to be firſt choſen; if in ſhort he ſkilfully combined, that it was ſufficient for him to finiſh his diſpoſition the inſtant the enemy arrived upon him? It is only a well digeſted

cuſtom

cuſtom of theſe kind of manœuvres, which, ſeeing the recent prejudice, can fortify troops againſt that appearance, which they look upon as uncertainty and danger.

CHAP. XV.

Continuation of OBJECTS, *proper to be practiſed in a* CAMP *of* INSTRUCTION.

BUT how many other objects of inſtruction are to be met with in a peace encampment? Sometimes the army executes ſimple marches to occupy a poſition reconnoitred by the ſtaff officers. Independant of the advantage which may reſult from accuſtoming troops in the practice and fatigue of marches, they would conſtitute for the ſtaff officers of the army the moſt uſeful and important inſtruction; for the general would be particularly occupied in examining if the columns be opened or diſpoſed, relative to the nature of the country, and to the eſtabliſhed principles; and if the poſition that is reconnoitred, perfectly compleats the object which he has pointed out, &c. It is thus in applying theory to ground, and in practiſing the ſtaff officers under the direction of a general, there can be hopes of forming them, ſooner than by unfruitful excurſions, made in various frontiers; excurſions which no one directs, where nothing but naked ground is diſcovered, where conſequently the buſineſs tranſacted cannot rectify their ideas, and in ſhort, from whence they bring away nothing but topographical knowledge, or reports entirely ſuppoſed, which cannot be verified, and which frequently are not their production!

In a paſſage particularly ſet apart for the purpoſe, ſome ideas will be ſelected on the ſubject of the reconnoitring of a country, that very intereſting part which relates to the ſtaff officers of an army, which neceſſarily has ſuch a relation with the great Tactic. Let us conclude to ſpeak of thoſe things which ſhould be practiced in a camp of inſtruction.

Attacks

Attacks and defenſive poſitions of different kinds ſhould be fancied, ſuch as intrenchments of poſts, of villages, of convoys, the execution of forced marches, paſſages of rivers and defiles, foraging parties, &c. ſhould be practiſed. Operations all important, all calculated to inſtruct troops, to develop and to extend the ideas of their commanders, but reſpecting which it would be here ſuperfluous to reaſon before hand, becauſe they all depend on the nature of ground and genius of the general.

There has been as much ſaid on the Tactic conſidered in itſelf, as I thought could be poſſibly ſaid. It is preſumed that this ſcience has been delivered under new and extenſive heads; that it would prove uſeful and intereſting to have it taught in public ſchools, in the ſame manner as I have explained it. When all other ſciences improve and advance to perfection by enlightened theory, ſhould the ſcience of war be the only one abandoned to a confined routine? Is it looked upon ſo vague, ſo diveſted of poſitive principles, that it ſhould not be taught? Was it the indignation of Annibal againſt the rhetorician of Epheſus, when he heard him give leſſons on military ſcience, which has for ever branded with ridicule all attempts to promulgate the ſame in ſchools? Annibal ſaw, with manifeſt pity and contempt, an obſcure and ignorant orator, preſume to ſpeak before him on the duties of a general; he would have rejoiced to hear a military man, a Xantippus, an Epaminondas, reaſon on the theory of his profeſſion; he would have known, that in a country where great men commanded armies in time of war, that in time of peace it would be neceſſary for them to take pains in forming troops and ſkilful ſucceſſors.

The nature of our conſtitutions, and of our prejudices, will not admit of our hoping for the like change; at leaſt let us regret that it cannot take place, and in the mean while offer to our citizens a tribute of our feeble endeavours. The complete courſe of Tactics, which I mean to publiſh in my great work, will be arranged in a more inſtructive and didactive manner. I

ſhall

ſhall endeavour to ſketch what the object of a public courſe of inſtruction of the Tactics ſhould be. I ſhall ſhew that this ſcience can be taught by a ſimple and amuſing proceſs. It was thus taught to me. And here let me be permitted to ſhew that reſpect, which a ſon owes to a father! my mind was ſcarce opened when he gave me the firſt leſſons of the Tactic. When I had once acquired a juſt conception of its elements, he ſucceſſively explained it to me by words, by plan and ground; he diſſected on paſteboard a kind of moveable figured plans, with which he repreſented all kind of ground. On theſe plans he explained to me, with ſmall pieces of wood, all the mechaniſm of armies. He ſhewed me a repreſentation of battles, which could furniſh relative examples; he more particularly ſhewed me thoſe of the war that was then carried on, and of which the details and events had the moſt engaged my attention; it was afterwards neceſſary for me to employ my *coup-d'œil* and judgment in all kinds of ground. We returned afreſh to it and purſued our amuſement. He ſuffered me to make objections. He permitted my imagination to eſſay itſelf. Inſenſibly it required more extention and juſtneſs; we then formed two armies, and each took one to his command. Then in different countries repreſented at chance by the arrangement of the paſteboard, we made our armies manœuvre and execute marches; we made choice of poſitions; we formed in order of battle one againſt the other. We afterwards reaſoned with ourſelves on what we had done. My father admired my doubts, and even my contrary opinions. The nights frequently paſſed in this occupation, ſo much this ſtudy engaged our attention, ſo much the perſon who planned it knew how to render it pleaſing.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

ANALOGY *of the Science of* FORTIFICATION, *with the* TACTIC *and* WAR *in general.*

THE ſciences of fortifications and the Tactic are intimately connected one with the other. It is from fortification that the defenſive Tactic has borrowed many of its principles, ſuch as the neceſſity of defending the flanks of a diſpoſition, and ſo regulating all the parts of that diſpoſition, that they may mutually protect each other; conſequently the neceſſity occurs of reuniting on the principal points on the parts that are menaced, the greateſt portion of fire and ſtrength. The ſubſtantial and true principles of fortification are likewiſe, in their turn, founded on the Tactic, ſince works themſelves ſhould be laid down and combined in a relative manner to the nature of ground, to the kind of troops, to their number, to their regulation, to the ſpirit which animates them, and to the different objects calculated, as well from the ſide of the perſon who makes the defence, as from him who makes the attack.

From this it reſults, a Tactician ſhould know the ſcience of fortification, and an Engineer ſhould have the qualities of a Tactician. The firſt part of this reſultation is admitted, and acknowledged by the military, without even officers taking pains to acquire information in that reſpect. The ſecond does not ſeem to be ſo with engineers; for, in general, they are ignorant how troops manœuvre, and how they ſhould be conducted: they even object to that knowledge; eſteeming theirs as the firſt of all arts, they look with contempt on all the other branches of military ſcience. If this prejudice be ſupported in their corps by the fine name of genius, with which they have been honoured and the art they cultivate, it is proper they ſhould be informed, that the above pompous denomination is the produce of a new creation; that in the time of Vauban, they ſimply ſaid *the corps of*

of engineers, and that engineers in the inſtitution of their profeſſion and in all other languages of Europe, take their derivation, not from the word *genius*, but from the word *engine*, becauſe at that time engineers were the conſtructors and directors of all warlike machines and particularly thoſe of a ſiege.

It is eſpecially in the determination of field works, that the importance of the Tactic ſhould direct the genius of thoſe who conſtruct them. Deficient of this knowledge, men proceeded but ſlow, they dare not vary from the common methodical routine; they ſee the effect of a piece of fortification, the relation which it bears to a neighbouring one; but they diſregard the general poſition at large, or the object it is intended for; they break ground, they multiply works, and they do not conceive who are to defend this immenſity of works, or that troops ſhut up in the like intrenchments, loſe all that advantage which might be derived from manœuvres and other external ſcience.

Peruſe military hiſtory for an age back and all thoſe errors will be traced, which the world has fallen into, owing to its not having combined the ſcience of fortifications with the Tactic. The uſe of lines was introduced under an inferior claſs of Generals, in the time when all the troops of Europe had neither diſcipline or the Tactic, an abſurd cuſtom, which brings to mind the famous and uſeleſs wall which Chineſe ignorance conſtructed at ſix thouſand leagues diſtance from us. To the cuſtom of theſe lines of defence, ſucceeded that of extenſive intrenched poſitions which, to ſpeak truth, were only ſhort lines and proportioned to the front of the army deſtined to occupy it: a ſecond kind of the defenſive leſs defective than the firſt, but always fatal to generals who have not known any other. Such was then the prejudice of the age, that a poſition was never looked upon as well defended by intrenchments, but when the works were continuous. In the literary correſpondence of the generals of Louis XIV. with that prince and his miniſters, theſe words, and often

the ſame purport are read " *Our poſition is already co-*
" *vered with redoubts; and if the enemy will but give us*
" *time to join them, all will go well.*" At this day the military have no longer that prejudice; it conceives that in reſpect to field fortifications, the curtains are uſeleſs, and that they ſhould never be conſtructed without troops. This is a great ſtep made towards knowledge, towards the real uſe an army ſhould make of fortification; but it ſtill remains to reduce to a more juſt value the uſe of an army intrenchment and to be firmly convinced that the ſublime defenſive conſiſts, not always in ſeeking after poſitions and receiving battles, but continually making the enemy fear offenſive movements from the army, and for which end manœuvres ſhould be executed, the enemy forced to do the ſame, and the moment diſcovered, where ſome miſtake has diſunited it, retarded it, forced it to action, ſo as to act afterwards offenſively againſt it. This is a point much too intereſting not to be explained with a more particular detail.

What is the end of fortification? It is to put a body of men inferior in number, courage, or the ſcience of movements, in a ſtate to reſiſt a body of men, ſuperior to it in one of theſe particulars. Therefore all fortifications comprehend a defenſive plan, and are conſequently only the worſt come to the worſt of thoſe troops encloſed in them; therefore at all times when a general finds he has the ſuperiority of genius, and his troops more powerful in point of numbers, more warlike and manœuvring, he would be very careful not to cover himſelf with intrenchments; he would act offenſively, manœuvre, and attack the enemy. Or if ſometimes he receives battle, it would not be owing to his having forced the army to attack with diſadvantage, or becauſe he had premeditated a movement, which, before the battle, or even during the battle, had produced the offenſive, which he appeared to have abandoned.

Let us find the reſult of that General's conduct, who finding himſelf inferior to the enemy, would act differently

ferently, and according to the general principle of modern armies. If he reſolves on the conſtruction of lines, and to poſt himſelf behind them, even as little as the enemy knows of manœuvres, they will be flanked, ſurprized, and broke into; there is no neceſſity to give a reaſon why they will be ſo, known reaſons and examples render that a ſenſible conſequence. If he takes poſſeſſion of an extraordinary good poſt, and if its front be covered by a chain of intrenchments, his hands are tied, he will no longer have it in his power to make the enemy fear his offenſive movements; he will ſpread in his army a ſpirit of timidity and diſcouragement; he will be afraid to engage out of his poſition.

Suppoſe the enemy cannot attack him with open force in his citadel, it can weaken him by movements on his flanks, on his communications, on the countries which he is intereſted in; it approaches him, it ſhuts him up, it lays ſiege to him; offenſive and moveable, it can have over that army thus fortified, all the advantages which the beſieger has over the beſieged, and over works that are immoveable and defenſive only; it can approach to them by trenches; can reunite in ſome points of that poſition all its force and all its fire; it will oblige him to the dreadful extremity of deſtroying his fortifications, to come and offer battle diſadvantageouſly, or to that of laying down his arms, like the Saxons at Lima, as Peter would have done at Pruth, without the addreſs of the Czarina.

But ſuppoſe that he no longer favours that prejudice which formerly exiſted in favour of lines and intrenched camps, and he neither adopts one or the other of thoſe defenſives. Will he reſolve on preſenting himſelf to the enemy, only on poſitions covered by many intrenched points, ſuch as redoubts, batteries, villages, abbatis, &c. making his army a kind of curtain to thoſe baſtions? This is the preſent routine of modern defenſive poſitions, a routine certainly more preferable to that which it has replaced, but notwithſtanding ſubject to many inconveniences; in the firſt place, becauſe it reduces the army that makes uſe of it, to the defen-

ſive only, and beſides, as it is already a kind of check, to receive the law from the diſpoſitions of the enemy, to be continually occupied in parrying the adverſaries efforts, and not to be prepared to return the blow; in the ſecond place, becauſe the enemy never runs any deciſive riſk in attacking an army thus poſted. Defeated, it retreats, and it is ſeldom that with well taken precautions it has any neceſſity to fear a purſuit. If it comes off the conqueror, it can render the day complete, becauſe it cloſes in with the enemy, and takes the poſts that are occupied in flank; Hochſtet was thus taken; the village of Antony, and part of the army of Maſhal Saxe perhaps could likewiſe have been taken in this manner, if the good diſpoſition of the enemy had ſuſtained what chance made it undertake; in the third place, if two circumſtances, one of them, the points fortified being at too great a diſtance from each other, as at Fontenoy, Lauffelt, or at Rocoux, where the enemy paſſing between two, or elſe made oppoſite to each of theſe points a diſpoſition which half ſurrounded them with batteries and ſuperior force, carried them, laid the army open that ſupported them, and gained the battle. If theſe fortified points be near enough to receive a mutual protection from each other, and to produce a flanking fire, this poſition falls into the inconvenience of intrenched camps; all the army finds itſelf poſted in ſuch a manner, that it is reduced to the moſt paſſive and unequal ſtate of defence. If one of theſe points be forced, how re eſtabliſh the battle? There are not troops ſufficient remaining, no great efforts to be employed to drive the enemy from the baſtion where it is eſtabliſhed, and from the curtain on which it will ſoon be formed; and what will in this caſe become of all the troops poſted in ſuch places where they will be ſoon attacked, taken in flank or in rear, and from whence they cannot retreat, but with great trouble and danger? In ſhort, this defenſive, founded on intrenched poſitions, is contrary to the great ſcale of war, at leaſt it was certainly never the plan of great men. There is only a neceſſity to recapitulate the battles that have been fought, the army has

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generally attacked, and if it received battles, it was ſeldom behind intrenchments.

It does not immediately follow from this, that there are no occaſions when an army may intrench itſelf. I condemn the abuſe which is made of intrenched poſitions, and not the uſe which is ſometimes neceſſary to make of them. For example, if an inferior army occupies an important poſition, and by which it abſolutely traverſes the projects of the enemy; if in covering a ſiege, a country, or ſome operation, it finds one of thoſe *unique* poſitions, which neither leaves the enemy a reſource for manœuvres, or for making diſcoveries, and which neceſſarily obliges it to begin the attack on that very poſition: if in ſhort the advantage which would be found in receiving battle, over-ballances that which would be acquired in proceeding before the enemy, there is no need of heſitating to increaſe the ſtrength of a like place by intrenchments; beſides, if they be diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, that a poſſibility of acting offenſively on the enemy is preſerved, ſuppoſing that the diſpoſition of the attack, or the movements of battle, give reaſon to hope that a more certain and complete victory might be obtained from ſuch a plan. Finally, thoſe intrenchments ſhould be ſo conſtructed, that an army behind them may not be reduced to the ſituation of the beſiged, and that an entire freedom of movements is left to the genius of the man who commands them, in the ſame manner to the courage and the ſcience of the manœuvres of the troops which compoſe them.

This is therefore, as I think, the plan for an army in the like caſe to intrench itſelf; it ſhould not be by continued intrenchments, or what comes to the ſame thing, by points intrenched, ſyſmetrically diſtributed from diſtance to diſtance, ſo as to flank and to protect each other; but by intrenching ſome points only of the poſition, ſuch as thoſe oppoſite to the *debouché*, if the enemy is neceſſitated to open upon you, thoſe where only a handful of troops can be poſted, and thoſe where courage and manœuvres can be leaſt relied on;

by intrenching thus on certain points, and putting them under cover from being carried, while by reuniting on other naked and open points, the choſen and greateſt body of troops, a more vigorous diſpoſition can be prepared againſt the enemy, and ready to become offenſive at the leaſt falſe movement it is diſcovered to make.

Only let us reflect on this, we ſhall find this method of defending a poſition abſolutely oppoſite to the preſent routine, and to be notwithſtanding conformable to the great and true principles of war. In the firſt place, it would be offenſive; a primitive conſtitutive quality of every defenſive of an army. In the ſecond place, the intrenchments would be brought back to their true uſe, to ſupply the deficiency of number or bad quality of troops, and to protect all weak and diſgarniſhed points; they would be but an acceſſary, combined upon and employed in the general diſpoſition, ſo as to fortify in one place ſome points, to admit of the *elite* and chief part of the troops to be tranſported elſewhere; that is to ſay, to produce in one place a ſum of reſiſtance ſuperior to the efforts of the enemy, and to procure elſewhere a ſum of power ſuperior to its offenſive.

Thus much I think that intrenchments ſhould be ſeldom employed by an army, thus much I think that, all poſts and detached corps ſhould make uſe of them, eſpecially if theſe poſts or detached corps occupy points which are eſſential to make reſiſtance from, when it is ſuppoſed they cover an operation, defend a depoſit, a magazine, or an opeping; for on theſe occaſions the queſtion is to be firm, to wait for ſuccour; for the ſmall number, however brave, however well poſted it may be, very poſſibly may be oppreſſed by ſuperior force; therefore, as good intrenchments ſupply the inferiority of numbers, and put a body of men in a ſtate to wait for reinforcements, theſe are then the occaſions to conſtruct them; in this circumſtance, they therefore become the principal and primitive means of the defenſive.

From the nature of the above reaſons, the poſt, or detached corps ſhould not begin to intrench themſelves,

ſelves, when they are ſimply deſtined to ſerve as a maſk, or to cover a greater extent of country than that they can occupy themſelves; in the firſt place their intent is not to fight, but to apprize; in the ſecond, it is uſeleſs to intrench on certain points, ſince they cannot defend the whole, and as they would only ſerve to indicate to the enemy the ſpot they can penetrate at. It is by manœuvring, by continually moving on the length of the line of defence they have choſen, to hope for the means of oppoſing it. In ſhort, in one or the other caſe, all poſts or corps of troops that intrench themſelves, that is to ſay, eſtabliſh themſelves in a poſition, and take poſt there for ſome days, will expoſe themſelves to an advantageous attack, becauſe that poſition will tempt the enemy, and give it time to combine an offenſive movement againſt it. But it muſt be obſerved, that this does not exclude the excellent maxim of paſſing the nights in the beſt poſition poſſible, of rendering, if near the enemy, this poſition ſtill ſtronger by ſome intrenchments, ſo planned as not to make the poſition a poſition of battle, ſince no battle is intended to be received by it, but calculated to procure time for the aſſembling and calling in of its poſts, or to cover and to facilitate a retreat.

In ſhort, to know when to intrench or not to intrench, to diſtinguiſh the occaſions when intrenchments can prove uſeful, unuſeful, and fatal; to combine them, when it is reſolved upon to conſtruct them, with the object propoſed, with what operation the troops can perform, with the power of the enemy, and for this purpoſe not to leave the determination to an engineer, provided he is neither a military man or a Tactician, is the duty of generals; they therefore ſhould have neceſſary knowledge for their rank; to which end, ſchools for the attack and defence of field fortifications ſhould be eſtabliſhed among the troops, and theſe, ſchools of practice more than of theory. In my large work I ſhall explain on what plan theſe ſchools ſhould be formed, what objects the inſtruction ſhould comprehend.

It will be proved, that in ſix months an officer may acquire an indiſpenſible knowledge on this part of military ſcience. If he be born a military man, experience, opportunities, the fermentations of the mind, originating at the ſight of things and events, when ſome information is acquired, will afterwards eſtabliſh him in theſe inſights, and teach him how to draw utility from them.

The eſtabliſhment of the true relation which field fortification ſhould have with the Tactic, and with military operations, has been juſt decided upon; let us now examine the influence which the great ſcale of fortification, properly called permanent fortification, or to be more clear, fortified towns, have had over the military ſyſtem of Europe. This will lead us to find to what point this influence ought to exiſt, and we ſhall diſcover that it is neceſſary this point ſhould be that, were it actually does exiſt.

The ſpirit of imitation and madneſs, which at this day occaſions ſuch a prodigious increaſe of artillery and light troops, ſeemed at the end of the laſt age as if it would convert every town into a fortification. Vauban and Cohorn made their profeſſion of that conſequence, and almoſt all the military part of Europe being at that time ſo ignorant, it is not to be wondered that theſe two men, having genius and principles in their art, drew after them all the opinions of the military. Cohorn fortified Holland, Vauban Flanders, the Rhine and a part of the frontiers of the kingdom. He conſtructed or repaired near 100 fortreſſes. Particularly in Flanders, chains of fortified places in two or three lines were ſeen to ſpring up; at the ſame time were ſeen, for errors departing from the ſame principle are generally cotemporary, entire provinces covered with lines; to take theſe lines in their proper ſenſe they were *multiplied polygons*, connected to each other on an immenſe extent. In ſhort, ſuch is the prejudice which now remains of what was ſpread at that time, that the moſt part of political calculators, in weighing the forces of France with thoſe of the neighbouring ſtates, even at this day

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ſtill throw, by a much too great weight in the ſcale, the number of fortified places which ſome of theſe frontiers are garniſhed with; as if baſtions alone could make a defence for the towns they cover; as if the fate of theſe towns, however well fortified, did not depend on the good quality and vigour of the troops which defend and ſupport them; in ſhort, as if places badly defended did not turn out to the ruin, ſhame, and inevitable ſlavery of the conquered people who were the conſtructors and maſters of them.

What has been the reſult of this enormous multiplicity of fortreſſes? Wars have become more deſtructive and leſs ſcientific; more ruinous in reſpect to money and men, becauſe they have in conſequence conſumed a much greater quantity of both. Theſe fortifications muſt be conſtructed, they muſt be ſupported; but that primitive and annual expence would ſtill be of no conſequence; theſe fortifications once raiſed, they muſt be replete with proviſions, they muſt even in time of peace be kept up, in time of war they muſt be covered and defended, that of the enemy muſt likewiſe be attacked, hence an augmentation on each ſide in reſpect to the number of troops, and all the relative *attirails* muſt take place: theſe troops and *attirails* muſt be ſupported during peace, conſequently be perpetually in a ſtate of war, which never ſuffers the people to take breath.

Let us examine with a little more detail, how the ſyſtem of fortified places has neceſſarily increaſed armies. The fortified places of the ancients were ſimply ſurrounded with a wall and a ditch; and a wall, the towers of which and the other flank works were ſcarcely ſaliant. They had no exterior pieces of fortifications, conſequently they required leſs force in their garriſons, and leſs conſiderable armies to inveſt and lay ſiege to them. Modern fortified places occupy more extenſive ground. At the curtains of their firſt circumference, baſtions are attached, the capaciouſneſs of which ſhould be large, that they might become adapted to the making a good defence. In front of this circumference, there is a ditch,

ditch, ravelines, covert-way, glacis, then out-works; ſometimes multiplied one before the other, in ſuch a manner, that the laſt of theſe works is perhaps at the diſtance of four or five hundred toiſes from the body of the place. It is therefore eaſy to comprehend that the like circumferences, require ſupplies for the defence and inveſtment of them.

Yet at the ſame time when one ſtate conſtructs theſe places on its frontiers, the neighbouring one endeavours to conſtruct the ſame. Thus in competition with each other, fortreſs againſt fortreſs is raiſed. This rivalſhip has been ſeen particularly in Flanders. It might be ſaid, that France, Auſtria, Holland, thought that, by increaſing the number of their baſtions, their power likewiſe increaſed. Theſe bulwarks being raiſed on each ſide, it was neceſſary that war ſhould be carried on with armies more numerous. At firſt it was neceſſary to have garriſons in fortified places, afterwards an army to carry on ſieges, and frequently another army to cover them.

The prodigious increaſe of expence and armies, occaſioned by the multiplication and preſent ſyſtem of our fortifications, is already a great toil, the overgrowth exhauſting population and the ſtate. Let us now examine if the art of war has improved, and if wars have become more vigorous and more deciſive.

Armies becoming more numerous, and training after them a much greater quantity of baggage, it was neceſſary the Tactic, in proportion to that increaſe, ſhould have made more relative progreſs; this progreſs was not made, conſequently armies became only complicated bodies, more heavy, more difficult to move and to ſupport. Leſs great movements were in play again ſteach other, leſs manœuvres, leſs ſkill. In the countries covered with fortifications, ſuch as Flanders, war was characteriſed by routine and torpidity, which are names moſt certainly not attributed to genius. A calculation can nearly be made what each campaign ſhould produce. One or two battles, either to cover places, to prepare or to cover ſieges,

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are fought, the moſt part of the time conducted and decided by chance. The defeated party retire behind their fortifications, and the conquering one begins, or puts an end to ſome ſieges. The following campaign is carried on in the ſame manner, and ſo on, with others, till one of the two parties finds itſelf drove to its laſt place, and conſequently, according to our preſent calculations, to its laſt reſources, expeditiouſly concludes peace. That is to ſay, to ſketch at one ſtroke, this plan of making war, two hundred thouſand men on the frontiers of each others country, are, for ſeveral years, draining each other of much blood and money, without, as is generally the caſe, any other deciſive effect reſulting from it than the capture of a few places, and the equal enfeebling of the conquered or conqueror.

To view all this in the light of philoſophy and humanity, it may be a happy circumſtance, that, whether owing to the effect of places, fortified towns, or of the eſtabliſhed routine, wars are thus carried on in ſmall operations, in alternatives of places taken and retaken, inſtead of conqueſts and devaſtations as were formerly made. But to reflect on the object of military art, the ſcience of war has certainly loſt ground ſince its effects are leſs; in ſhort, ſince it does not fulfil the firſt and fatal end it ſhould arrive at; that of injuring the enemy as much as poſſible, and expeditiouſly deciding the quarrels of nations.

Hence it does not follow, that the art of well fortifying places, of attacking them, of defending them, carried to the point it is on in ſome reſpects, and perfectioned as it might be on many others, does not reflect honour on human wiſdom, and does not become an intereſting branch of the extenſive ſcience of war; but it has been made to act by much too great a part in this extenſive ſcience; the world ſeems to have forgot that it was only intended for an acceſſary, and that the great Tactic, the Tactic of movements, by which battles are gained was the moſt principal object: fortified towns have been too much relied upon; they have

have been too much increaſed; an infinity of errors and prejudices have been blindly followed, which engineers unfortunately but little inſtructed have not failed to give credit to and extend, while the other branches of the military, totally uninformed, and unhappily circumſcribed in the ſphere of their art only, and conſequently enthuſiaſts, excluding farther reſearches and rarely extending their views beyond their fortifications.

Before I can preſume to ſubſtitute my opinion in the place of theſe errors, I ſhall oppoſe two objections, which having already been propoſed to me in converſation, may be proper to lay before my readers. This is the firſt: "Suppoſing that the multiplicity of fortified towns has contributed to the origin of a revolution in the military ſyſtem of Europe, and of producing an increaſe to armies: has this change added a political evil to States? Wars becoming more ruinous have become of a ſhorter duration: thus the balance of the conſumption of men and money ſhould be equivalent?" This is my reply:

"Let us conclude that the nations intereſted in the famous thirty years war, have ſhed as much blood, expended as many millions, had as many men under arms as thoſe nations, which fought the laſt war during ſeven years in Germany. This conſumption, equal to all appearance will, nevertheleſs, have very burthenſome, and much more deſtructive effects, for theſe laſt, by being made in a leſs number of years, by the difference being much greater, in expending during thirty years ſucceſſively a ſum proportionable or elſe a little diſproportionable to its capitals, or to expend the total of that ſum in a ſmall number of years, and conſequently be neceſſitated to employ the capitals, increaſe the impoſts, and have recourſe to uſurious loans. What I have here ſaid of the finances, may be applicable to population: it will ſuffer much leſs from an indiſcriminate conſumation of men made in ten years, than from an equal conſumation made in two; it will ſupport much lighter the burthen of a million of men employed

"ployed in war, and conſequently during that time "taken out of the way of marriage, from agricul- "ture and all the uſeful arts, than that of an equal "number of men, initiated in the profeſſion of arms "in the ſpace of a ſmall number of years. In a word, "wars of long continuance, and carried on with a "ſmall coſt of men and money, were ſmall evils that "could not be of any prejudice to a vigorous ſtate, "while wars of a ſhort duration, and carried on at "immenſe charges, that is to ſay, our preſent ſyſtem "of war, are evils of a certain criſis, which throw "the moſt flouriſhing and beſt conſtituted ſtate into "languor and poverty."

I ſhall now paſs to the ſecond objection, it is the great argument of engineers in favour of fortified places. "Fortifications they ſay conſtitute the ſtrength "of a ſtate: they are reſources in unfortunate wars. "Without fortified places, wars of incurſion and de- "vaſtation would be again renewed, in the ſame man- "ner as in Poland and Tartary. Without fortified "places, they add, France would have been over-run "in the war of 1700? The battle of Ramilies and of "Mulplaquet were fought behind the Somme." In this reaſoning there is to be found ſome truth ſur- rounded with ſpecious errors. It is a motive for diſ- cuſſing and digeſting it. Let us firſt reaſon on the laſt reſource of this argument.

True it is, that the chain of misfortunes and blun- ders which France experienced in the war of Succeſſion, might have carried the allied army into Picardy and perhaps ſtill farther, without the aſſiſtance of all the places in Flanders, which retarded them ſtep by ſtep. But what does this prove in favour of the multipli- city of fortified places? They have been uſeful; they have rendered the progreſs of the allies more tardy and leſs deciſive: but there is a neceſſity for a Tactic and good troops; the diſcipline eſtabliſhed by Louis XIV. muſt not fall to the ground: there is a neceſſity to apply to the forming of generals: you would not create a Chamillard miniſter of ſtate, and the courtiers of

Madame,

Madame Maintenon generals: it was poſſible to have held the campaign with advantage; that aſcendant might have been had in Flanders, which a national army, and one that was neighbouring to its own country, might naturally have had over an army of confederates, ſome of which were at a great diſtance from their country: theſe battles might have been gained inſtead of being loſt: conſequently the diſaſtrous ſuccour from fortified towns would not have been wanted. Becauſe a ſtrange enchainment of blunders and unſkilful actions, becauſe the defects of our military conſtitution have rendered fortified places uſeful; do not let us therefore conclude in favour of their number. It would have added much more to the luſtre of a ſtate, and its military power, had both been ſo conſtituted as not to have ſtood in need of either; in this caſe, what millions would have been ſaved! what millions might have been ſuffered to have remained unemployed in campaigns, or depoſited for more uſeful expences! In ſhort, in the war which we have ſpoken of, it was not fortified places which ſaved France; it was intrigues at the court of England; it was the affair of Denain. Without theſe events, it would have been the ſame with Cambray and Arras, as with Liſle and many other towns; and France would have fallen to the enemy's ſword.

Let us continue. Fortified towns, they ſay, are the ſtrength of a ſtate. This requires great modification; for in themſelves fortifications contribute no more to the force of a ſtate, than its arſenals, and thoſe attirails of war, which are only productive of reſources, but when armies are in a ſtate to employ them. In a ſtate there is no effective and permanent force by itſelf, but troops carried to the greateſt point of inſtruction and diſcipline. Take poſſeſſion of fortified places, and have the beſt poſſible, if at the ſame time you have no army, or if that army be a bad one; thoſe places, however multiplied, however ſtrong, they may be, only ſerve to make the garriſons priſoners, and to eſtabliſh the conqueſts of the enemy. See Holland harraſſed

with

with fortified towns, and generally defended by mercenaries, and a ſtrong body of troops: in 1672 ſhe was almoſt entirely over-run in ſix weeks. She was only ſecured by her inundations, by the deciſion ſhe made of putting at the head of her few remaining troops the Prince of Orange, who reſtored their courage, and adopted the offenſive on the French, ſcattered and weakened by the tenure of the ſame places they had conquered, and unreaſonably kept when they ſhould have been deſtroyed. In the war before laſt, ſhe was ſeen to have been in the ſame manner very near conquered. Marſhal Saxe, ſuperior in genius and ſkill to the commanders of the enemy, gave the aſcendant to our armies: he gained battles; owing to that, all towns feebly defended, opened their gates: ſo true it is, that the fate of fortified towns is always decided by battles; that theſe towns are only acceſſaries, and that the principal object, the thing to be regarded, is to have an army ſuperior in manœuvres, and miſtreſs of the field. Without fortified towns wars would be more deſolating, the interior of ſtates would run greater riſks. This is of all objections the beſt founded, and which militates, in the ſtrongeſt manner, in favour of theſe towns. But let us carefully inveſtigate this. As war is now carried on, it is certain that it impedes incurſions and retards the invaſion of a country. It now only remains to know, if fortified towns would be obſtacles for armies differently conſtituted to ours, if a cavalry, indefatigable and eaſy to ſubſiſt like that of the Numidians and Tartars, would fear to paſs between them, to make excurſions in the country, and enter it by an oppoſite province. It remains to be conſidered, whether a general, who is a man of genius, and at the head of an army trained to patience and ſobriety, to great and reſiſtable things, would not dare to leave behind him all theſe pretended barriers, and carry the war into the interior of a ſtate to the capital itſelf. The doubts which I here advance, may moſt likely ſhow, that, if fortified towns retain the enemy on the frontiers, and avert the war from the heart of the ſtate, it is generally on account

count of the nature and ſimilitude of our conſtitution, on account of the routine of war we have adopted, than in reſpect to the real obſtacles they oppoſe.

But the queſtion is not in what manner war is to be carried on, it reſpects that which is conducted and made relative to this laſt, to our military conſtitutions, and ſtill more to our political conſtitutions: fortified towns have a utility which I ſhall mention, and which will be the means of my recommending them to the moſt part of European ſtates. This utility perhaps has not been perceived in the ſame point of ſight by their moſt zealous advocates.

Among the generality of the countries in Europe, the intereſts of the people and thoſe of government are very much divided: patriotiſm is ſimply a word; the citizens are not ſoldiers; the ſoldiers are not citizens; wars are not the quarrels of the nation, they are thoſe of the miniſter or the ſovereign: yet they do not ſupport themſelves, but by money and the means of impoſts; adding that in ſome ſtates theſe impoſts are exceſſive, that the people are diſcontented, miſerable in themſelves, and in a ſituation, which no revolution can be brought about in their favour.

This ſtated, I ſay that in ſtates of this nature, fortified towns are uſeful; for independent of the ſervices which they render againſt internal troubles, it is important for them, that ſtrange wars ſhould be always carried on out of the frontiers: if they penetrated into the interior, there would be no vigorous reſource to be expected from the people. Indifferent and puſillanimous, they would ſtoop their heads to the new yoke that is preparing for them. Miſfortunes might accumulate great troubles and ſhocks in the government; at leaſt they would occaſion revolutions in the miniſtry. But ſuppoſe there was ſuch a thing as a free ſtate, a people that had refinement, virtue, courage, patriotiſm; a people that could carry on war with little coſt, becauſe all the citizens would arm themſelves for the common defence, without crying out for pay from the ſtate; a people that has a majeſty in itſelf, and conſequently

ſequently at an intereſting criſis could neceſſarily place at its own head the moſt enlightened and moſt praiſe-worthy character. I aſſert that ſuch a ſtate may diſpenſe with fortified places; that to preſerve its liberty it ſhould poſitively diſpenſe with them; that in having no fortified places it runs no riſk of being ſubjugated: in the firſt place it might be aſſerted, that the beſt commanded, braveſt, and beſt conſtituted armies would ſtop the enemy on the frontiers: if the reverſe happens, the ſtate would not be in danger for the loſs of a few leagues of territory; its citizens would aſſemble from all quarters againſt the common enemy. The more ſucceſs the enemy has, the more it muſt extend and conſequently weaken itſelf: where the enemy is, there would be the frontier, becauſe, if I may thus expreſs myſelf, the ſtate would only recoil upon itſelf, and wherever men and ground remained, the ſtate would ſtill ſubſiſt. Thus the territories of Rome were overrun by the Gauls, Rome itſelf was deſtroyed, but its knights, its name, its deſtiny was rallied on the Capitolian mount, while a citizen, having united the ſcattered remains of the nation, came and repelled the conquerors.

Let us in the briefeſt manner poſſible enter once more on my opinion of fortified places. They are too much multiplied; they are computed at too great a value in the balance of the ſtrength of a ſtate, and in the preſent ſyſtem of war. They have rendered wars more ruinous, by compelling armies to be reinforced and augmented: they have rendered them leſs ſcientific and deciſive, by having occaſioned the great Tactics, or the art of fighting battles, to be neglected, and by having in general confined the views and operations of the military. On the other hand, they have rendered wars leſs fatiguing, they are obſtacles to incurſions and devaſtations: they may, well defended, hinder or retard conqueſts: they perhaps would not procure theſe laſt advantages, if armies were differently conſtituted, if a new kind of war was ſubſtituted to the adopted routine; but this not being the

caſe, the exiſting effects muſt be calculated. In ſhort, to ſpeak as a politician, fortified places are neceſſary to the moſt part of governments, but they would be leſs ſo in proportion as they become more free, more vigorous, more virtuous, better beloved by the people; they would be more eſſential in proportion as they depart from theſe qualities.

It remains for me to ſay how fortified places may be more advantageous to a ſtate. When for example the openings on its frontiers be reduced to ſome points, theſe fortifications occupy and defend them; it is when, by the nature of the country, the frontier be open and without obſtacle, they are conſtructed on ſome principal points, ſuch as rivers, confluences of rivers, &c. it is when, in whatever part they are conſtructed, they be extenſive, capable to contain magazines, arſenals, depoſits of an army; it is when, being thus conſtructed, they be fortified ſo as to receive great garriſons, remains of armies, and yet, on an emergency to be able to defend themſelves with few troops; in a word, when they be places of arms, magazines and points of ſuccour, baſtions where a good army and a manœuvring one is the curtain of them, or before which, this army may act offenſively, with a certainty of finding a ſupport in caſe of a check; or in ſhort that this army may rely on its own ſtrength, waiting for favourable circumſtances to attack the enemy that lays ſiege to it.

I once more repeat, that fortified places ſhould be few in number: if they be multiplied, you muſt exhauſt yourſelf by great garriſons to mantain them, which conſtrains an army to keep out of the field and to act only on the defenſive; or, if theſe garriſons be but weak, the enemy threatens all of them, manœuvres, ſteals a movement in ſecret, and concludes by the inveſtment of thoſe that are unprovided; inſtead of this, if there be one or two places to cover, they cannot be loſt ſight of, but be always before-hand with the enemy on each of them, and keep head againſt it with the whole united force. This tends to the

above

above opinion which I have eſtabliſhed, that war in the great ſcale, or a war of campaign, ſhould be always the principal object, it being the fate of armies which decides that of fortified places.

I again repeat, that it is neceſſary fortified places ſhould be capacious, to ſerve as a depoſit and ſupport for armies: if they be ſmall, if, like all our places of this kind of the ſecond and third claſs, they be uſeleſs, they are neither adapted for armies or points to retreat to, places to rally by, or points of eſtabliſhment. Let the enemy beſiege them! they cannot fail being taken: ſuppoſe it does not beſiege them! it is eaſy for it to maſk them: it can even, without inconvenience, leave them behind. If places of this nature be but weakly garriſoned, the works abandoned to the methodical defenſive are frequently overpowered by the ſuperiority of the beſieger. If a ſtrong garriſon be planted, they are but oftentimes more expeditiouſly taken, becauſe this number becomes embarraſſment, becauſe the generality of commanders are ignorant of the art of covering themſelves without the works, from the approaches of the enemy, and to profit of the ſtrength of their garriſon to render their defenſe at the ſame time offenſive. In ſhort, the greateſt and deciſive reaſon which can be given againſt theſe kind of places, whatever can be ſaid in favour of them, is, of its being uſeleſs to conſtruct them before-hand, and at great coſt; becauſe in time of war, it is poſſible to ſupply the immediate object they fulfil by poſts fortified on the ſpot, and at the time preſent. Is there a neceſſity for a magazine, a head quarter, a point for the defenſe of a *debouché?* Let a town, village, height, an advantageous ground be choſen, let many hands be employed to throw up intrenchments; in a few days, the work is made, where good troops and a man of judgment can ſufficiently ſecure themſelves, to give time to the army to arrive for their ſuccour. What ſervices more do the trifling fortifications yield which are conſtructed and maintained at great coſt? An age may elapſe without having an occaſion to make uſe of them, and

then they ſuffer them to be degraded; or if they be maintained, there is an age in accumulating annual expences which make conſiderable ſums, and which very likely might be more uſefully employed; yet when they be beſieged, if an army does not arrive for their ſuccour, they conclude by capitulating; thus, nearly in the ſpace of a few days, poſts raiſed on ground, as I have propoſed, would anſwer the object they were deſigned for. In a word, theſe laſt have advantages which fortified towns cannot have: for with theſe circumſtances determine the poſition and conſequently they determine them always more aptly to the object of the moment; when circumſtances have varied, the poſt is evacuated, or elſe it is raiſed to take poſſeſſion of another; they may alſo conſtruct the poſt proportionably to the object it is to fulfil, to the number of days it is meant to be kept, to the number or kind of troops to place there, to force and ſkill of the enemy that is to act againſt it; in ſhort, the officer entruſted with the defence of the poſt, preſides at the ſame time over its conſtruction, directs it according to his defenſive views and his reſources, while contrary to this, in the generality of fortified towns, his views and his reſources are in contradiction with the nature of the works, and their too extenſive or too much confined diſpoſition. Let us explain this laſt idea. To prove it, it is neceſſary in ſpite of ourſelves to extend our reaſons.

The inconvenience of all fortified towns, and an inconvenience which becomes more ſenſible as they are more multiplied, is, when in general the circumſtances which determine the ſeat and ſyſtem of their conſtruction, changing by the revolution of events, theſe places become uſeleſs or badly ſituated or without any connection with the circumſtances of the time being. To convince ourſelves of this truth, let us caſt our eyes over two hundred places which are numbered in France.

Any perſon who has not reflected on their poſition, would be induced to think that, with this quantity of fortreſſes, all the provinces in the kingdom are covered, and

and we have frontiers which are abſolutely unfurniſhed with them; in our maritime provinces there are ſcarce any: our greateſt poſts, our marine eſtabliſhments are ſcarce, on the ſide of the country protected from a *coup du main.* In other places we have two or three lines of works: we have them in points where nothing is covered by them, where they defend nothing; the reaſon is, in ſome places the frontier is advanced, in other places it is retired; formerly the ſyſtem was, to oppoſe fortification to fortification, and thoſe of the enemy no longer ſubſiſting, ours were, in ſome points, become uſeleſs: formerly it was the cuſtom to fortify every place; and even now this branch of adminiſtration is not conducted on a more determined plan. We have neither courage to deſtroy or entirely to abandon part of theſe fortified places, nor money ſufficient to maintain them; they are incompleatly repaired. There are unuſeful ones, which are preſerved out of reſpect to Vauban, or by other routinous prejudices: there are others which are augmented, becauſe towns have grants, which eſtabliſhed the annual funds of their maintenance; and there being an eſtabliſhed rule, that theſe funds ſhould be employed for the fortification of theſe towns, ſuppoſing theſe towns were not in want of them. There are others, which the directors or chief engineers are pleaſed to throw down, or overcharge with uſeleſs works, to oppoſe the opinion of their predeceſſors, or to follow their own. There are others, round which are conſtructed lines of works, which an army alone can defend, works on the immenſity, inutility, and extravagance of which, it is impoſſible to help deploring, when one thinks that, if there be not an army to throw into theſe works, the place cannot be ſaved; that if this army exiſts it is much better it ſhould keep the field; cover the place by a poſition well choſen, or a war of movements; and in ſhort that, in caſe of misfortune, or too great inferiority, intrench itſelf under the place, and maintain itſelf in its out-works, until fortune takes a better face.

By this it is eaſy to ſee, how important it is for government to be occupied with this object, andthat in reſpect to this, it ſhould form a plan, combined on the preſent ſtate of the kingdom, and on the true principle of war. If I have well conceived the particulars of theſe laſt, this plan ſhould be to have, in all the frontier provinces, in proportion to their extent, one or more great and excellent fortified places, not only in the poſition the moſt advantageous in itſelf, but in thoſe which, to ſee the thing in great, covers or ſupports the frontier in the beſt manner; in a word, what I have called places of depoſit, and to rally upon.

It would be to have, in the rear of frontier provinces, and in four principal points for the totality of the kingdom, four more places deſtined to receive the foundries, arſenals, and military apparatus of all kinds; for it is ſtrange, that the moſt part of theſe eſtabliſhments are found on the frontiers and in towns of the firſt line. Our two firſt eſtabliſhments of artillery are at Douay, and at Straſbourg, almoſt all our caſt iron and our ſmall arms are manufactured in villages on the frontiers, and ſo much unprotected, that at all times, when war approaches them, it only depends on the enemy to deſtroy them effectually.

After having determined on the principal fortifications neceſſary for France to maintain, beſides the four places, which I have before ſpoken of, for military fabrications and arſenals, a variation in this ſyſtem ſhould be made according as circumſtances require, for example, after an unfortunate war, and which would have turned a province into a frontier, that province ſhould be fortified in the ſame manner as the one that was loſt; and the ſame in a fortunate war, and which had retired the frontiers of the kingdom, the fortifications of the old limits ſhould be abandoned, and new ones conſtructed, ſo that the ſtate, by this means, is in poſſeſſion of frontiers, by the ſupport of which, or in advance of them, its armies may carry on the war with advantage: all the expences relative to the conſtruction and maintenance of places ſhould be likewiſe applied

plied with combination and advantage; in ſhort, the ſupport of all other fortified places ſhould be neglected, or moſt likely it would be proper to raze them, for this great number of fortreſſes, in general too ſmall, badly ſituated, half diſgraced, is ruinous, uſeleſs and contrary to the good and true principles of war; and eſpecially in caſe of war, intrenched poſts relative to the object of the preſent moment can, with advantage, anſwer the ſame end as theſe kind of places.

But to execute with a fruitful reward ſo great a change, all parts of our military conſtitution ſhould be brought to perfection: the ſtate ſhould have troops to be depended upon, and manœuvring; generals who know how to command them; and who daring to vary from the eſtabliſhed routine, in a ſenſe adopt a new kind of war. It ſhould have troops indefatigable, accuſtomed to labour, and who could, on an emergency, and inſtantaneouſly, as the Roman legions conſtructed their *caſtra*, which they employed for the ſame uſe, create the moveable fortifications I have ſpoken of: theſe troops ſhould be exerciſed in the conſtruction and defenſe of thoſe poſts, and for which end, they ſhould have continual and well directed ſchools, in ſhort the ſtrength, and courage of the ſoldiers ſhould be formed, the minds and prejudices of the officers; troops having once attained this point of perfection, with earth and men, poſts are eaſily conſtructed, which anſwer the end of fortifications.

The late Marſhal Broglio proved the truth of this, at Prague. Eighteen years afterwards his deſcendants renewed his example, at Caſſel and Gottingen. Gottingen had only one line raiſed, diſgraced and open to inſult in every part. In a month it was put in a ſtate of defence, complimented with proviſions, and left to its own forces. The enemies approached it, and were aſtoniſhed to find a place capable of threatening them, where they expected to find one incapable of any inſult. At Caſſel, General Broglio conſtructed part of his out work during the ſiege. He conſtructed ſome under fire of the enemy. He oppoſed labour

againſt labour, earth againſt earth. In a word, hiſtory will point out, that thoſe works of momentary conſtruction, if I may thus expreſs myſelf, have ſuſtained the moſt vigorous ſieges; and a commander, who knows how to repair a bad line, concert and increaſe obſtacles, that is to ſay, advance them under the ſteps of beſiegers, will be found to have generally, in the defence of his works in point of execution, intelligence, coolneſs and reſolution.

Having preſumed to advance my opinion, on the real uſe which ſhould be made of fortifications, I can, in a well-timed manner, venture to ſpeak concerning the corps, how that in this revolution of ſyſtems, there is a poſſibility of prefixing another conſtitution to it, a conſtitution, which would render the corps more analagous to that of troops, and to the knowledge of all the other branches of war; which would even give it, on the art it cultivates, ſchools more inſtructive and more military; in ſhort which, in rooting out many prejudices, reſulting from the preſent conſtitution, and the manner it is applied to, would render it applicable to more, and to greater objects.

This chapter exceeds the bounds I had preſcribed it; but is it poſſible to confine ourſelves within the limits of thoſe ideas we have begun. Can we ſtop in the expoſition of thoſe truths we conceive we have diſcovered? This part was therefore as much intereſting as it was novel to treat of, and the moſt part of the errors I have endeavoured to combat, have been manifeſted by time; and from the darkneſs theſe have been buried in, brought forward to the face of day.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

RELATION *which the* KNOWLEDGE *of* GROUND *has with the* TACTIC.

TO form a judgement by all the military details, which are left us by the ancients, the ſcience of the knowledge of ground ſhould be much leſs important for them than for us. Their orders of battle, much deeper, and much ſhorter than ours, required a poſition for a great development. Seldom does it appear, that they were occupied with a choice of thoſe poſitions In the deſcriptions of all the battles of antiquity, no topographical detail is to be found. Their battles appear to be fought on planes, and that this kind of ground was preferred by their armies. At that time, all the reſource of troops were in the manœuvres. One army ſupported the other, the cavalry, in general, formed the wings. At Pharſalia, Cæſar formed his army in an oblique echelon, and it was there, this diſpoſition gained him the battle. Seldom is it ſeen in hiſtory, that a wing of an army has found its protection in the nature of ground: and as to battles of poſts there is nothing of the kind to be met with: the arms and tactic of the ancients, were not adapted to things of the kind. The phalanx was only formidable in planes. A Roman legion had all its confidence in itſelf. As long as the infantry was brave, and well armed, as long as warlike machines were not multiplied, as long as man againſt man ſingly oppoſed each other, this was the conſequence: but when the legions degenerated, when they threw aſide their defenſive arms, when they became timid and infirm in plains, when catapultas and baliſtas were increaſed in armies, in like manner, as cannon are at this day increaſed in ours, then reſources in ground were ſought after, heights were taken poſſeſſion of; the increaſe of effects of warlike machines and the contrivance of placing obſtacles between the enemy, and the party engaged,

engaged were deſirable. In the wars of Arien againſt the Alans, the details of the diſpoſition of a battle are ſeen, which in that age approached very much to ours.

The ancients almoſt indifferent about the reſources which a broken or uneven country could offer to their orders of battle, ſeemed even leſs occupied about topographical knowledge, in the daily conduct of their operations. In no quarter, till the ſecond punic war, was the Roman tactic ſeen to have any relation with ground. Fabius, to oppoſe the ſucceſs of Annibal, was the firſt who began to profit by the nature of the country. His imprudent predeceſſors were defeated on plains; he knew he was too much inferior in the Tactic to his adverſary: to put himſelf in competition with him, he ſought for elevated or commanding ground, ſeized on poſitions, made a war of movements, avoided battles. His conduct ſaved Rome, and that conduct was reprehended; ſo much the principles of that ſcientific campaign were unknown to the Romans, accuſtomed to fight, ſooner than to manœuvre!

Hiſtory ſometimes diſcovers Cæſar to be occupied with the nature of the country in the choice of his camps; but the few topographical details, which he himſelf ſeems to introduce in his commentaries, apparently proves, that theſe details were at that time not looked upon as very important. They were much leſs ſo, in thoſe times of barbarity and ignorance, which ſucceeded to the flouriſhing days of the empire; all branches of military ſcience at once degenerated; campaigns were nothing more than incurſions: and chance or courage alone decided battles.

When fire arms acquired ſome perfection, ground moſt naturally would have ſome influence over the operations of war. Infantry ſought for uneven country. It ſooner occupied villages, woods and heights. The tenure of theſe poſitions became intereſting poſts, and places of ſuccour; they were in conſequence compriſed in the combinations of caſtrematation and the Tactics. This undoubtedly was a new reſource for genius, and a ſtep nearer to the perfection of the ſcience;

ence; but, as almoſt in all things, abuſe ſucceeds to truth, ſo, by degrees, that influence of ground over military operations became too abſolute. The ſcience of the movement of troops has been neglected: it has been thought that it was uſeleſs to manœuvre, that all the art of war conſiſted in the choice of advantageous poſitions. Hence aroſe ſo many real or pretended topographical officers, who fill up the ſtaff of armies, and the cabinets of miniſters; officers who, for the moſt part, have no knowledge of the Tactics, who even eſteem that knowledge and cuſtom beneath them. This rage for topography, this extreme prejudice of the ſtaff, in favour of thoſe details they are charged with, were alone created to gain ground in France, ſooner than in any other place; becauſe theſe officers preſume to reaſon, and to fancy themſelves elevated by functions, which by being arrayed with ſome appearances of importance, initiate them into the myſteries of military operations.

Doubtleſs the art of reconnoitring is important, it ſhould be cultivated, and its reſult ſhould be comprized in the daily combinations of war; but it ſhould be only regarded as a branch of the Tactic, which is, I repeat it, the mother ſcience. Therefore all ſtaff officers ſhould be tacticians; they ſhould be acquainted with the method of diſpoſing and conducting troops; they ſhould not forget in their calculations, that troops defend poſitions, even more ſo than thoſe troops are defended by them; that ground is only an acceſſary, and that the arm is always the principal; in ſhort, they ſhould not have the miſtaken pretenſion of thinking, that all the ſcience of war, and the ſublimity of the buſineſs are centered in their labours of the cabinet.

So that this might take place, how ſhould the election be made of ſtaff officers? It ſhould be made among men, who were acuſtomed to the details and movements of all the arms; among field officers, or heads of corps; among thoſe who have moſt intelligence, activity, ſagacity, and preciſion in the *coup d'œil*. Since after all this, the perfect reconnoitring of a country

try is a talent, and this talent is founded on a theory, of which, the practical acquiſition is important, ſo thoſe officers ſhould conſtitute in time of peace, as in time of war, a permanent ſtaff. This corps ſhould be under the direction of a General, who ſhould, himſelf, unite to the moſt decided ſkill in the great ſcale of war, the ſcience and cuſtom of moving all the different arms, comprized in the compoſition of an army, who, in a word, conſequently would not eſteem the Tactic as a minute and ſubaltern ſcience, under the direction of a General; for the denomination of this rank, which but too often has little affinity with what it promiſes, ſignifies a man who, by his ſtudy and experience, has embraced all the branches of war, and who knows the analogy they ſhould have between each other. Where ſhould the ſchools of inſtruction of this ſtaff be held? In the centre of troops, in great garriſons, in peace encampments. There no ideal calculations can be made, and which practice cannot aſcertain and explain; there, the great operations of war, ſuch as marches, orders of battle, would be put into execution and combined with ground; there conſequently the Tactic would be inſtructed, that is to ſay, the kind of Tactic. I have defined: *The ſcience which relates to all the branches of war:* there, ſtaff-officers would by degrees acquire the ſkill of putting troops in movement, fortify their *coup-d'œil* againſt illuſions, which are produced by numbers, againſt the difference of ground, naked or covered with troops; in ſhort, theſe officers would, by degrees, familiarize themſelves with troops, inſtead of tending to alienate themſelves from them, inſtead of looking upon them, as mere mechanical ſprings, as they are at this day.

Let them compare ſuch a ſchool of the ſtaff, to that which, ſince the peace, we have attempted to eſtabliſh. In this laſt, ſome officers the moſt part of whom are ignorant of, and who deſpiſe the firſt elements of the Tactic, have been ſent to reconnoitre on the frontiers; thoſe in whom a greater degree of confidence is placed, have the liberty of adding to the reports of theſe re-

reconnoitrings, military memoirs, ſyſtems of offenſive and defenſive operations; the others are young officers diſcriminated by the name of pupils: From theſe laſt mere topographical memoirs are required, that is to ſay, the work of a geographical engineer. Nevertheleſs one and the other ſuffer the troops to eſcape their reflection..

"What is there to be done with troops? ſome cry "out, (and theſe by the bye are moſt enlightened) we "are excluded from the command of them, they are "abſorbed in details, it ſeems, that the world does not "conceive our operations to have the leaſt relation with "them. What are Tactics? others reply (and theſe "are the greateſt number.) They are a futile ſci-"ence, and the details of which, we are extremely "happy in being exempted from. Of what uſe is "all this diſcipline, all theſe evolutions? The ſub-"limity and the importance of the buſineſs are found "in our reconnoitring plans, in our marches, in the "choice of our poſitions." Thus reaſoning, they proceed to their draughts, preparing itineraries, putting in motion their imaginary armies, and very often do not ſet eyes on a ſoldier from year's end to year's end. What is the reſult of this? If on the firſt war that breaks out, the generals are obliged to employ indifferently all the members of that ſchool, the buſineſs will be badly carried on; if they refuſe the greateſt part of them, to chuſe ſtaff officers themſelves, thoſe they make choice of will not perhaps be much better; or if even they ſhould have the neceſſary qualities to ſucceed, they will at leaſt be inexpert, or ruſty in the details they are charged with.

There is certainly a theory and principles to reconnoitre a country by, to diſcover the details, to ſeize upon them and ſketch them in the memory. In ſtudying the direction of roads, and the courſe of waters, a more military and neat idea is formed of the country. On the entrance of a country unknown to an officer, by his taking poſſeſſion of thoſe points, for the better diſcovery of its aſpect, the poſts for aſſembling ar,

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and for ſignals which he chuſes, by the triangles and lines which his eye projects, it is eaſy to judge whether he has the talent of reconnoitring. Particularly in mountainous countries, it is an art to diſtinguiſh the principal chains from the ſmall ſummits or contre forts projected from them; thoſe points, where the ſources of waters are to be found, the entry of gorges; the nature of overhanging ground, the profundity of vallies, the diſtances of places. There is in being a moſt excellent theory of this, drawn up by M. de Bourcet, of whom the military ſhould requeſt the publication.

But the principal means of becoming ſkilful in the ſcience of reconnoitring ground, is daily practice in our youth, when we travel, hunt, and make military *promenades*. In Polybius, we read of Philopemon, who followed theſe rules. This ſhould be the caſe with all officers, who are deſirous of riſing to the great ſcale of war. For, in whatever arm one ſerves, the ſcience of the coup-d'œil is of the greateſt importance. In my elementary Tactic, I have propoſed for officers, ſchools for this ſtudy. Theſe ſchools would produce good field officers; and from theſe field officers excellent ſubjects for the ſtaff of an army.

When once the coup-d'œil is formed, when the perfect judgement of ground is acquired, and diſtances meaſured from an opinion formed under various aſpects of country; when the ſight is affirmed againſt the numberleſs illuſions produced by the difference of ground, the quantity and complication of troops of various arms, ſeen under different appearances; the manœuvres of theſe troops, the artifices of the Tactic, which they avail themſelves of, ſuppoſing them to be ſkilfully manœuvred; the horizon more or leſs ſerene, and a thouſand accidental and local cauſes; a country ſeen in a military manner, that is to ſay, the ſkill in diſtinguiſhing, with certainty and alacrity, that influence which a country has over military operations; the poſition it offers, in ſuch or ſuch a caſe, to the army, or body of troops, the movements of which

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are calculated; what the *debouchés* and the entire of the march would be, on ſuch or ſuch a point; in ſhort, the general affinity and details, which that maſs of a country might have with the armies acting in it. This talent may improve, but not be acquired by practice; it is a gift of nature, and an intuitive quality. For let us ſuppoſe a man to be an excellent topographer, who could perfectly well define and embrace, with eye and imagination, the whole ſcale of a country, an abſtraction made of troops and circumſtances: if this man be not born a military man, only tranſport him into a country covered with troops; let him be obliged to combine his local knowledge with military knowledge; ſhould he be entruſted with the determination of a movement or a poſition, relative to ſuch or ſuch a circumſtance, he would be embarraſſed, uncertain and blinded; and ſhould he at laſt be reſolved, he would take the worſt deciſion; and for a ſtronger reaſon he would make this reſolve, becauſe it frequently happens in war, that his determination ſhould be as ſudden as his coup-d'œil; that it ſhould be taken in the midſt of tumult and danger, in the midſt of inconveniences, which reſult from all the falſe deciſions that ſurround the only true one. This is the ſagacity of that coup-d'œil and judgement which ſucceeds in battles, and which nature is not bountiful in beſtowing, but to a few ſelect men in the ſpace of an age.

The ſcience of the coup d'œil, and knowledge of ground being intimately connected with the Tactics, the many falſe and uſeleſs lights, produced from the ſchools of ſtaff officers, which are not conſtituted after this fundamental principle muſt be ſeen. I ſhall explain this more fully. The queſtion is to chuſe a poſition for an army. If the officer who determines on this poſition be no Tactician, how will he know how to combine it relatively to the force of this army, to the extent this poſition ſhould occupy? How will he, in the choice of this poſition, be attentive to the kind of arm, in which the army is ſtrongeſt or weakeſt; to the kind of order of batile, which would be

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moſt advantageous, to occupy it? Ignorant of this combination, poſitions are taken good in themſelves, but which are found to be defective, relative to the number and kind of troops which occupy them. Poſitions are taken, the front of which is reſpectable, but where the army cannot manœuvre for want of depth. Others are again taken, which are formidable on all ſides, but in which the army, reduced to the defenſive, loſes the advantage of manœuvring, and of profiting of the enemy's miſtakes. In ſhort, poſitions are taken which, by an unforeſeen movement, the enemy turns them, pierces through them, or forces them to be abandoned, without the poſſibility of making a reſiſtance.

But after a poſition is determined upon, even after it is known to be advantageous, whether relative to offenſive or defenſive views, whether in reſpect to the number, and the kind of troops that ſhould occupy it, there ſtill remains a method of diſpoſing the different arms, in which it is ſtill neceſſary, that the Tactic ſhould be combined with the knowledge of ground.

This mixture of combinations is an art, which has likewiſe its principles. For example, ſuppoſe a chain of heights is determined upon, for the front of the poſition the army occupies. If according to the general routine, the diſpoſition of troops is made on the ground itſelf; and in running over the front of the poſition, there is a riſk in not diſtributing the arms in thoſe poſts that might prove of the greateſt advantage to them, and in not drawing from the poſition all the reſource, which it is capable of furniſhing. On the other hand, by tranſporting one-ſelf in front of the poſition, and to thoſe points by which the enemy might arrive on it, a more perfect diſcovery might be made of the whole and its details: at firſt ſight the ground in front of it will be diſcovered, the aſpect which it preſents to the enemy, the offenſive diſpoſition it may diſcover to it. Afterwards, ſuppoſing one-ſelf in the place of the enemy, thoſe methods would be

be ſought after, by which the enemy could attack this poſition; and of courſe, what counter methods could be oppoſed to it. By ſeeing the face of the poſition a better judgement can be formed of the poſts which each arm* ſhould occupy; the advantageous ſaliant points to be occupied by batteries; the effect which the fire from theſe batteries ſhould produce on the debouchés from whence the enemy might advance, the moſt convenient elevations to be taken poſſeſſion of, ſo that the fire of ſmall arms might not be too plunging; the ridaux, behind which a body of the troops might be poſted under cover of the fire of the enemy's batteries, or deceive the enemy in the number of men, and in the real diſpoſition to be oppoſed to it.

Thus it is evident, the ſcience of reconnoitring ground combined with the Tactic, may furniſh matter for an intereſting work; and without doubt this work would ſpring up from the ſeminary appropriated for the inſtruction of ſtaff officers conſtituted on the plan I have propoſed. On this branch of military art, like many others, there is nothing reduced to principles: this is conſidered as uſeleſs: becauſe on one ſide they ſay, the talent of reconnoitring a country is an innate gift, and that on matters of genius there can be no inſtructions layed down: on the other, becauſe they ſcarcely conſider the Tactic in a ſcientific light, and ſtill leſs of its having an indiſpenſible connection with the knowledge of ground.

By ſuppoſing field officers to be Tacticians, I admit for a more ſolid reaſon, that Generals would be alſo Tacticians, and therefore armies would be more manœuvring: when I ſay armies, I underſtand armies in maſs, and not cut up into corps and detachments. They would know how to execute marches *aportée* to the enemy, form orders of battle, and acquire ſucceſs over the enemy by manœuvres. In proportion as wars of movement increaſe, ſo the preſent routine would be deviated from; we ſhould have recourſe to armies

* *Arm*, from the French *arme*, ſignifies a diſtinct branch of the army.——Cavalry is an *arm*.—Artillery is an *arm*, &c.

leſs numerous, and leſs burthened with embarraſſing particulars; what the military call *poſitions* would be leſs ſought after: for poſitions ſhould only be the laſt reſource of a manœuvring and well-commanded army. When an army knows how to manœuvre, and will fight, there are few poſitions which it cannot attack in reverſe, or force the enemy to abandon them. In a word, poſitions ſhould never be taken, but when there are reaſons to remain inactive, or that they are of a nature to force the enemy to attack them with diſadvantage, or to fail in their operations. This requires an explanation more in detail.

In ſhort, what is a good poſition? It is an extenſive expanſe of ground, the front and flank of which furniſh advantageous poſts to the army that ſhould occupy them, and preſent to the enemy that would diſlodge the army, obſtacles difficult to ſurmount. But what could this poſition, however good it may be, be able to effect againſt a ſkilful and manœuvring enemy? Can it not be turned at a diſtance, if not by a proximation to it? And then is not the army, which occupies it, forced to evacuate it? This poſition, formidable in front, is it formidable in its rear? And attacked on this laſt ſide, meaning the rear, can it not become diſadvantageous? It ſeldom happens, that nature furniſhes theſe poſitions with double front, in which an army may be equally well poſted on one or the other face. Such is even the routine of received ideas; that no army having as yet been known to have been attacked in its rear, ſuch a thing is therefore looked upon as impoſſible. There is nevertheleſs nothing more poſſible.

For example, let us ſuppoſe, on one ſide, an army over-burthened with embarraſſing particulars, awkward in its manœuvres, in ſhort ſuch as ours are; and on the other, one that is well conſtituted, a manœuvring one, and commanded by a General, who has ſtudied all the reſources of the Tactic. The one will ſeek after poſitions, and put all its confidence in them; will move ſlowly and with difficulty; will be fettered by its methodical plans of ſubſiſtence; will think itſelf

ſelf loſt, unleſs it has all its eſtabliſhments behind it in perfect order. The other will be light to move, and manageble, capable of bold movements, of rapid and forced marches: it will be always on the offenſive, ſcarce ever confine itſelf in poſitions, and deſpiſe thoſe it has oppoſed to it. Will the enemy think to ſtop it by one of thoſe imaginary inexpugnable poſitions? It will know how to ſteal a movement from it, or it will, in ſight of it, tranſport itſelf on its flank, or in rear of it. To execute this movement if neceſſary, it will have ſubſiſtence for eight days, and diſpenſe with its eſtabliſhments. What will the enemy attempt ſurprized at this new kind of war? Would it wait while an army ſkilful in moving, in daſhing rapidly on the weak part of its poſition, changing in a moment from the march order to that of battle, finds itſelf prepared to attack the flank or rear of its poſition? This inactive ſtate would prove fatal to it. Would it change its poſition? In this caſe it would loſe the advantage of ground which it relied upon, and it would be neceſſitated to receive battle where it can. Perhaps its heavy and ſlow motion would favour an attack upon it: it would be embarraſſed with its baggage and its means of ſubſiſtence; it would fear being ſeparated from its eſtabliſhments, which it could not diſpenſe with, becauſe it had contracted the habit of being confined to them, and becauſe its troops, more numerous than thoſe of the oppoſite army, would, excluſive of that, be leſs ſober and leſs patient.

In ſhort, I aver that an army, well conſtituted and well commanded, ſhould never find a poſition before it, which ſhould ſtop its movements, or force it to attack, with diſadvantage, the army which is eſtabliſhed in it, unleſs it is one of thoſe rare poſitions, which, extending to the object it ſhould cover, leaves no reſource for manœuvres on its rear or on its flank. Such was the ſkilful poſition choſen by M. the Marſhal Broglio before Frankfort, and ſo gloriouſly juſtified by his ſucceſsful battle there. Such are in general thoſe which an army might take at the head of a ſingle *de-*

bouché, which it means to defend, before, or at a ſmall *porté*, from the fortified towns, which the enemy muſt neceſſarily lay ſiege to. In all other caſes, I ſay, poſitions are deſpicable; that it is eaſy to oblige the enemy to evacuate them; and if it is obſtinate in remaining in them to attack it with advantage. Tranſport the army on the flank or rear of the enemy; attack it on any other point than the front of its poſition, which is that, where it premeditates its diſpoſition of defence, and where the ground is advantageous to it. I maintain, that a general, who will, in this reſpect, ſhake off eſtabliſhed prejudices, would embarraſs his enemy, aſtoniſh him, not ſuffer him to take breath any where, force him to give battle, and to give way continually from before him. But to ſuch a general, there is a neceſſity to have an army differently conſtituted to ours; an army which, having been exerciſed and formed by him, ſhould be prepared to the new kind of operations which he makes it execute.

I have already thrown, into the courſe of this work, ſome ideas on this important ſubject: I again return to it, becauſe I preſume to conceive, there is a method more advantageous, more deciſive, and better contrived to procure a great ſucceſs, than that which has been made uſe of till now. The King of Pruſſia is the only general who has ſometimes had this method, by which he has acquired the name of a glorious monarch.

CHAP. XVIII.

RELATION *of the ſcience of* SUBSISTENCE *with* WAR, *and particularly with a* WAR *of* CAMPAIGN. *An* EXAMINATION *into the* METHOD *of ſubſiſting our* ARMIES.

THE art of furniſhing ſubſiſtence to armies, is an important branch of the vaſt ſcience of war. This art, like others, has had its revolutions; it has, according to the times, varied in its details and in its principles,

principles. I am here proceeding to make an intereſting examination of what it was in the principal ages of antiquity, and what it is in the preſent one.

It is not found in hiſtory, but it is eaſy to conceive, how thoſe little armies of the Grecian republics, carrying on war at ſome leagues diſtant from their territories, could and ſhould ſubſiſt; and what kind of war was this! Incurſions of ſome days made in the harveſt, and generally terminated by a battle, at the end of which the two parties repaired their loſſes and cultivated their lands.

Hiſtory, in this reſpect, equally leaves us without light, and it is more difficult to find out the method by which theſe armies ſubſiſted when the ambition of the Greek ſtates, increaſed with their power, made them more numerous, and which invited them to the conqueſts of the neighbouring iſlands, and of ſome parts of the coaſt of Aſia. We then only find the ſoldier, who before fought without reward, received a regular pay. Hiſtory ſays, that this pay was all in ſpecie, and it mentions the ſum. Was the ſoldier afterwards obliged, by the means of this pay, to provide himſelf with ſubſiſtance? How did he ſubſiſt? Did the army provide magazines? This is what we are ignorant of. I could form conjectures on theſe heads; but it is uſeleſs to hazard conjecture where no light is to be found.

We ſtill leſs know how thoſe almoſt fabulous multitudes ſubſiſted, with which the kings of Perſia attempted to over-run Greece. They were ſo numerous, they dragged after them ſuch a great quantity of equipage and beaſts of burthen, that they, according to the hyperbolical Herodotus, drained the rivers near which they ſojourned; and that famine and peſtilence eſtabliſhed themſelves after them, in the countries which they paſſed through. From this we may conclude, that theſe armies lived, by chance and without method, on thoſe reſources which the countries furniſhed; and what confirms it is, their expeditions were only incurſions. Theſe armed inundations had their courſes,

like deſolating torrents which ſweep away all before them. We have no need to regret, that hiſtory does not inform us, how theſe barbarian armies ſubſiſted in their expeditions; they periſhed in them, in like manner as in the battles which they fought, victims of their immenſity and ignorance. But in return we ſhould regret our not having more detail in that proceſs of ſubſiſtance practiſed by fortunate and ſkilful conquerors, ſuch as a Cyrus, an Alexander, an Hannibal. Hiſtory does not tranſmit a ſingle detail of this to us. In no place do we ſee their armies ſtopped by the formation of magazines, and by calculations of ſubſiſtence. There is no doubt but they lived in the country in which they carried on their war, and on its commodities; they were doubtleſs temperate and robuſt; conſequently they had alſo combinations of ſubſiſtence leſs complicated, leſs timid, leſs partaking of the finance than ours. Let us only reflect on the expeditions of theſe armies; let us reflect on the departure of Alexander from Macedonia for the conqueſt of Aſia; Hannibal, when he left Spain to carry on war againſt Rome, paſſing over the Pyrenean mountains, traverſing Gaul, having at each ſtep an unknown people to reconcile or to fight with, afterwards opening a road acroſs the Alps, deſcending into Italy, and ſuſtaining himſelf victoriouſly in that country nine years, and without drawing any ſupport from Carthage. Let us but draw a parallel between thoſe campaigns and ours; let us tranſport thoſe vaſt operations on the preſent ſcale of our military combinations, we ſhall be forced to doubt hiſtory, or to confeſs the narrow limits of our genius.

The wars of the Romans do not much more inſtruct us on the ſcience of ſubſiſtence among the ancients. While the Roman armies were engaged with the people of *Latium*, it is natural to ſuppoſe their details were ſimple and eaſy. But hiſtorians do not inform us what they were, when Rome was engaged in foreign and diſtant wars. Some few lights here and there conſtitute all our knowledge on this head. The diſtribution of vinegar, wine, and grain is ſometimes

times mentioned in Livy; ſome legions who were to be puniſhed, were condemned to barley bread; a proof without doubt, that ſome, other kind of grain was diſtributed to the reſt of the army. In Vegecius we learn, that the prefects of the camp, which was an office ſimply military, were charged with the detail of ſubſiſtance. We likewiſe read of the Roman centurions having hand mills, and that grain in its native ſtate was delivered to them. In other places we are informed, that each ſoldier on an expedition, carried a fortnight's proviſion of meal, and of which, after having arrived in camp, he made with that moiſoned meal or flower, a kind of cake which ſerved for his ſubſiſtence. This uſe of hand mills and diſtribution of grain or flower to troops, have frequently in our time been propoſed, but has been treated as chimerical. However, the inſtructive leſſon we ſhould draw from the ſtudy of the conſtitution of the Roman legions, and the reſult of their operations, in the time of their vigour, is temperance, auſterity, and indefatigable patience which were the baſis of them. Such troops knew how to accommodate themſelves to all kinds of food, and in time of exigence to endure hunger and thirſt. For which reaſon, in the ſplendid military age of that people, their operations were never ſtopped by calculations of ſubſiſtence. In our modern hiſtories, at each ſtep are ſeen, combinations of ſubſiſtence impeding the progreſs of armies, and forcing generals to obey the ſame delays.

Another important truth which may be drawn from the ſtudy of the war of the Romans, a truth, the reſult of which greatly contradicts our preſent ſyſtem of ſubſiſtence is, that their armies lived in the country, and on the production of it. *War ſhould nouriſh war* was Cato's expreſſion in the Senate; and this maxim of Cato was among the Romans made a ſtate maxim. As ſoon as an army had ſet its foot in an enemy's country, it was the general's duty to find ſubſiſtence for it; and the man who ſerved moſt uſefully the republick, was he, who, in carrying on the

moſt glorious campaign, had ſubſiſted his army in the beſt manner, and brought, after the campaign broke up the moſt money to the treaſury. Hence the ſolution of that almoſt continual ſtate of war, in the centre of which the republick flouriſhed. From war it received increaſe of ſtrength and riches, as our ſtates at this day by the diſordered conſtitution of their military ſyſtems, receive weakneſs and poverty. Scipio carried war into Africa, and far from ſtraining Rome to nouriſh his army, its granaries were filled with African corn. Cæſar departed for the conqueſt of the Gauls, and Rome heard nothing of him, excepting the rumour of his victories. Not only was his army without expence to the ſtate, but he enriched the ſaid army, he remitted a fund to the publick treaſury, and he reſerved what was requiſite to his vaſt deſigns; he embelliſhed the Gauls after having ſubdued them; he changed the face of towns; he conſtructed roads which are remaining at this day; with Gallic gold he prepared fetters for Germany, and for his own country: the Gauls notwithſtanding were pleaſed with his dominion. We have not the art of thus conducting wars;—But let us return to the object of my enquiries.

I was to blame in ſaying, that in hiſtory there exiſted no ſcrap, where a ſucceſſion of details was to be met with, which related to the manner of the ſubſiſtence of Roman armies. I have met with one: it is the detail of that excellent campaign of Cæſar in Africa, againſt the lieutenants of Pompy. This valuable ſcrap brought to light and reſtored by Guichard, proves how much their ſcience of ſubſiſtence was different from ours; how much they were more ſimple in their means, more bold in their combinations, and leſs tireſome for operations. Cæſar landed in Africa with a few legions only, he found himſelf without proviſions, magazines, or fortified places. A tempeſt diſperſed and drove back the greateſt part of his fleet. The enemy aſſembled from all quarters; he had the indefatigable Numidians againſt him, and who harraſſed him in a different manner to our preſent light troops. He intrenched himſelf on the

the ſea coaſt; from thence ſtep by ſtep, and preſerving always his communication open with his firſt principal magazine, he advanced into the country, eſtabliſhed poſts by echelons, took the town of Adrumettum, which he made a ſecond principal magazine, formed magazines in it, then after having received a reinforcement, evacuated his firſt poſition, took a ſecond more offenſive, made more daring detachments and eſtabliſhments, and afterwards always harraſſed and always victorious; ſupported himſelf, was joined by all his forces, which he then detached, overcame the lieutenants of Pompey, diſperſed their army, and thus terminated the moſt glorious and perilous war he ever engaged in.

Cæſar landed with an army in Africa, without proviſions or military equipage: in this reſpect he conducted himſelf as a great man, and not as an adventurer: he conſidered that he landed in a fruitful country, peopled, and full of open or weakly fortified towns; that in a like country, an army but ſmall and well conducted, finds always ſubſiſtence, was it only on that produce which prudence reſerves for the mouths of the inhabitants. He concluded that in making long preparations on the coaſt of Italy, he ſhould give time to Africa for the aſſembling of its force, and for the oppoſing of his diſembarkment; that diſpoſitions in a diſtant country ſhould be made ſuddenly, reſolutely, rapidly; and that when to vulgar eyes they appear hazardous, the man of genius who directs them, can with the greateſt certainty ſupport them. I ſhall have occaſion to return to this particular.

Thoſe times of decay which undermined the Roman Empire, and the barbarous ages which followed its downfal, produce nothing inſtructive on any one branch of war.

Till the epoch of Naſſau and Guſtavus Adolphus, armies fought without combination, and ſubſiſted nearly in the ſame manner. Campaigns were of the nature of incurſions. Armies were detached over the country; they marched in corps and cantooned themſelves.

ſelves. If they aſſembled, it was for ſome days only, and to give battle. The country contributed as well as it could, for the ſubſiſtence of ſoldiers, and it could not furniſh the ſame for any ſpace of time, on account of the extreme want of diſcipline which reigned amongſt them.

Under Naſſau and Guſtavus, a new order ſprung up in armies; troops learnt the method of encamping, marching and fighting. With the rigid diſcipline eſtabliſhed by theſe great men, other procedures for ſubſiſtence were neceſſary to be adopted. Armies aſſembled in camps, were in want of magazines. Guſtavus ordered daily diſtributions of bread and meat to the ſoldiers. In caſe of forced operations they knew how to live more abſtemious. He trained them to ſubſiſt on any thing, and to faſt without murmuring. This ſpirit long after his death actuated the Swediſh troops. Theſe new methods of ſubſiſtence did not fetter the operations of Guſtavus and the great generals who ſucceeded him. Armies at that time were ſmall; they had not an enormous quantity of artillery and equipages attached to them. Luxury had not enervated the manners, and increaſed the wants of men. With theſe ſmall armies great conqueſts would be made. The generals performed themſelves the office of commiſſary of ſtores. The Duke of Rohan, in his *compleat captain*, particulariſes the function of this office. He is incenſed againſt thoſe perſons, who have made propoſals of entruſting theſe details to military perſons; as if, ſays he, to provide all things neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of an army, did not conſtitute part of the art of conducting it.

Towards the concluſion of the reign of Lewis XIII. and of Lewis XIV, the French armies being more organized, the ſubſiſtence of armies began to be regularly delivered to troops. The details of ſubſiſtance were no longer in the hands of military men. If the generals were ſo indolent, as to eſteem themſelves happy in being eaſed from the care of the ſupplies of proviſions &c. miniſters, without doubt, with pleaſure

ſaw them enter into their departments; becauſe by this means in ſome reſpect, both the generals and their operations were dependant on them.

The ſubſiſtence of our armies have ſince been, by turns, conducted by contractors and managers. M. de Louvois was the firſt miniſter who began to extend and give importance to that branch of details, which, till then, was looked upon in a ſubaltern light. In reality it became leſs ſo, by the change which took place in the ſyſtem of war, by the prodigious augmentation of armies and their equipages, and by the nature of moſt part of campaigns, which were entirely taken up in ſieges. I have in a former paſſage ſaid, how from that time there was ſcarce what I call a war carried on, by either party. The ſcience ſeemed to conſiſt in oppoſing fortified town to fortified town. Magazine to magazine. The collections of ſupplies, though a wiſe precaution when confined to certain bounds, were degenerated into a kind of frenzy with M. de Louvois. Theſe he had on all the frontier countries. By this he pretended to have all the means of operations in his power, and to determine the plan of a campaign. In reality, this deciſion was made by him. His adulators called him the general of generals. I do not pretend to ſay, that M. de Louvois was not a man of genius, that he had not rendered great ſervices to the arms of Louis XIV; but to what reſpects a fugitive ſucceſs, which, while he lived, his preponderance of genius, and ſuperiority of conducting the new ſyſtem of war, on the cabinets of other powers, had contributed, he occaſioned great evils afterwards. He deceived Louis XIV on his real power; he introduced a kind of war diſaſtrous for population and the finances; he increaſed armies, conſequently the expences of government; and, not having for this eſſential, ſuperior reſources to the reſt of Europe, he benefitted nothing; he only forced the other princes to unite againſt Louis XIV, and to ruin their ſtates like him.

After

After the death of M. de Louvois, Louis XIV. had indifferent miniſters, and generals ſtill worſe. Notwithſtanding this, their routine was caught and adopted by all Europe; it was no longer poſſible to make any change. Compelled on all quarters to ſtand her ground, France found herſelf oppreſſed by an unfortunate defenſive plan. It is unknown how many millions the new ſyſtems of ſubſiſtence, introduced by M. de Louvois, coſt the kingdom. There never was a battle loſt or town taken, which did not draw after it the loſs of immenſe magazines. The acceſſary misfortunes became more deſtructive than the principal ones. Hochſtet was the occaſion of forty millions worth of magazines being loſt, eſtabliſhed by Echelons, from our frontiers to the Danube. At Turin, and in the other part of Piedmont, an immenſe quantity of beaſts of draught, equipage and ſupplies was abandoned. Chamillard tripled his reſources, by which means he thought himſelf certain of the ſucceſs of Feuillard his relation. Beſides it cannot be ſaid, that his magazines were formed at the expence of the enemy; France paid for them. The greateſt part of Germany, where we carried on the war, was allied to us; and the purchaſes made by the King were immediately liquidated. In Piedmont, the arrangements for the Ducheſs of Burgandy, were immediately paid for, delivery of goods which were demanded in a haughty tone, from the country under the title of contributions. The kingdom was over head and ears in debt. All the ſupplies for ſubſiſtence were accompliſhed by contractors; the markets of the contractors roſe every campaign, owing to the uſurer who ſold his ſervices when the times were really neceſſitous.

Our ſyſtem of ſubſiſtences is not amended ſince the war of 1700; it has progreſſively become more financing and ruinous. The routine and diſorder of the finances have always been a friend to the contractor. In the midſt of theſe errors let us render juſtice to that company which, during the two laſt wars, was entruſted with the ſupply of bread to our armies.

This

This company in the civil power honorably contributed its ſervices; it ſometimes loſt without murmuring, and never profited with exceſs.

I have inſpected the ſettlement of its accounts of the laſt war; its profit, proportioned to its advances, to the uncertainty of payment, to the deficiency of royal effects which it re-imburſed, was but a lawful one. Unfortunately this company has not been entruſted with all the contracting branches which relate to troops. Let the world alſo particularly call to mind, the horrors of the campaign of 1757; the pillage was compleat; hoſpitals were carnal houſes *, enough; I will not foul my pen with a repetition of crimes.

It even now appears to be problematical, whether it is better to adminiſter ſubſiſtence to armies by management, or by contracting plans. This is being uncertain, whether the adminiſtration of the countries belonging to government is more advantageous than the finance adminiſtration; it is making it doubtful, whether it is better to have your ground farmed, or to cultivate it yourſelf.

All agreements by contract ſuppoſe, that the contracting parties (or elſe thoſe parties are a ſet of dupes) make a tacit covenant of profiting at the inſtant the bargain is made, and that a certain calculation is fixed of that profit. It may be poſſible that, by extraordinary misfortunes, accompanied with much diſintereſtedneſs, the ſociety profits little; but for this ſingular chance, a thouſand will extend the profit beyond their computed hopes. Therefore, all contract, calculated and conducted by men of parts, muſt be advantageous to them. Their profits would be leſs conſiderable, in proportion to their being leſs covetous, more honeſt, more exact in their ſupplies, in proportion as they approach more to the principles of the company I have deſcribed. But if theſe aſſociations of contractors are

* A work treating of a better plan of adminiſtration for the hoſpitals of an army, and of a better police to be obſerved in them, would much intereſt humanity.

badly

badly compoſed, then the profits become illicit and immenſe; then follow the baſe alloy in the ſupplies, depredations, ſuppoſed or exaggerated loſſes at the expence of the King, falſe verbal procedures, &c. Then we ſee running here and there, in every quarter attracted by the lures of fortune, the patronized man, the man of intrigue, the uſurer; they unite to each other, and make their way to the offices and anti-chambers of the court; there they find protection. So many are in an age of luxury and of intrigues, covetous of wealth! The miniſter is ſeduced by the offer of a bargain, at a lower rate, and gives his conſent. This contract is underfarmed, runs through two or three hands, and at laſt concludes by falling into thoſe of a man who, ſo as not to ruin himſelf, and to ſatisfy all the retributions impoſed upon him, is obliged but wretchedly to acquit himſelf of thoſe ſervices which he is entruſted with.

Struck with the truth of theſe remarks, and if there be no other reaſons to be given in anſwer to them, a well informed government ſhould therefore avoid all kind of bargains made by contract. It ſhould more eſpecially do this, that the ſtate might benefit by that profit which is reſerved for contractors; that perſons who have theſe round-a-bout methods of conducting this buſineſs, ſhould be diveſted of all temptation of corruption; that the publick might not be ſhocked with the glitter of thoſe indecent fortunes, accumulated through the medium of contracts; that the gangrene which is introduced in the manners of the people, by the example of theſe fortunes, might be eradicated. A certain dilemma ſhould in this reſpect, be the baſis of government conduct. If the ſociety which propoſes itſelf for a contract, be compoſed of men of property and parts; let it be conſtituted an adminiſtratrix in the ſervice of government for the object in queſtion; let the members be encouraged by the juſt ſalary of their offices, by flattering diſtinctions, by its honourable reſources, which being well beſtowed, ſtimulate men of that ſtamp

more

more than intereſt. If the ſociety which offers itſelf be compoſed of doubtful and unknown men, it ſhould be rejected: loſs is generally ſuſtained by ſuſpicious men, and who have not given proofs of their honeſty.

But it may be ſaid, that theſe are evils inevitable. All the nations in Europe make bargains by contract, for different objects of their adminiſtration. The journals of the Engliſh Parliament will ſhow how much the ſubſiſtences of the army under Prince Ferdinand, have during the laſt war coſt England. Every thing was conducted at the price of gold, and with unheard-of depredations. The Auſtrians, they had contractors laſt war, and the King of Pruſſia was himſelf obliged to have recourſe to thoſe means.

But ſhould we take example from our neighbours? —When they do well let us imitate them, when otherwiſe, let us ſhut our eyes upon them, and ſeek for the good where it is to be found. The King of Pruſſia is cited: in the firſt place it is a miſtaken aſſertion, that his ſubſiſtences were in general adminiſtered by contract. The adminiſtration of his ſubſiſtances, was delegated to a war directory, divided into ſeveral commiſſaries. With the army, one of theſe commiſſaries had the direction of the bake-houſe. In Saxony, his magazines were formed at the expence of the country, and by the combined care of the country itſelf. When his troops were quartered there, the country ſupplied them with ſubſiſtence. Thoſe ſtates where the commodities were conſumed, were viſited by the generals, commanders of the rounds, and by the commiſſary, who were afterwards diſpatched to the chief directory, eſtabliſhed at Torgau, or at Leipſick: where a deduction was made of the conſummation of commodities, from the run of the impoſts exacted from the country. By the means of this adminiſtration, all employers, all coſts of magazines, all extravagant waſtes, all deficiences, were corrected; as long as they were not conſumed, the magazines belonged to the country. The King of Pruſſia now

and

and then made uſe of contractors; but the occaſions were theſe. In extraordinary and preſſing circumſtances let us ſuppoſe, it was neceſſary to make a depoſit of neceſſaries at Auſtin, Breſlaw, or in other parts. He would have permitted the contract for theſe proviſions to be given to a private perſon or ſociety. Theſe kind of temporary contracts for limited quantities, are never ruinous for a government, and the King of Pruſſia calculates too well the value of reſources, to be deprived of that. He engaged in a conſiderable ſtock-jobbing buſineſs with Ephriam, and other Jews; but this ſtock-jobbing was relative to money concerns; in other reſpects, he is himſelf the contractor and manager of all the proviſions and other expences which relate to his military eſtabliſhment; and it is this wiſe maxim which ſo univerſally multiplies his reſources. I have entered into this detail, becauſe the example of the King of Pruſſia unreaſonably cited by the abettors of contracts, was a kind of authority proper to be eradicated.

But to adminiſter ſubſiſtences for Government, it is neceſſary the government ſhould have money or credit. Without the reſource of enterprizes, how was it poſſible for our armies to have lived? To an adminiſtration of this nature, daily and conſiderable funds are required. The purchaſe of grain, the formation of equipages, the ſalaries of thoſe who are employed, the daily preſervations or draw backs, all theſe are not paid with royal effects. Government apprized of the abuſe of contracts, no longer employs in time of peace the company which furniſhed proviſions, the moſt irreproachable and ſubſtantial which ever exiſted. At preſent, it adminiſters proviſions for the army, at the King's expence, it adminiſtered them with ſucceſs in the laſt expedition againſt Corſica. The expences attending this adminiſtration, which in France were thought exorbitant, becauſe they were prefixed to an expedition, which was not ſtamped with publick ſanction, did not exceed during two campaigns, more than ſix millions of livres. But on the firſt great

war

war which France will be obliged to ſuſtain, and when it muſt provide proviſions for an army of a hundred thouſand men, out of the kingdom, how will the miniſter conduct his affairs? Where will he make up his funds? Will he raiſe loans in the King's name? The purſe which would open at the name of a private well known perſon, would be ſhut at that ſacred title. Yet this army muſt be ſubſiſted. The miniſter will be forced to have recourſe to contracts. The company which was diſcharged, will be ſolicited to return to the management of their former buſineſs; it will excuſe itſelf, by the diſplay of its loſs of credit; by the impoſſibility of reſtoring the loſs of that credit, owing to the blow ſtruck at the exiſtence of the company, which the publick thought was permanently eſtabliſhed, by the diſperſion of its members, and of thoſe who were employed by it: the miniſter will inſiſt on its ſervices, it will obey his commands; and he will think himſelf fortunate to make a perpetual bargain with it on higher terms than the former one.

However certain it may be, that a well adminiſtered arrangement of affairs of ſubſiſtence would more advantage the ſtate, than a contract however well conducted, the miniſter will be compelled to make uſe of this laſt plan. But that this plan might not take place, in diſſolving this company appropriated for the management of proviſions, it was neceſſary in the time of peace, other means ſhould have been thought of for the ſucceſſion of it. At the time of its deſtruction, annual funds, and more than ſufficient for the expence of the proviſion of troops ſhould be aſſigned, ſo that from this overplus, reſerves for war might be made, and to reimburſe loans for annuities, which might then have been raiſed on the fund, ſet apart for the management of the ſubſiſtence.

The foundation of this new adminiſtration ſhould on all parts, be made before hand; the moſt capable ſubjects, ſhould be ſelected from the demolition of this company, to attach them to the new plan; and

to conſider how, in drawing the greateſt reſources from this adminiſtration, a new ſyſtem of ſubſiſtence, leſs complicated and more ſubordinate to military operations, ſhould on the firſt war that breaks out, be eſtabliſhed. There exiſted in this company, induſtrious and well informed men, who, having by degrees departed from the routine of M. Duvernay, comprehended the deſign of the miniſtry, and extended the myſtery of their art. There is now one of theſe men exiſting, * under the eyes of the miniſtry, who is ignorant of what I am writing, and poſſibly who might bring about this revolution, becauſe it is my opinion he knows the neceſſity of it.

The world ſlumbers on this important object, and when it would be willing to rouſe itſelf, it would then be too late. War threatens us, money is wanting, a multitude of more preſſing objects occupy at the ſame time the miniſtry. It is much the ſame with a ſtate as with a private perſon, and this old common proverb may be equally as well applied to either; *riches increaſe riches.* Is a ſtate rich, and eſpecially well regulated? It can meliorate its conſtitution, and execute uſeful projects. Is it arrived at a certain point of diſorder and ruin? Every thing increaſes its melancholy ſituation: it is almoſt impoſſible to propoſe a good change to it, or at leaſt, one that is eaſy to be brought about. This is ſtill leſs to be done, if, for its ultimate misfortune, there be no plan laid down for its reſtoration; if all the departments of the miniſtry increaſe and are deſtructive; if they have not the power of uniting for the general good of the ſovereign; if, in a word, ſuch be the number and complication of diſorders, the evil muſt be left to its progreſs. This reflection has drawn me ſomewhat from the purpoſe. In reflecting on any particular object, it is impoſſible to hinder the ideas from ramifying.

* M. De L'Iſle, formerly chief Commiſſary of ſtores of the armies in Germany, ſince which, veſted with the conduct of proviſions, during the expedition againſt Corſica, and now at the head of the committee, which is eſtabliſhed for the adminiſtration of affairs in that iſland.

But

But the pecuniary inconveniences attached to our ſyſtem of ſubſiſtences is nothing; it is neceſſary to obſerve, how this ſyſtem acts contrary to the operation of our armies. Beſides this laſt diſadvantage does not only belong to the unſkilfulneſs of our method of ſubſiſtence, but to the conſtitution of our troops, to our manners, to the received ideas of our generals. All theſe particulars are allied to each other by a conformity, the enchainment and error of which will be intereſting to point out.

Since in France, the details of ſubſiſtences of armies are no longer in the hands of the military, and as they in ſome meaſure form a diſtinct branch of knowledge, the gentlemen of the army do not make it a ſtudy. It would be difficult to name ten officers acquainted with the works that treat of them. Why ſtudy them, they exclaim? Are there not commiſſaries of ſtores provided for the ſame? On the other hand, theſe laſt, ſecretly flattered in finding themſelves initiated into the myſteries of the operation, and in ſome reſpects, making them dependant on them, do not fail of throwing darkneſs on all theſe details. There is no doubt but the practice and combination of theſe details, conſtitute a ſcience by itſelf; but they exaggerate the importance and difficulty of it, and over burthen it with calculations. They peſter it with writings. All this aparatus impoſes on men, who only ſkim the ſurface of things.

A general arrives at the command of armies, and conceives that to be a labyrinth, which he has not made his ſtudy. He demands from the commiſſary of ſtores, the neceſſaries for thoſe operations he is planning; but in reality, this laſt being maſter of the details, being alone initiated into them, is deſpotick in his meaſure. For the better aſſurance of his ſervices, he makes a demand on the court for one half more equipages and proviſions, than there is a neceſſity for. He little regards how this multiplicity of baggage doubles the trouble of things, and adds

a greater burthen to the army *. At every ſtep he multiplies magazines and eſtabliſhments. All theſe eſtabliſhments are not ſet down to the company's account; if they be taken, they are placed to the King's account: if not, he has every where taken precautions, no movement can be made by the army to ſurprize him unawares, and this is then called a brilliant ſervice, and which covers the general with praiſes. Here he will imagine difficulties to procure himſelf the merit of overcoming them. There he will force the general to incline towards an operation, the reſult of which, would prove convenient or advantageous to his own diſpoſitions. Almoſt always for the want of calculating, in this reſpect the whole of the operations, and for the want of knowledge, which he cannot attain to, he will conceive his proviſions to be the principal object, when they are only an acceſſary.

From theſe conſiderations, how is it poſſible that the commiſſary of ſtores can equal the general in his calculation? It is natural to ſuppoſe, that he has not abilities for it, and conſequently the general muſt have different ideas to him. His ſucceſſes are in an other line to thoſe of the general. The campaign may very eaſily fail, and ſtill the ſervice of the commiſſary be very exact. It is poſſible he may have performed his duty better: the more the operations of the campaign have been ſlackened, the more it has been indolent, in a greater proportion will the ſervices of the commiſſary be aſſured; the troops, who only eſti-

* In the different contracts, which government has agreed to fulfil with the companies for ſubſiſtence, the purchaſe of baggages and equipages, have always been ſet down to the King's account. The ſame has been the caſe in loſſes of magazines, in the capture of convoy's in waſtes, or in accidents that have befallen raw commodities or perſons in office when theſe waſtes have been occaſioned by the marches of the army. From this conſideration, the company muſt be very ill adminiſtered, if it does not accumulate conſiderable profits; and it may be ſeen what the King gets in providing the entire compliment of ſubſiſtence, ſince he has already the expences of the equipment and eſtabliſhment of equipages, deficiencies of funds accidents and waſtes charged to his account.

mate,

mate the merit of the commiſſary, by the regularity of the diſtributions, and the good quality of the bread, will beſtow their praiſes on him. Where will the real merit of the commiſſary be centered? It will be in drawing from a country the greateſt reſource; in his active ſervices, by facilitating and being greatly uſeful in many and conſecutive forced marches; to ſudden and unforeſeen charges of the armies route; to the formation of rapid eſtabliſhments: all theſe circumſtances combined in the generals cabinet, troops are ignorant of. To arrive at the execution of the project of a general, the commiſſary will deviate from his common road, ſurmount great difficulties, take advantage of the country, diſtribute half rations in critical circumſtances, where the general is apprehenſive of his being totally deſtitute, when owing to unforeſeen accidents, he muſt diſpenſe with providing ſubſiſtence ſomewhat varied, changing the nature of proviſions, and ſome how or other contrive to nouriſh the army. Troops who are ignorant of the general's object, the merit of having conquered difficulties, the trouble of having procured the little which has been delivered to them, will only be ſenſible of the want they experience, and moſt likely murmur. The commiſſary, notwithſtanding, may have ſerved with credit in the eyes of the general, and of thoſe people who know the meaning of calculation.

From theſe inconveniences will reſult the want of concord almoſt inevitable, between the combinations of generals, and thoſe of the commiſſaries. I have only ſpoken of the commiſſary blindly confined by the routine of his art, and not ſeconding the general, owing to his incapacity of perceiving the whole ſcale of the thing, and that ſubordination, which the acceſſary combinations owe to the principal one. This commiſſary may have many other faults, which may more eſſentially injure the ſervice. He may be deſirous of traverſing the operations for the ſake of private intereſt, or reaſons of intrigue. He may, which is much worſe, be both well informed and evil minded. He may,

being well-informed and well-diſpoſed, be deprived of the intimate confidence of the general. Therefore not being expeditiouſly admitted to the ſecret, his interior meaſures will not concur to the execution of the general; therefore, he will involuntarily find himſelf behind hand, or in a miſtake, at the time when the general opens his ſecret to him. Well informed, well diſpoſed, and having the confidence of the general, in ſhort, he may not be ſufficiently diſcreet in his conduct or his preparatory meaſures, and conſequently betray the whole, or part of the ſecret operations.

To pourtray theſe inconveniencies, I have been obliged to ſuppoſe neither an excellent general, or an excellent commiſſary. Such men are rare, and they would not have ſuffered me to have ſaid any thing on the ſubject. By ſuppoſing each to be of the inferior claſs, I have painted men and inconveniencies, ſuch as the courſe of things in general produce.

It is eaſy to ſee what I am aiming at: it is to be regretted that we have ſeparated the ſcience of ſubſiſtence, from the ſcience of war; that it does not conſtitute an object of our ſtudy; that we have abandoned the details to the hands of ſtrangers. If the proviſions were adminiſtered for the King's account, why ſhould not the general be the commiſſary of his army? Subſiſting the army is therefore a leſs important object, leſs attached to its operations, than the encampment and marching of it. The general has, for his laſt details, a quarter maſter general. A general officer may, in like manner, if he be ſkilful, and has confidence, be veſted with the details of proviſions. This general officer will work in his cabinet; he will have under him, the neceſſary ſervants, in ſhort, an eſtabliſhed adminiſtration, but conducted with as little expence and as ſimple as poſſible. In my large work, I ſhall give a plan of this new adminiſtration, explained, and compared to that which has taken place, till this preſent moment in our armies.

But,

But, thus to entruſt the adminiſtrations of ſubſiſtence in the hands of the military, it is neceſſary, that the military ſhould be informed. The details of ſubſiſtence cannot be conducted by perſons who have neither theory or practice. Sources do exiſt, from whence knowledge may be drawn. There is a general treaty on ſubſiſtences by M. Dupré d'Aulnay, commiſſary of war. In this work ſome correct details are to be found, ſome excellent inlights,* but this work is not the production of a military man, the relation of the ſcience of ſubſiſtence with the Tactics, is neither inveſtigated, nor even perceived. It is the routine of M. Duverney, commented upon and ſomewhat improved. I am acquainted with manuſcripts by M. Dumaeriés commiſſary of war. Theſe intereſting manuſcripts, becauſe the author was a man of ſenſe, and was employed in our armies, diſcover the greateſt part of thoſe abuſes in detail, which exiſted in the adminiſtration of ſubſiſtences and of hoſpitals. In ſhort there is a very compleat manuſcript on ſubſiſtences made by M. Deliſle. This work en-

* Particular attention ſhould be paid to thoſe chapters where he propoſes to ſubſtitute inſtead of the fixt and maſſive ovens, thoſe that are portable and on wheels, as alſo to the reaſons he gives in ſupport of this change, the particulars of theſe new ovens, their advantages evinced by the proofs which he has made, the ſecret motives which he has hitherto occaſioned them to be rejected by the contractors. It is very extraordinary, that an abuſe ſo clearly pointed out ſhould be ſuffered to exiſt. It is not only to be found in the work of M. Dupré d'Aulney, but in the experiment made in foreign armies. The baking arrangements of the King of Pruſſia, thoſe of Prince Ferdinand, ſeldom employed any other than portable ovens; I have ſeen theſe laſt. Thoſe propoſed by M. Dupré d'Aulnay, are of a lighter conſtruction, more ſimple and more advantageous. They may moſt likely be ſtill improved upon. In ſhort, the uſe of theſe ovens adapted by the baking arrangements in the field, will not in any ſhape hinder the opportunity of making uſe of (on occaſion) the fixt ones, that are found in the country. Why have they, not likewiſe in armies, hand-mills. M. Duprè has propoſed this, Montecuculli propoſed the ſame before him. How imperfect is our ſcience of ſubſiſtence! How very diſtant from the purpoſe!

tirely modern, undertook by the eldeſt ſon of M. the Marſhal Broglio, is a valuable relick, on account of the order of the details, and the ſagacious views which it is replete with *.

From all theſe materials, it would be of high importance if an officer, verſed in the great maintenance of an army, would get together a tactical work for the uſe of the military. When I ſay, *get together*, it is not the word; for, in many reſpects it is neceſſary, to vary from the calculations admitted in theſe works, to eſtabliſh a new ſyſtem of ſubſiſtences, free from the complication and defects of that which has hitherto been practiſed.

On the ſcience of ſubſiſtences, in like manner as on the branches of military art, there is a neceſſity of having in peace time, a well directed ſchool. There, ſhould be tried, compared and improved, the different methods practiſed, as well with us as with ſtrangers. There, methods might be invented of ſimplifying the details of magazines eſtabliſhments, fabrications, tranſports, computations, &c. There, choſen officers will familiarize themſelves with the knowledge and inſpection of the details, in like manner, as in the ſchool of the ſtaff officers, they will accuſtom themſelves to the details of marches and of reconnoitring. In ſhort,

* The author ſees all the inconveniences which reſult from the defect of concord, between the combinations of generals, with thoſe of the commiſſaries. He inſiſts on the neceſſity of this connection, and from thence to the entire confidence which ſhould exiſt between the general and the commiſſary of ſtores. He conceives the importance, of the commiſſary on extraordinary occaſions, deviating from the methods of routine and exactneſs. There is no doubt, but he can much better than any other perſon, find the methods of ſupplying the defects, of perfecting our ſyſtem of ſubſiſtences, and of rendering it more ſubordinate to the operations of generals. But, for this end, he ſhould be the director of ſubſiſtences, and not a member of the ſociety for contracts. For there is a great difference between working for private glory, and the intereſts of a company; the ſame difference of working from ones own ideas, and being fettered by a routine and a plan which is ſtopped, between oneſelf and the company.

from

from this ſchool, the advantage will reſult of re-uniting to the ſcience of war, a branch which ſhould never have been ſeparated from it I have ſhown how the deficiency of a unanimity between the combinations of generals and commiſſaries is injurious to operations. I ſhall at preſent examine, how other vices render our ſyſtem of ſubſiſtences both expenſive and routinous, and how it contrarily acts to all the principles of war.

Our equipages of proviſions are almoſt always too numerous. A crime ſhould not be laid to the commiſſary, who in general, blindly ſuppoſed to act in their favour, regulates the formation of them. They demand them numerous to inſure the ſucceſs of their ſervices: they are obliged to demand them ſuch, becauſe in our armies there is no knowledge of drawing reſources from the country, where war is carried on; becauſe patience and ſobriety do not ſubſiſt; becauſe the army murmurs, if the diſtribution be retarded ſome hours, if the bread be not always of the beſt quality; becauſe murmurs increaſe much more, if one day be neglected, or if the quality of the proviſions be changed. Provided commiſſaries had only in their office, methods that were ſtrictly neceſſary, the greateſt part of generals, without calculating theſe methods would require of them diſproportioned reſultations, and would not know in what manner to favour their ſituation, or to increaſe their methods by taking advantage of the reſources of a country, or giving a different turn to the ideas of troops. But when ever war breaks out, if a good general is himſelf director of ſubſiſtences, or if he has with him a ſkilful director under him, they will find, that whatever diſburthens an army will render it more maniable, more eaſy to ſubſiſt, more adapted to great operations. They will together find that juſt proportion, which ſhould rule the formation of the equipages of proviſions; that proportion which they may attain to for ſubſiſting the army, and at the ſame time not over charge it. They will eſtimate, that beyond the proportion which ſhould be relative to ſim-

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ple and daily operations, the means of extraordinary operations ſhould be found in induſtry, in the reſources of a country, in the ſpirit of ſobriety and patience, which ſhould be inculcated among troops. Even attentive to the curtailing of that proportion in as great a degree as they poſſibly can, they will always calculate it relative to the country where the theatre of war is carried on. To carry on war in Flanders, there is certainly a neceſſity for a leſs number of proviſion equipages, where the country is covered with fortified towns and paved roads than in Germany, where there are few points for forming magazines, and where the roads are moſt all of them only tracts traced through the country. Thus there is a neceſſity of having a leſs quantity of equipages in the Palatinate, a country abounding in commodities, in waggons and inhabitants, than in thoſe deſarts of the Ukraine, the tomb of the army of Charles XII.

The firſt principle in my ideas, relative to the ſcience of ſubſiſtences, may be ſeen to be the diminution of baggage and to fulfil the greater number of objects with the ſmalleſt means that is poſſible.

But it is in the formation of our magazines where more injurious abuſes are found. This department which is abſolutely independant of the general is in the hands of contractors; and power, is itſelf juſtice, that in thinking in the moſt honeſt manner poſſible, they conduct themſelves according to their greateſt intereſts. It is on the purchaſe of commodities, purpoſely made, that contractors have their certain gain.

Loſs as well as gain will oftentimes enſue on all the other parts of the proviſion eſtabliſhments, when its ſervices are honeſtly exerted. Thus, as may be imagined, the good price of the commodities that are purchaſed, is the principal end of all their combinations. They buy up when the ſeaſon is favourable; they have their magazines for publick inſpection, and their ſecret ones: they have their brokers, their ſtock-jobbers; they give earneſt for the commodities privately and before-hand,

before-hand, in the neighbouring countries to the ſeat of war; and by that means, frequently betray the ſecret of the operations. It may be ſaid, that theſe purchaſes or earneſts for the bargain being ſeaſonably made, may be contrived as a ſtratagem againſt the enemy. Granted, but in the hands of the general, this will equally exiſt, and which would not be made uſe of, but till ſuch time he thinks it expedient for the utility of his projects. Hitherto the evil is not yet arrived to any great height: it is to the places fixt upon, for the depoſit of materials for ſubſiſtence, that theſe inconveniencies become dangerous. It is natural to ſuppoſe, that unleſs the general is acquainted with this detail, and will not enter into the merits of it, that theſe places are determined on according to the will of the contractors, and that the contractors in general, fix upon them relative to their confined ſpeculations, and excluſive of their buſineſs. Frequently theſe depoſits are found placed in unmilitary ſituations, or where the operations are unconnected with them. In general theſe depoſits, too much diſperſed, form an infinite number of ſmall magazines, each of which has its ſtore-keeper, its underlings, its abaters, its accidents of war, or of other circumſtances. Oftentimes magazines of this kind are choaked up with commodities, and in this caſe the contractor inclines towards the party who can procure a conſumption for them. Sometimes he will refuſe a purchaſe to the party which is deſirous of drawing too much conſumption in the quarter where commodities are ſcarce, and where they cannot be procured but at an extravagant price. At other times magazines are too full, becauſe too much expedition has been made in purchaſes when the markets are low; or ſome to be emptied, becauſe foreſighted ſpeculations diſcover the critical time when good purchaſes are to be made, and this requires contractors to conſume; in this caſe they are provident in reſtraining the army from ſupporting itſelf at the expence of the requiſite contributions of the country; but this ſyſtem has its difficulties;

difficulties; time is acquired, and the commodities procured by contract are conſumed. From this unknown labyrinth, and which I have been a ſhort time in running over, all the combinations of ſubſiſtence which contractors ſhove forward in the cabinets of commanders, in general proceed. When the queſtion is of calculating the means of ſuch or ſuch operation, the general may perfectly well diſcover a ſecret reſiſtance or inclination, but he may poſſibly not decypher the cauſe, as great calculations deceive him; generally he is not ſufficiently reſolute in reſiſting, or ſufficiently inſtructed in furniſhing means; his projects fail, and he finds that inſtead of giving law to the plans of ſubſiſtence, it is the plans of ſubſiſtence which have governed his operations. I here repeat that I do not point at any one; if I portray abuſes which have not exiſted, they are abuſes which may be dreaded.

If a general conducted the plans of ſubſiſtence himſelf, or had a ſkilful perſon under him, and who mutually departed from the ſame ſyſtem, they might together combine the time for making purchaſes, the kind and quantity of materials to lay in, the places where theſe purchaſes ſhould be made, and where they ſhould be depoſited, &c. An infinity of œconomical or military views ſhould have an influence over theſe objects which appear ſo foreign to war. The time for making the purchaſes is neither indifferent, or relative to the price of commodities, or to the information which the enemy may draw from them. The nature and quality of commodities is ſtill leſs ſo, ſince they ſhould be combined on the views they are intended for. This is the caſe with the ſituation of magazines, they ſhould be fixed relative to near or diſtant operations which are meditated, and the ſame with extraordinary operations, which the army may be forced to. The choice of ſituation for magazines may give vigilance, or the change of quarter to the enemy. Circumſtance ſhould likewiſe determine the depoſit of proviſions to be made in one country more than in another. If theſe purchaſes can be made in our own country,

country, and this does not prejudice any military view, they ſhould be preferred to a much cheaper purchaſe in a foreign one *.

If the army be on the defenſive, the countries are exhauſted between it and the enemy: if on the offenſive, they are leſs liberal of their produce. In all caſes, as much as poſſible, the country behind the army ſhould be frugally ſpared, and that where the operations can be conducted: for a ſtronger reaſon the country will be ſpared, if in any part of it eſtabliſhments are made, if by the poſition of things, the country is friendly, or is in a ſtate to ſubſiſt the army a long time. For the oppoſite reaſon it will be leſs ſpared, if it be a foreign one, or if there be a neceſſity of evacuating it. In ſhort, more or leſs œconomiſing, the more or leſs the ſurrounding country will be exhauſted, and that in which the army is eſtabliſhed in, by reaſon of meditated and foreſeen events, which is as though the ſcience of ſubſiſtences was diſcovered, which military combinations would moſt likely conſiderably influence.

If I am reproached with repeating known truths, how many examples can I not inſtance which would prove that if they be ſo, they are equally known to be ſuch, and without an application having been made to circumſtances. In 1757, the King's army entered into the country of Halberſtadt. That principality is the granary of the Marche of Brandebourg, and of almoſt all

* This mark of foreſight of M. de Louvois, is with propriety cited, who, in the preparations of the war in 1672, ſecretly made his purchaſes in Holland, and by policy diſtreſſed the Dutch, when they in their turn, were deſirous of forming magazines; but in inſtances of this kind and even in others, where it may be ſometimes advantageous to buy up at foreign markets, it is almoſt always advantageous to conſume the commodities of your own country. This is a conſideration to which contractors will not aſſent; for it is their intereſt to procure their ſupplies at the cheapeſt ſales. An able adminiſtration will ſee where the money of the ſtate is expended, and it will be ſenſible of the advantage of raiſing commodities at a high price from Alſace, or from the three Biſhopricks, than buying them up at a lower price in Holland or in Germany.

lower

lower Saxony. The harveſt was juſt over; there was a produce of corn and rye ſufficient to nouriſh an army like ours, for the ſpace of two years. A general, who had the true principles of the ſcience of ſubſiſtence would have ſaid to himſelf. "I am arrived in a "fruitful country, my only end is to remain in it "during the time of autumn; when winter arrives, "that country muſt be evacuated. If I am deſirous "of quarters which the enemy cannot diſlodge me "from, I muſt have them in my rear, and protected "by a large river, for example, ſuch as the Wezer."

This calculation is not difficult. The ſeaſon was advanced, the court would not aſſent to the ſiege of Magdeburg. The Hanoverians were evaſive in ratifying the convention of Cloſter-ſeven. To judge of the method which the army of the circles marched by ours, it was eaſy to conclude that, if it was not defeated, it would be forced to take up its winter quarters in Heſſe, and in Thuringen. In conſequence, the general I have been ſuppoſing, would continue to reaſon thus. "I muſt draw from the poſition I am in, "all the advantages poſſible: as no operations can be "carried on, I muſt at leaſt ſubſiſt at the expence of "the enemy." Therefore inſtead of laying waſte the country, of foraging in it after the French faſhion, of conſuming in ſix weeks and without profit to the ſtate, a produce which might nouriſh an eaſtern army for the ſpace of ſix months; inſtead of leaving by the care of thoſe in office, in the midſt of abundance, the commodities for contracts, and for the eſtabliſhment of magazines; inſtead of ſuffering the army to ſubſiſt on the produce of France in grain; inſtead of furniſhing, pay with the riches of the kingdom, he had kept his troops in good diſcipline, profited by the reſources of the country, or tranſported behind the Wezer, contractors, ſtore-keepers, or other uſeleſs ſervants. The army in this caſe would have ſubſiſted on the produce of the country, and it would ſtill have been able to form great magazines in its rear. Contributions extended to Magdeburg, in Brandeburg, and to the gates of Berlin, would

would have brought into the military cheſt ſufficient to ſuffice for the pay of the troops. A French army in this caſe would, for the firſt time, have been ſeen without expence to the ſtate, and ſubſiſting on the fruit of its conqueſts. As for myſelf, I do not think it poſſible that a circumſtance more meritorious could have happened, more glorious in the eyes of thoſe who knew in what true glory conſiſted, than the concluſion of ſuch a campaign, when Marſhal Richelieu could have exclaimed: "I have not taken Magdeburg, becauſe higher powers were unwilling I ſhould lay ſiege to it. I have not defeated the enemy, becauſe they were not oppoſed to me; but I have ſubſiſted the army of the King at their expence; and for the ſpace of ſix months it has been of no charge to the ſtate."

What I have ſaid concerning our reſidence in the country of Halberſtadt, might have tranſpired ſince the army of the King was in the electorate of Hanover, and might have continued ſo while it was there. The King of Pruſſia has ſhown us the example in Saxony; and the enemy's country which we occupied, was three times greater than Saxony; it was the Duchy of Hanovre and Brunſwick, Heſſe, the principality of Halberſtadt, Eaſt Friezland, the county of Mark, Gueldre, &c. But we are utterly ignorant of the art of forcing war to be ſubſervient to its own ſupport. Should a general riſe up who had the talent, would he be permitted to put the ſame in execution? It is the cuſtom in France, that the views of the miniſter and the general ſhould croſs each other; this contrariety even exiſts between the different branches of adminiſtration; and through theſe unfortunate contradictions, all the abuſes eſcape, augment, and grow inveterate.

What is the conſequence when a French army ſets its foot on an enemy's ground? At that inſtant, and on the ſteps of that army, another arrives of dependants in office, clerks, overſeers, all of them men who are ſeeking after their fortune. Under pretence of

ſpreading

ſpreading order and preciſion on all ſides, inventions, complications and confuſion take place. Projects are formed, regulations ordered, nothing is executed, the brain of the country adminiſtrators is turned. If there be contributions levied, they are diſſipated through the channels they emanate. Some private perſons accumulate private and ſcandalous fortunes. The expences of the King are not diminiſhed. The army is empoveriſhed, inſtead of being enriched: the country wears a face of devaſtation and miſery, it ſhuts up our gold, ſhowers curſes on our heads, ſees us depart and deſpiſes us without dreading our power. But to return to the ſurvey of our adminiſtration of ſubſiſtences. During the winter of 1757 to 1758, the army took up its quarters between the Wezer and the Aller. At laſt it was reſolved on, ſubſiſting at the expence of the country. An impoſt is decided upon for the delivery of grain to the Bailwics between the two rivers: two hundred ſacks were raiſed at Hannover, Brunſwick, &c. Reaſon would have prompted a general to ſay who had the government of proviſions, or a conductor who had made his combinations relative to the poſition of the army: "Let us conſume this grain, for it is "impoſſible the army can winter in this quarter. If "the enemy move, the firſt effort which they make "will force us to repaſs the Wezer." This event was not difficult to forſee; it was perceived by the whole army. But inſtead of this, the army continues to ſubſiſt on the country behind it. Though it is choaked with ſubſiſtences on the Wezer, purchaſes are made on the Maze and the Rhine. The enemy breaks into the quarters: the magazines are burnt and abandoned: the army retreats without looking behind it: it traverſes fruitful countries that are not exhauſted: it traverſes them in diviſions and in cantoonments, a movement very favourable to ſubſiſt troops on the produce of a country, and notwithſtanding it is the company of ſubſiſtence which continues to ſupply them; and for which purpoſe it expeditiouſly tranſports grain

to

to the mouth of the army, from the Wezel and the borders of the Rhine.

I may be accuſed of exaggerating this deſcription; but I have fifty thouſand of my countrymen who are my witneſſes, the unfortunate remains of a hundred thouſand men who compoſed eight months before a flouriſhing army. I have for vouchers two hundred millions of livres, which that fatal campaign coſt the nation. I have ſeen, (and I will not forget that ſcene, becauſe it will compleat the picture which ſhould be made of our want of skill in drawing reſources from a country,) all the pontoons of the army, and twenty-four pieces of large cannon abandoned at Hamelin. I ſaw twenty four other pieces of 24 pounders, left at Lippſtadt: owing to the ſcarcity of horſes to tranſport them. The general's quarters had time to remain fixt for ſeveral days, in each of thoſe towns; and the country, of which I ſpeak, abounds ſo in horſes, that a brigadier of huzzars might have muſtered five hundred in four and twenty hours.

It is aſtoniſhing what advantage a good military proviſion eſtabliſhment might draw from the reſources of a country. I ſpeak of an inhabited and fruitful country like Flanders, and the greateſt part of Germany. In a country of the kind, a well conſtituted army, that is to ſay, one that is not too numerous, temperate, patient, and accuſtomed to ſubſiſt on any thing without murmuring; an army that excels in diſcipline, and which conſequently would not cauſe the inhabitants to fly, or bury their effects, would find great eaſe in ſubſiſting itſelf: it could advance itſelf in it, traverſe it, reſide in it, without baggage and eſtabliſhments. For certainly in ſuch a country, the inhabitants do not live from day to day: they have even when their weekly labours are finiſhed, advances of ſubſiſtence for ſome weeks.

The abilities of a director of ſubſiſtence, would conſiſt in knowing how in extraordinary occaſions, to take advantage of his reſources, to make bread for the army in any place, collect proviſions every where, in ſhort,

to find the means of advancing and ſubſiſting an army in a country where the enemy aſtoniſhed, does not conceive it poſſible for it to remain or to ſupport itſelf, and where the enemy fettered by its accuſtomary methods, does not dare to hazard itſelf without eſtabliſhments.

I am not ſingular or inconſiſtant in my opinions: I ſhould not ſay to an army. "Do not have any "equipage of ſubſiſtence, magazines, articles for con- "veyance or tranſport, ſupport yourſelf always on "the country; if it be neceſſary, advance into the "deſarts of the Ukraine, providence will ſupport "you." I think I have already ſaid, that an army ſhould have an equipage of ſubſiſtence, but the ſmalleſt poſſible, proportioned to its force, to the nature of the country in which it ſhould act, and to the means that is required for its ordinary operations. If it moves from a river, or a frontier, it ſhould have on that baſe, magazines and depoſits, well diſpoſed in a relative manner to the ſafety and plan of its operations. It is my opinion, that if it be in an enemy's country, its magazines ſhould be formed at its expence, and by its providential ſupplies, and that as much as poſſible the country ſhould be chargeable with the proviſionary ſupply. Reſponſible alſo for preſervation, tranſporting from one ſpot to another, that by this means no expences can be made for damages, contingencies, perſons in office, or verbal procedures.

It is my opinion, that either in a friendly or inimical country, magazines ſhould be made of thoſe materials, which conſtitute the ordinary proviſions of the inhabitants, becauſe in this caſe they will be procured at a cheaper rate, and in greater abundance; conſequently if the inhabitants live upon rye, troops ſhould likewiſe ſubſiſt upon it, and they ſhould not enforce any other proviſion, becauſe a regulation from the War-Office has determined, 80 years back, the kind and form of the loaf to be diſtributed to the ſoldier, ſo that only one kind and form ſhould be delivered. It is my opinion, that while operations are ſimple, eaſy, not far diſtant

from

from the eſtabliſhments that are formed, that the bread ſhould be made and delivered according to the accuſtomed regulation; that the directorſhip ſhould fulfil its office with all poſſible order and exactneſs. I likewiſe conceive, that the means of tranſport, which can be procured in the country, ſhould be employed for the details of this proviſionary ſupply; ſo that the equipages of proviſions may be ſo much eaſed, decayleſs, be nearer to the army, and ready to ſerve it efficaciouſly in an extraordinary operation. Should the movements be multiplied, follow rapidly each other, and it be neceſſary to execute a bold operation of forced marches; the directorſhip ſhould in this caſe force its reſources, it ſhould know how to deviate from its methods of routine and preciſion. Suppoſe the enemy takes an unexpected poſition, and where the general will not, nor can attack it; he is ſure of making it quit its poſt or of taking it in reverſe, by marching on its flank. According to our preſent routine, it is neceſſary, for this charge of direction for the general to form freſh eſtabliſhments and freſh lines of communication. Fifteen days are ſuppoſed to be neceſſary for the formation of theſe freſh eſtabliſhments: they ſay materials muſt be provided, ovens conſtructed, &c. This is preciſely the ſituation in which I would not be commanded if poſſible by the proviſions, this is the exigence in which the directorſhip ſhould re-double its induſtry, that the army might ſupport itſelf on the reſources of a country; endure hardſhips, change its proviſions, and if compelled to it, faſt without murmuring. The movement of the army in this circumſtance, is the principal object: all other combinations are only acceſſary and ſhould be ſubordinate to it. The enemy ſhould behold the army in motion, when it believes it to be fettered by calculations of ſubſiſtence; this new kind of war muſt aſtoniſh it, not ſuffer it to take breath any where, and diſcover at its expence, this inimitable truth, that there is ſcarce any tenable poſition before a well conſtituted, temperate, patient and manœuvring army. The critical moment tranſpired,

the movement of the army having compleated its object, then the plans of ſubſiſtence will once more return to their accuſtomary order and preciſion. Then the troops ſhould be eſteemed and rewarded for the efforts they have made, and the hardſhips they have undergone. It is by this well conducted alternative of douceurs and fatigue, that diſguſt, indolence, indiſcipline, and ſickneſs are eradicated out of them: it is by this, that they are made in any preſſing occaſion, to accompliſh things beyond human power. In ſhort, if I be in an enemy's country, and the country fruitful, I ſhould ſuſpend the expenditure of the directorſhip during the time it can furniſh ſubſiſtence: the army ſhould live at its expence. For a ſtronger reaſon I ſhould ſuſpend the ſame, if the army entered winter quarters: the country ſhould be obliged to make the deliveries, eſtabliſh magazines, provide commodities; for the rations of which they ſhould be reſponſible. There, I could wiſh that troops ſhould be recompenſed for the fatigue of the campaign: that they might live with the inhabitants, that they might have their pay accumulating. A regulation of their exigencies ſhould be made on a reaſonable footing, and in the nature of the commodity which the country conſumes. At the ſame time, as I procure this reward to troops, I ſhould eſtabliſh the moſt rigorous diſcipline, to puniſh the moſt trifling diſorders. During this interval of reſt, the ammunition waggons can be repleniſhed, and freſh ſupplied with draught; and the directorſhip meditates plans with ſecrecy for the following campaign.

This will lead me to the following important political truth, which is not ſufficiently underſtood by our government: a kingdom ſo conſtituted and powerful as France, ſhould ſeldom have great alliances, and never ſmall ones; it ſhould eſpecially avoid having them in the country, or in the environs of the country, which is made the ſeat of war. It was a ſtate maxim among the Romans: their allies were a kind of vaſſals, they contributed to the expences

expences of the war: when on its territory, they nouriſhed the army. The politicks of our contrivances and our ſecret ſubſidies, are for a great people confined and ruinous: for military operations they are particularly fatal: they are embarraſſing for generals, and very troubleſome to armies. France, in reſpect to that ſplendor and weight, which a plan of reform unfortunately not to be expected, might carry her to, ſhould in the eyes of Europe, of which ſhe is the centre, ſupport herſelf by her own conſequence: with a frank, unlimited and bold manner, peculiar to great empires, ſhe ſhould ſay to her neighbours. "I am not deſirous "of extending my territories, I ſhall endeavour to "avoid making enemies, and I ſeek no alliances.

Here I have only ſcattered ſome general obſervations on the neceſſity of giving a new face to our ſyſtem of ſubſiſtences.

Theſe obſervations ſhould be inveſtigated and backed with their details: they will be ſo, in my great work. I ſhall then treat of *forage*, that other branch of ſubſiſtences, ſo important to digeſt, and to improve. This ſtudy, like that of ſubſiſtence for the mouth, has its principles, and its theory: it requires practice and intelligence from thoſe who are charged with it: at all times, in peace as well as in war, in campaigns as well as in winter quarters, it ſhould be in military hands: it ſhould be compriſed in the plan of the ſchool of ſubſiſtences which I have propoſed to form. We have in this kingdom, an officer, (*) who has greatly extended

(*) M. Dubris lieutenant colonel of dragoons, and employed on the ſtaff of the army during laſt war. It was under the command and inſtructions of M. the Marſhal and M. the Count of Broglio, that this officer acquired knowledge in the details of that branch of ſubſiſtences. They found the neceſſity of making over to him the military proviſionary eſtabliſhment, which they contrived in the moſt ample manner that laid in their power. I ſay, as much as laid in their power, for it ſeems impoſſible that this can be compleatly effected in the French army. Our commanders are generally fruſtrated by miniſters. Miniſters are, for the moſt part, ſwayed by offices; and offices are natural enemies to every ſyſtem which tends to convey the adminiſtration of the army details into military hands.

knowledge in this branch. Four years back the miniſter ſent to him, and ſeemed willing to profit by his information. This good intention has hitherto remained without effect. This is the caſe with almoſt all thoſe, that originate from men, who are at the head of a great admiſtration, when they be incoherent and without relation to a general plan which demand their ſerious conſideration. Circumſtances, a moment's reflection convey the eyes of the miniſter on the abuſe; he is ſenſible of it, he wiſhes for a reform; other buſineſs withdraws his thoughts from it, his deſire wears off, and this tranſient warmth has only been a uſeleſs ſuſpiration of good.

But to finiſh this important article, it is impoſſible for ſo compleat a reform to take place, which I have propoſed in our methods of ſubſiſtence; unleſs the conſtitution of our troops and their manners be in ſome degree changed. Our troops are not militarily conſtituted. Our manners are not military. Our ſoldiers and our officers have neither temperance, patience, or ſtamina, the firſt and conſtitutive qualities for warriors. Theſe qualities are, in this age held in no eſtimation; they are impaired and made the but of ridicule by luxury, and the reigning ſpirit. We are Sybarites; and ſuch is nevertheleſs the influence of example, and faſhion over the nation, which is at once weak and powerful, flighty and capable of reflection, that if the ſovereign was deſirous to change its manners, to give it a military ſpirit, learn how to command his armies, put himſelf at the head of them, ſuppreſs luxury, ſhow the example of frugality and patience under fatigue, by his own conduct, before a few years tranſpired, the warlike virtues would become as univerſal and reſpectable as they are now neglected. Honour that virtue ſo eaſy to regenerate a nation, will it then never tempt one of theſe princes?

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CONCLUSION.

HERE finiſh my general Eſſay on Tactics, I have examined this ſcience in all its branches, and under all its relations. If there be ſome parts which I have not thoroughly digeſted, it is becauſe this eſſay is only a ſketch of a greater work. I am deſirous that application, time and criticiſm ſhould enlighten me and give greater weight to my opinions. I would wiſh to reſemble thoſe architects who entruſted with the conſtruction of a great edifice, expoſe the projection to the publick, and watch the remarks of attentive obſervers, to acquire a proper ſhare of information before the building is raiſed.

There are important objects on which I have but ſcarce delivered my doubts. Such is the enquiry into our preſent ſyſtem concerning the formation of armies, and the management of a war of campaign; and the changes which I think would be advantageouſly made in it. I have ſupported theſe doubts with a ſufficient number of details and reaſons, to put thoſe on the road, who are willing to underſtand me. In laying them down as aſſertions, I ſhould not have convinced more fully, and I ſhould have diſaffected many more than I have. For whatever relates to matters of genius and men of high rank in the army is difficult to treat of. Whatever touches on genius muſt neceſſarily carry a ſyſtematical impreſſion; and to announce, ſyſtems is already making enemies of an infinite number of perſons who condemn them without reading them. It is ſtill more dangerous to reaſon on what regards generals. Newton without any blaſphemous apprehenſion, dares to attack Deſcartes, and all Europe become Carteſians. Another Mathematician may erect a ſyſtem againſt Newton. If he diſplays no genius in it, he only runs the riſk of ſhame. But in the military profeſſion, it is ſcarce allowed that ſtudy can ripen the un-

derſtanding, and that genius can outſtrip the years of a man. To be entitled to the priviledge of arguing, upon the ſcience of generals, the perſon muſt have commanded armies: the ſubordination of age and rank is extended even to thought. From under military command and in military diſcuſſions, if I can give that name to military controverſies which have been publiſhed, this ſlavery may be prejudicial to the progreſs of the art, but it is neceſſary, and though I have myſelf endeavoured, perhaps to get free from the yoke, I ſtill do not think the reſtriction ſhould be leſs ſevere, eſpecially in an age and in a nation, where ſcraps of knowledge, caught up almoſt by every one, give almoſt to all the world the pretention of judging, and the appearance of talents.

In the courſe of this eſſay, attentive to avoid perſonalities, I have ſometimes with energy riſen up, againſt reigning abuſes. I have been adviſed to ſoften theſe paſſages; I have made the attempt; but doubtleſs, the depth of my thoughts have been allied to my expreſſions: for the words which I ſubſtituted, were inexpreſſive of my ſentiments. To argue on truths with coolneſs, which are felt with warmth, is a very neceſſary talent, but which I believe is only to be acquired by age and experience.

Military ſcience is itſelf an encyclopedia. Whether conſidered relatively to the variety of its details, to the importance of its objects, to the glory and great intereſts connected with it, it is the moſt intereſting of ſciences. May this truth, felt by men, who are deſtined to command armies, invite them to ſee the immenſity of their obligations! For the acquiſition of that knowledge which compoſes military ſcience, muſt ſtill be accounted as nothing; to be ranked with the firſt claſs of generals, this knowledge ſhould be applied with judgement; to poſſeſs a genius which cannot be acquired, a coup-dœil which practice improves, but cannot beſtow; an aſſemblage of phy-

phyſical and moral qualities, more than human muſt be re-united. Setting all this aſide, we ſhould be confounded with reſpect and aſtoniſhment, at the name of the ſmall number of generals, which poſterity has honoured with the name of great men. It ſeems, that nature only produces them here and there, in the midſt of ages, but to ſerve as epochs of the greatneſs of human underſtanding.

In general, men of letters have not this high idea of the ſcience of war. They look upon it as vague and deſtitute of poſitive principles. This unfortunate prejudice is even ſpread among many of the military. Through the neglect of having ſtudied their art, they do not ſufficiently eſteem their profeſſion. I ſhall draw from my work a great prize if I open the eyes of ſome of them. It is encouraging, when a ſcience is cultivating, to ſee it acquire eſteem and importance in the opinion of men.

ON THE

TACTIC OF M. GUIBERT,

BY

M. DE VOLTAIRE.

T'OTHER day, as I ſaw my friend Mr. Caille,
Whoſe books are, in general, not fit for ſale,
" I have got (were his words) a work that is new,
" Of much uſe to mankind—here read it—morbleu!
" Pray examine the work, it's no author's trick,
" 'Tis the ruler of fate—prenés—the TACTIC."

THE TACTIC, I cried, before I ne'er heard
The value or meaning of this learned word.

THIS word," he replied, " from Greece hither came;
" And means the Great Art, or an Art of Great Fame;
" Of men who ſeek glory, it inſpires the mind.—"
To purchaſe this TACTIC I felt much inclin'd.
Rejoic'd there to find, how my life to prolong,
To baniſh thoſe griefs that to mortals belong;
My taſtes to improve, my foibles to ſeaſon,
To make my deſires ſubſervient to reaſon;

Do

Do juſtice to others, be true to myſelf.—
Confin'd in my room to read this learned pell;
I there got by heart, with much labour and ſkill,
The art, O my friends—how our neighbour to kill.

I LEARNT that in Germany once, a good prieſt
Some brimſtone had powder'd, and ſalt-petre preſt;
With a noiſe much like thunder, a ball he could throw,
Which, if aim'd ſomewhat high, ſhould fall ſomewhat low;
That from a braſs tube how death winging his flight,
In the juſt line of a parabola's height;
And if truly pointed, would ſweep down in rows
Devoted automatons—blue-coated foes.
How that muſket, cannon, ſword, bay'net or ſhell,
All theſe are eſteem'd—precious weapons of hell!

THE Author then paints murd'ring ſoldiers by night
Who, unſeen, purſue their dread actions with ſlight;
And arm'd moſt diſcreetly, with ſwords in their hands,
Cut centinels throats ſurprized on their ſtands;
Then mounting the works on a ſudden alarm,
The citizen ſleeping, unconſcious of harm;
And wielding deſtruction with weapons and flames,
They murder the huſbands and raviſh their dames;
Harmleſs infants they butcher, and panting for breath
They revel and triumph, ſurrounded with death.
When morning appears, their God they petition,
Returning him thanks for their happy condition;
In Latin aloud crying God's their ſupport,
And that his great wiſdom procur'd them much ſport;
How that they could neither rob, plunder or kill,
Unleſs their exploits were approv'd by his will.

SURPRIZ'D

SURPRIZ'D, O my friends, at a ſcience ſo boaſted,
As I was much hurt, I thought Caille ſhould be roaſted--
I threw him his book, and in warmth thus exclaim'd,
" Old Satan of this would be ſurely aſham'd;
" To the Chevalier Tott thy TACTIC preſent.—
" With Sabaoth he, Turks to battle has ſent.
" With plenty of guns he the Dardenelles ſpreads,
" And with infidel hands ſmites off Chriſtian heads.
" Go, Bookſeller, go—this Romanzof tender
" To thoſe bloody conq'rors of Azof and Bender.
" But firſt, I do charge you, beſtow it on Fred'ric,
" And be well aſſured more he knows of the TACTIC:
" To him greater ſkill did the devil beſtow,
" When he dubb'd him maſter in each murd'ring blow;
" More ſkill'd in this art than Guſtave or Eugene.—
" But away—it is falſe—mankind has ne'er been
" Made a compound ſo ſtrange by God's mighty hand,
" T'inſult his creator with impious command.
" To trample on nature with pride uncontroul'd,—
" Should man with ten fingers defenceleſs, yet bold,
" Be ſporting with life, and oppoſe Nature's law,
" When fate it's ſmall limits ſo ſcanty does draw?
" The gout ſore diſtracting, and concreted ſlime,
" Which forms in the bladder a hard ſtone in time;
" Each malady direful, which human kind racks,
" And added to theſe—hundred curſes in quacks,
" Are torments ſufficient our earth to perplex—
" Muſt man ſtill the ART OF WAR to them annex?

" IN my heart I contemn all heroes from Cyrus,
" To that brilliant King who train'd up a Lentulus.
" Let them boaſt, let them ſwell o'er proweſs of evil,
" Far from them I'll fly, and wiſh them at the devil."

THESE

THESE words I expreſs'd—while attentive there ſtood
A youth, who had curiouſly mark'd my odd mood.
On his ſhoulders two epaulets brilliantly ſhone,
The marks of his rank not profeſſion alone.
His manner was ſteady, ſerene ſeem'd his eye,
There talents, not anger, I ſoon could deſcry.
In ſhort! 'twas the Author of this learned book,
Who anſwered me gracefully modeſt in look.
" I do clearly perceive whence comes your diſdain;
" A ſage much experienc'd, you cannot refrain
" From loving mankind.—Tho' ſevere is my ſcience,
" It's uſeful for mortals, when foes bid defiance.
" My heart feels the ſhock I repeat it with pain,
" It's of uſe when man has the blackneſs of Cain.
" The Huns boiſt'rous ruſhing, the Franks and Goths
" wild,
" Would from Tanai's banks, ne'er our lands have
" diſpoil'd.
" Nor had they advanc'd beyond Seine's fruitful ſtrand
" If chiefs ROMAN TACTICS did then underſtand.—
" Of a veteran ſoldier, I, from my birth,
" Have ſtudied to guard, not injure this earth.
" Why ſhouldſt thou repine when my ſuccour I lend?
" Thou ſhouldſt rather rejoice, that no Gothic fiend
" Your lands richly cultur'd, by induſtry made,
" Could hoſtilely ravage, or dare to invade:—
" From rav'nous wolves that leap over your fold,
" Your flocks are ſure guarded with dogs that are bold.
" Since then, worthy Sir, war, at times, may be juſt,
" Pronounce not great deeds as actions accurſt.
" Full well do I know how your Muſe has proclaim'd
" The greatneſs of Henry, and ſtil'd him the fam'd.

By

" By his claims to birth-royal, his greatneſs was known:
" The league it was guilty—his juſtice was ſhown.
" But not to count over the feats of this King,
" Can I not FONTENOY to your mem'ry bring?
" When the brave Britiſh column reſolute ſtood,
" And purchas'd their glory by ſhedding their blood.
" Thou fortunate lounger in Paris was ſeen,
" With jeſt in thy count'nance, and careleſs thy mien,
" Plung'd in laughter, as uſual, with wit waging
" faction,
" In the pit ogling Gauſſin with love and diſtraction.
" Unmoleſted, a judge on actors, thou ſate.
" But oh! what of authors would have been their
" fate?
" Indeed of all Paris, on that very day,
" If our King o'er the Calone had not made his way?
" If four-penny Cæſars withdrew from the fight,
" And forc'd not the Engliſh to loſe it by flight?
" Thou well know'ſt the man who, by glory impell'd,
" With only four cannon recover'd the field.
" Intrepid Grammont, for thy generous loſs,
" And thou youthful Craon, and thou ſage Luttaux,
" The fine bards of Paris your memories greet,
" With madrigals diſmal, infeſting the ſtreet,
" Of much the ſame tribe, who with envious grin,
" Semiramis hiſs, Meropé, Orphelin.
" Thus Apollo, full arm'd, like Mars takes the field,
" Parſons, lawyers and courtiers their weapons wield.
" Clement and Savatier from garrets diſcharge
" Paper bullets in ſhow'rs, with ſenſe warring large.

" Why

" Why may not a ſoldier his art then improve,
" And yield ſtrength to France with profeſſional love,
" Then ev'ry citizen with peace would be crown'd."
And here GUIBERT ended, with bowing profound.

STRUCK dumb with this truth I could make no reply,
And reaſon prepond'ring, ſoon whiſp'red me why;
For of human arts, warlike deeds I firſt granted,
And admired the man, who Bayards had chaunted:
Who caus'd this great art in his numbers to flow,
And made to command, what none better could know.

STILL muſt I confeſs my breaſt heavily panted,
In wiſhing this art was not ſo much wanted;
That juſtice for mortals might ſhortly prepare
The chimerical peace of th'Abbé St. Pierre.

FINIS.

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Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 02 July, 2018